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Abstract 
 
Finding an effective way of assessing the performance of a competition authority is an objective that 
recently has been widely debated by academics and practitioners. Although several methods of 
evaluation exist, the issue that still remains unsolved is how the assessment could be done 
systematically. This thesis consists of one descriptive, and four substantive chapters, the substantive 
chapters (3-6) includes one theoretical and three empirical, all centred on the assessment of 
competition law and policy enforcement. The first empirical chapter (3) studies the determinants of 
the reputation of a competition authority (used as a proxy for performance). In the theoretical chapter 
(4), a model is developed to understand how an age profile of the number of cartels detected by a 
competition authority can reflect the combined effects of increasing detection efficiency and greater 
success of deterrence over time. The second empirical chapter (5) builds on the theoretical model and 
studies the age profile of cartel cases detected across time and between different competition 
authorities. Finally, the last chapter (6) empirically examines the possible interactions between the 
different types of competition cases (mergers, cartels, abuse) in the presence of a competition 
authority which is budget constrained, and therefore must choose how to allocate its resources 
between these different areas. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Never mistake activity for achievement. 
John Wooden, 2010 
 
Performance has always been one of the key concerns of individuals, and profit as well as non-profit 
institutions. But the question commonly asked is how to assess such performance? Performance of 
individuals can normally be assessed using a metric usually tied to whether or not they performed a 
task and the amount of output they generated by doing so (key performance indicators). Performance 
of financial institutions can easily be measured by a host of financial indicators (price earnings ratio, 
Tobin q ratios, among others). But, when it comes to measuring the performance of non-profit 
institutions, more specifically competition authorities (CAs), it is not so straight forward. The mandate 
of CAs to detect (measurable) and deter (unmeasurable) anti-competitive conducts, makes it difficult 
for researchers and policy makers to come up with clear and well-defined standards to assess the 
performance of CAs.  
 
“Performance, per se, is not a factor which can be isolated in a normal organizational system and there 
is no satisfactory qualitative model of the relationship between quality and efficiency of the 
organization” (Ciobanica, 2016). As highlighted by Petru (2007), it remains a priority to identify 
principles that could design and implement an effective system of performance management which in 
turn, could lead to excellence in the field of activity in which the organization operates. Therefore, by 
assessing how well a CA is doing, it will enable the latter to identify its weaknesses, develop the 
appropriate institutional and legal framework to progress and achieve the ultimate aim of competition 
policy1 and law that is maximising consumer welfare. 
 
Although the first competition law dates back to over 100 years, it is only recently that governments 
around the world have been focusing in promoting a competitive environment to make markets work 
well. In the last two decades, there has been a drastic increase in the number of countries establishing 
competition authorities (more than 120) around the world. CAs are increasingly attempting to review 
mergers, investigate alleged monopolisations and abuses of dominance, or join in the fight against 
cartels. But, the obvious question that now arises is how successful have CAs been in the enforcement 
of competition law and policy? 
                                                          
1 Competition policy refers to government policy to prevent and reduce abuse of monopoly power, cartels and 
anti-competitive mergers. It encourages efficiency, creates a wider choice for consumers and helps reduce prices 
and improve quality (European Commission, 2016). As defined by Motta (2004), page 30, competition policy is 
‘the set of policies and laws which ensure that competition in the market place is not restricted in such a way as 
to reduce economic welfare’. 
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Although, it remains a difficult task to assess the performance of CAs, several attempts have been 
made by researchers and policymakers to come up with effective methodologies. Some of these are 
summarised in OECD (2005) and critically reviewed by Huschelrath & Leheyda (2010) and Davies & 
Ormosi (2012). The most extensive is the Competition Policy Index developed by Buccirossi et al (2009) 
and peer review.  
 
This thesis belongs to this tradition, but hopefully adds to the existing work of the academics and 
experts in competition economics and policies such as Davies & Ormosi (2010, 2014, 2015), 
Hüschelrath & Leheyda (2010) and Kovacic (2009, 2011). It provides hopefully a significant contribution 
to the existing economics literature by firstly applying the count activity with a theoretical framework. 
Under count activity methodology, performance of a CA is directly related to the level of activity; the 
more cases the CA investigates, the better the performance. But when deterrence occurs it is likely to 
have a negative impact on the number of investigations. Secondly, this thesis looks at detection and 
deterrence at the same time. Thirdly, the use of the panel dataset brings both a time series and cross 
country dimension to the literature where the time series looks into the evolution of performance over 
time and the cross-sectional study enables the assessment of performance across countries. By 
enabling the identification of the countries which are doing well and doing poorly, those doing poorly 
can learn from those doing well to improve their performance. And fourthly, in contrast with other 
studies, I contribute to the literature by looking at the three measures of activity (cartel, monopoly 
abuse and mergers) alongside each other, within a system of equations. 
 
This thesis is presented as five interrelated papers (as well as this brief introduction and a very short 
concluding chapter). One is descriptive in nature (chapter 2), three (chapters 3, 5 and 6) are empirical 
studies and the theoretical paper (chapter 4) provides the background for empirical studies carried out 
in chapter 5. Within each substantive chapter, there is a literature review which places the study into 
the context of the broader discipline.   
 
Chapter 2 is preparatory in that it introduces the data to be used in succeeding empirical papers. This 
comprises a dataset of 35 countries for a period of 9 years (2006-2014); all of which have been 
compiled from secondary sources. Data was initially gathered from competition authorities’ annual 
reports and website, and reports from international organisations, but due to inconsistencies in terms 
of reporting across the different competition authorities and to ensure consistency, I opted for the 
data reported in the Global Competition Review (GCR) annual enforcement reports. The initial data 
gathered was then used to cross check the GCR data especially where inconsistencies were identified.  
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Chapter 2 describes the basic features of the data used in the thesis to allow simple interpretation of 
the data. They provide the background information on the competition authorities found in the 
database to enable the better understanding of the findings of the chapters. The data on the number 
of competition cases and budget used in our analysis are shown. I also report and explain the anomalies 
in the data.  
 
Chapter 3 which is a joint work with Professor Bruce Lyons empirically studies the national and 
institutional framework that provides the foundation for a good performance of a CA. We argue that 
a widely known ‘star rating’ measure of reputation to be highly correlated with genuine performance. 
This rating is available annually from 2006-2014 for 35 competition authorities across 32 countries. An 
econometric model is developed to explain the reputation of competition authorities to highlight 
features of a successful institutional design. We find significant roles for national governance culture, 
‘economies of scale’, common law legal systems and (endogeneous) budget in positively influencing 
reputation.  
 
In Chapter 4, jointly with Professor Stephen Davies and Dr. Franco Marriuzzo, we assess the success of 
a CA in detection and deterrence of cartelised behaviour. A theoretical model of a CA that administers 
a deterrence based competition policy is developed. This model is then used to look into the behaviour 
of competition authorities and to unravel the functional form of the age profile for the number of 
cartels convicted over time which can be interpreted in terms of both its efficiency in detection and 
success in deterrence. It is found that the age profile of a CA’s convicted cartels depends on the 
magnitude of the detection efficiency of the CA and the deterrence effects of competition law and 
policy. While an increase in detection efficiency is likely to cause a CA to increase its effort in initiating 
investigations, and detecting cartels, a successful deterrence policy is likely to cause cartels to reduce 
their prices and/or break, hence reducing the possibility of being detected by the CA. Detection and 
deterrence thus have opposite effects on the age profile of cartels convicted of a CA. The number of 
cartels convicted will increase if the effects of the detection efficiency outweighs that of deterrence, 
and will decrease if the effects of deterrence is stronger than the detection efficiency. This 
consequently results to an expected inverted U-shape of the age profile of convicted cartels. 
 
Chapter 5 empirically tests the theory put forward in Chapter 4 by studying the age profile of cartel 
cases convicted. Using the dataset, the random effects maximum likelihood estimations and the age 
period cohort analysis, the performance of CAs is assessed by looking at both detection and deterrence 
over age profiling of cartels cases. The results reveal that age of the cartel law does have an impact on 
the number of cartels convicted over time – the number first tends to increase rapidly, before slowing 
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down and then flattening off over the life of the CA. This result is interpreted as evidence of increasing 
deterrence as a consequence of the increased efficiency of detection. Thus, initially and potentially for 
many years, the CA is observed to successfully convict more cartels as a consequence of its growing 
experience. However, this greater efficiency also increasingly deters cartels from forming. Eventually, 
the latter outweighs the former, and we observe a downturn in cartel cases convicted. It is important 
to stress that this interpretation indicates that competition authorities are successful in deterring 
cartels, even though the number of cases eventually declines and flattens. Further empirical findings 
show that (i) previous budget allocated is important in determining the number of cartels convicted 
by a competition authority, (ii) leniency does influence the number of convicted cartels, (iii) number 
of mergers notifications positively influences the CA’s convicted cartels, (iv) countries with a common 
law prosecute less cartels than those with civil law, (v) institutional design does not matter and, (vi) 
fines and imprisonment do deter cartelised behaviour. 
 
Chapter 6 goes beyond cartels, and empirically looks into the interaction that may exist between 
cartels, monopoly abuses and mergers given an allocated budget and the CA’s allocation decision. I 
apply a two stage least square estimation and use an instrumental variable econometric methodology 
to address the endogeneity problems that may arise in budget allocation. The instruments obtained 
are then used to correct the endogeneity in budget variable. It consequently enables the better 
understanding of the behaviour and the strategies by CAs and firms. Budget is found to play a very 
important role in determining the level of activity of CAs. Only budget allocation to cartels seems to 
have a contemporaneous impact on in-depth merger investigations; allocation decisions appear to 
take more time before impacting on cartels and monopoly abuse cases. Interestingly, a causal 
relationship is also identified to exist between merger investigations and convicted cartels cases. 
Moreover, a degree of substitutability is also observed between cartels and monopoly abuse cases.  
 
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by summarising its main findings. The possible extensions of the 
chapters are also discussed. 
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Chapter 2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the basic features of the data used in the making of this 
thesis, so as to allow simple interpretation of the data. It provides the background on the competition 
authorities and the data to better understand the findings of the chapters.  
 
2.1 Data collection 
 
Data has mostly been collected from the Global Competition Review (GCR) annual reviews, World Bank 
Indicator Catalogue, American Bar Association Book on Competition Law and Policy, Common Law 
Jurisdictions by Tetley (2000), The Design of Competition Law Institutions by E. Fox and M.J. Trebilcock 
and competition authorities’ websites to fill the gaps2. A small amount of interpolation has been made 
for missing years. 
 
Given the structural change when Brazil Competition Authority, Brazil Secretariat of Economic Law 
(SDE) and Brazil Secretariat for Economic Monitoring (SEAE) integrated to Brazil CADE in 2012, the data 
set caters for Brazil SDE as a missing value for year 2012. GCR did not report information for Slovenia 
for 2012, 2013 and 2014 which has also been treated as a missing value in our analysis. In the case of 
the UK, given that there were two institutions -- the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) and the Competition 
Commission (CCUK) -- that were engaged in the enforcement of competition law and policy before 
2014, only data pertaining to the OFT has been included. Since the CCUK was engaged in conducting 
in-depth mergers referred by the OFT, inclusion of mergers of the CCUK would double count the 
merger data.  
 
2.2 Sample data 
 
A sample dataset of 37 competition authorities from 35 jurisdictions (including EU) over a period of 9 
years, from year 2006 to 2014, has been used across this thesis. The countries included are based on 
the availability of data. Our dataset includes competition authorities from every continent, although 
more than half of them are from Europe as shown in Table 2.1. Some jurisdictions have multiple 
agencies and in the next section I explain how I dealt with such in this thesis. For example, the 
Competition Commission of UK (CCUK) is excluded because all of the mergers it investigated were first 
investigated in phase 1 by the OFT. So to include them would lead to the double counting of merger 
                                                          
2 The idea initially was to collect data from the CA’s annual reports and website, but due to inconsistencies and 
accuracy in reporting of the figures across the CA, we choose to use the GCR annual reports. 
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cases. Moreover, it also creates a good transition to the establishment of the CMA from the fusion of 
the CCK and OFT. However, the sample slightly varies across the chapters based on specific 
requirement.  
Table 2.1: List of jurisdictions 
Asia Israel, Japan, Korea, Pakistan 
Europe 
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, EU, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom 
(OFT) 3 
North America Canada, Mexico, United States (FTC and DOJ) 
South America Brazil, Chile 
Africa South Africa 
Oceania Australia, New Zealand 
 
2.3 Compilation of data 
 
There are a few countries which have several bodies enforcing competition law and policy. I next 
explain how these issues have been tackled in the analysis throughout this thesis. 
 
Belgium 
Prior to 3rd April 2013, the Competition Authority of Belgium comprised of the Competition Tribunal, 
the College of Competition Prosecutors, the Directorate-General for Competition, and the Registry. 
The Competition Tribunal was the main decision-making body and its decisions had the force of res 
judicata (final decision). The Competition Tribunal made the final decision as to the finding of an 
infringement on the basis of an investigation carried out by the College of Competition Prosecutors.   
 
The College of Competition Prosecutors was responsible for receiving complaints and requests for 
interim measures concerning practices that restrict competition. If it decided that a complaint or 
request was inadmissible or groundless, it had the power to close the file by reasoned decision. When 
an investigation was completed, the College of Competition Prosecutors drafted a Statement of 
Objections (SO) and submitted it to the Competition Tribunal. The drafting of the SO played a crucial 
role because the decision making power of the Competition Tribunal was restricted in scope to the 
anticompetitive practices listed in the SO. The Directorate-General for Competition detected and 
examined anticompetitive practices (e.g., abuse of dominance, cartels, merger concentrations) under 
                                                          
3 The Competition Commission of UK is excluded in the database as the CCUK made in-depth (phase II) merger 
investigations following recommendations by the OFT. Hence, including CCUK’s merger data would be double 
counting.  
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the authority of the College of Competition Prosecutors, which designated officials of the Directorate-
General to participate in inspections carried out by officials of the European Commission. The 
Directorate-General of Competition thus helped the Competition Prosecutors perform its functions 
and carry out its investigations.    
 
Then, in 2013, the new Belgian Competition Act (the Act) established an independent Competition 
Authority with a simplified structure and introduced significant procedural changes in competition 
proceedings. The new Competition Authority became an autonomous legal entity, managed by a board 
of directors consisting of the president of the Competition Authority, the Prosecutor General, the Chief 
Economist and the General Legal Counsel. Although the Authority is fully integrated in one 
autonomous institution, there is still a division between the decision-making body, the Competition 
College, and the service in charge of the investigation, which is composed of the Prosecutor General 
and his staff of prosecutors. The new Competition College replaced the Competition Council, the 
former decision-making body, and is composed of the President of the Authority and two assessors. 
We therefore used data from the competition council up to 2013. 
 
Brazil 
Brazil had three bodies that formed the Brazilian Competition Policy system, namely (i) the SDE which 
concentrated on anticompetitive agreements and abuse of dominance (ii) the SEAE which 
concentrated on merger analysis and (iii) CADE which complemented investigations conducted by SDE 
and SEAE in either conduct or merger cases, until 2011. For the purpose of the analysis and to prevent 
duplication of data, data from SDE and SEAE only was used. As from year 2012, SEAE data was used, 
following the amendment to the competition law in terms of (i) a restructuring of the antitrust 
authorities4; (ii) new merger control review rules and criteria; and (iii) a new definition of 
anticompetitive behaviours and the penalties imposed for violation. 
 
European Union (EU) 
We also include the European competition commission (EC) in our database. The EC basically pursues 
trans-EU cases. When violation of competition rules happens within just one country, the national CA 
would normally handle the case. But if the anti-competitive effects are also felt in many countries 
across the EU and beyond, then the EU commission handles these cases. The Commission has the 
power not only to investigate but also to take binding decisions and impose substantial fines. The 
                                                          
4 SDE merged with CADE to form a single body which has been nicknamed “Super CADE”. CADE is formed by the 
Administrative Economic Defence Tribunal, the General-Superintendence and the Department of Economic 
Studies. SEAE will continue to exist along with "Super CADE", although the former will play a "competition 
advocacy" role (MONDAQ, 2012). 
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Commission enforces the EU competition rules together with the NCAs of the EU countries. All EU 
countries have these authorities with the power to enforce EU competition law, with essentially the 
same powers as the European Commission. These authorities and the European Commission exchange 
information on implementing EU competition rules through the European Competition Network (ECN). 
This network makes it easier to identify which authority should be dealing with particular issues, and 
which others could provide assistance. The network helps to ensure effective and consistent 
application of EU competition rules. Through the ECN, the competition authorities inform each other 
of proposed decisions and take on board comments from other competition authorities. In this way, 
they can pool their experience and identify best practices (European Union, 2014). 
 
United Kingdom (UK) 
For the UK, the competition data for the Office of Fair Trading which was established by the Fair Trading 
ACT 1973 and enforced both consumer protection and competition law until 2013 was reported. 
Following the provisions under the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 and with the 
establishment of the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)5 on 1 April 2014, data from the CMA 
was used for the UK for year 2014. Data from the Competition Commission of the UK (CCUK)6 was not 
included in the database as the CCUK would make in-depth (phase II) merger investigations following 
recommendations by the OFT. Hence, including CCUK’s merger data would be double counting.  
 
United States (US) 
For the US, data from both the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice 
Antitrust Division (DoJ) was included in our database, as they complement one another. This is because 
the FTC caters for the elimination and prevention of anticompetitive business practices, such as 
coercive monopoly and anti-competitive mergers and the DoJ has exclusive authority for criminal 
enforcement at the federal level, and it shares civil enforcement authority with the FTC. “Over the 
years, the agencies have developed expertise in particular industries or markets. For example, the FTC 
devotes most of its resources to certain segments of the economy, including those where consumer 
spending is high: health care, pharmaceuticals, professional services, food, energy, and certain high-
tech industries like computer technology and Internet services. Before opening an investigation, the 
agencies consult with one another to avoid duplicating efforts” (Federal Trade Commission, 2016). In 
chapter 3, separate data from FTC and DOJ was used. In Chapter 5, since it deals with detection and 
                                                          
5 The CMA combined many functions of the OFT and the UK Competition Commission. 
6 The CCUK was responsible for investigating mergers, markets and other enquiries related to regulated 
industries under competition law in the UK. 
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deterrence of cartels, only data from DOJ was included in our panel data and in Chapter 6, the 
combined data of both institutions was used. 
 
2.4 Legal and institutional framework 
 
In this section, an overview of the legal and institutional framework within which the competition 
authorities operate is provided. Table 2.2 describes the indicators used in Table 2.3 to show the 
different legal and institutional specificities of the different CAs. The information shown has mostly 
been collected from the world competition database of the George Washington Competition Law 
Center (GWCLC), Competition Laws Outside the US, Volume 1 by S. Harris (Harris,2001), the CA’s 
website and Annual Reports (AR), and Annual competition reports from OECD.  
 
In addition to the Table 2.3, we find that the decisions of all the CAs are subject to judicial review and 
have a leniency program. 
Table 2.2: Description of indicators 
Indicator Details 
 
Source 
First C Law 
Year CA adopted first competition law-regulating anti-
competitive law 
OECD, CA’s web 
site and AR 
Plaw Year CA adopted principal law- modern competition law7 
Harris (2001) and 
CA's website 
CA year Year the CA established 
Harris (2001) and 
CA's website 
Mandate 
CA has exclusive mandate on competition or multiple 
mandates. Multiple mandates-1, exclusive mandate-0 
GWCLC 
Judicial review 
Decisions of the CA are subject to judicial review. Yes-1, No-
0 
GWCLC 
Nbudget 
There is a provision of the national budget allocated by law 
to the CA to ensure its proper functioning. Yes-1, No-0 
GWCLC 
Financed own 
means 
The CA can be financed by its own means (notification fees, 
fines, etc.). Yes-1, No-0 
GWCLC 
Minister 
appoint heads 
A minister appoints the heads. Yes-1, No-0 
GWCLC 
Aresponsible 
Number of agencies responsible for competition 
enforcement. One agency- OA, Multiple agencies- MA 
GWCLC 
Cpunishment 
The CA has powers to seek criminal punishment. 
Yes-1, No-0 
GWCLC 
(continued) 
                                                          
7 Modern competition law which includes anti-competitive agreements, abuse of monopoly situations and 
merger controls. 
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Table 2.2: Description of indicators (Continued) 
Indicator Details 
 
Source 
CA investigate 
and prosecute 
cases 
The CA makes the decision to investigate and to prosecute 
cases. Yes-1, No-0 
GWCLC 
Single body 
There is a single body that carries out the investigation and 
the guilty findings within the CA. Yes-1, No-0 
GWCLC 
Appeal to court The CA’s decisions can be appealed to a court. Yes-1, No-0 
GWCLC 
Investigate and 
prosecute  
There are different authorities that make the decision to 
investigate and to prosecute cases. Yes-1, No-0 
GWCLC 
Separate 
entity/Tribunal 
Disputes are presented for decision to a separate 
entity/tribunal. Yes-1, No-0 
GWCLC 
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Table 2.3: Legal and institutional information on competition authorities 
Authority First  
Claw 
Plaw CA 
year 
Mandate Nbudget  Financed 
own 
means  
Minister 
appoint 
heads 
Aresponsible Cpunish CA 
investigate 
and 
prosecute 
single 
body 
appeal to 
court 
investigate 
and 
prosecute  
separate 
entity/ 
tribunal 
Australia 1890 1974 1974  0 1 0 0 Ma 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Austria 1988 1999 2002 1 1 0 1 oa 1 0 0 0 1 1 
Belgium 1960 1991 1991 1 1 0 0 oa 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Brazil  1962 1994 1994 0 1 1 0 oa 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Canada 1889 1986 1986 1 1 0 1 oa 1 0 0 0 1 1 
Chile 1980 1980 2004 0 1 0 1 Ma 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Czech Rep 1948 1991 1991 1 1 0 1 Oa 0 1 1 1 0 0 
Denmark 1937 1998 1955 1 1 0 1 Oa 0 1 0 1 0 0 
EU 1951 1962 1962 1 1  0  0  Oa  0  1 1   1  0 1 
Finland 1958 1992 1988 0 1 0 0 Oa 0 1 1 1 0 0 
France 1791 1986 1987 0 1 0 1 Ma 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Germany 1922 1958 1958 0 1 0 1 Ma 0 1 1 1 0 0 
Greece 1977 1991 1995 0 1 1 1 Oa 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Hungary 1990 1996 1996 1 1 1 1 Oa 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Ireland 1996 1991 2002 1 1   0 1 Oa  1  1  1 1   1  0 
Israel 1959 1988 1994 0 1 0 0 Oa 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Italy 1990 1990 1990 1 1 1 0 Oa 0 1 1 1 0 0 
Japan 1947 1947 1947 0 1 0 1 Oa 1 0 0 1 1 1 
Korea 1975 1980 1981 1 1 0 1 Oa 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Lithuania 1992 2002 1999 1 1 0 1 Oa 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Mexico 1993 1993 1993 0 1 0 1 Oa 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Netherlands 1958 1998 1998 1 1 0 1 Oa 0 1 0 1 0 0 
N. Zealand 1986 1986 1986 1 1 1 1 Oa 0 1 0 1 0 0 
 (continued) 
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Table 2.3: Legal and institutional information on competition authorities (continued) 
Authority First  
Claw 
Plaw CA 
Year  
Mandate Nbudget  Financed 
own 
means  
Minister 
appoint 
heads 
Aresponsible Cpunish CA 
investigate 
and 
prosecute 
single 
body 
appeal 
to 
court 
investigate 
and 
prosecute  
separate 
entity/ 
tribunal 
Norway 1920 1993 1994 0 1 0 1 Oa 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Pakistan 1970 2007 2007 1 1 1 1 Oa 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Poland 1926 1990 1990 1 1 0 1 Oa 0 1 1 1 0 0 
Portugal 2003 1993 2003 0 0 1 1 Oa 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Russia 1990 1990 1991 1 1 0 1 Oa 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Slovakia 1990 1994 1990 0 1 0 1 Oa 0 1 1 1 0 0 
South Africa 1955 1998 1998 0 1 1 1 Oa 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Spain 1963 1989 1963 0 1 1 1 Ma 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Sweden 1925 1993 1992 1 1 0 1 Oa 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Switzerland 1962 1995 1996 0 1 0 1 Oa 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
UK (OFT) 1918 1998 1973 1 1 1 1 Ma 1 1 0 0 0 0 
US (DoJ) 1887 1914 1903 1 1 0 1 Ma 1 1 0 1 0 0 
US (FTC) 1887 1914 1914 1 1 0 1 Ma 1 1 0 1 0 0 
OA- One agency, MA- Multiple agencies
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2.5 Database 
2.5.1 GCR ratings 
Since the subject of interest is the assessment of the performance of a CA, the GCR ratings (Global 
Competition Review), used in Chapter 3 as a proxy for performance for the different CA’s for period 
between 2006 and 2014 are shown in Table 2.4. It should be noted that the index ranks CAs in a scale 
of 1 to 5 (See Appendix 3.A). 
Table 2.4: GCR ratings 
Countries 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Australia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Austria 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Belgium (CC) 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Brazil (CADE) 3 3 3 3 3.5 3.5 4 4 4 
Brazil (SDE) 3 3 3 3 3 3       
Brazil (SEAE) 3 3 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5       
Canada 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Chile   2 2 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 3 
Czech Rep 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2.5 2.5 
Denmark 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3 2.5 2.5 2.5 
EU 5 5 4.5 4.5 5 5 5 5 4.5 
Finland 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3 3 3 3 3 
France 4 4 4 4 4.5 5 4 5 5 
Germany 4 4 4 4 4.5 5 5 5 5 
Greece 2 2 2 2.5 2.5 2.5 3 3 3.5 
Hungary 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Ireland 3.5 3 3 2.5 2.5 2.5 3 3 2.5 
Israel 2.5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Italy 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Lithuania    2 2 2 2 2 3 
Japan 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 4 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Korea 3.5 3.5 3.5 4 4 4 3.5 4 4.5 
Mexico 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 3 3 
(Continued) 
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Table 2.4: GCR ratings (continued) 
Countries 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Netherlands 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 4 4 4 3.5 3.5 
New Zealand 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3 
Norway 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.5 3.5 
Pakistan     2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5  
Poland 3 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 3 3 3 3 
Portugal 3.5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Russia 2 2.5 2.5 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Slovakia 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2 2       
South Africa 2.5 3 3.5 3.5 3.5 3 3 3 3 
Spain 3 3 3.5 3.5 3.5 4 4 4 4 
Sweden 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Switzerland 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
UK (CC) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4.5   
UK (OFT/CMA) 4 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4 4 4 4 
US (DoJ) 4.5 4.5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
US (FTC) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Source: GCR Annual enforcement reports 
 
2.5.2 Competition authorities output and budget data 
The time series data for number of cartel decisions (#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙), number of monopoly abuse cases closed 
(#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒), number of in-depth merger investigations (#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ), number of mergers notified to the 
CA (#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟), and the budget allocated to the CA (in million Euros) are presented in Table 2.5. These 
data have mostly been used in Chapter 5 and 6. 
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Table 2.5: Time series of CA’s investigations and budget allocated 
Country  Variables 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Australia 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 10 6 4 6 2 2 2 2 4 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 15 10 10 26 27 11 17 12 20 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 14 31 24 40 159 104 76 13 21 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 375 432 410 348 321 379 269 296 323 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 38.7 35.5 32.5 41.7 47.9 58.5 62.9 55.0 37.8 
Austria 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 2 20 0 15 41 34 73 10 33 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 22 19 15   16  10 23   33  0 23  
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 12 15 10 7 7 9 5 10 3 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 274 341 275 213 238 281 307 299 323 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 1.4 2.0 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.8 
 
Belgium 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 2 15 6 11 9 1 6 3 5 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 1 10 6 6 2 4 14 3 2 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 8 1 4 0 1 1 5 2 2 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 17 20 13 7 19 20 17 24 16 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 0.3 3.8 3.4 2.9 2.5 2.0 2.0 8.9 8.4 
Brazil 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 26 9 4 3 4 16 15 13 14 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 46 18 116 117 94 33 87 38 67 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 100 137 182 121 162 116 109 43 69 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 430 594 638 460 660 758 626 377 423 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 5.6 7.1 7.7 13.5 6.7 6.7 10.8 11.0 10.2 
Canada 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 2   8 14 4 4 8 5 5 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 18   20 11 11 14 11 5 6 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 30   17 22 7 4 31 25 31 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 259 268 228 207 216 218 204 212 250 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 24.0 22.0 21.8 28.6 28.4 31.7 30.8 26.4 29.5 
Chile 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙     3 2 2 3 2 2 6 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒     56 34 14 20 30 57 21 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ     0 6 9 18 14 15 17 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟     12 12 11 10 2 0 3 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 0.0 3.7 4.3 5.3 5.7 6.3 24.0 6.0 9.5 
Czech 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 4 11 4 10 3 5 1 1 10 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 6 3 2 3 1 1 1 0 1 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 4 2 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 61 61 57 40 45 49 53 35 45 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 3.0 5.5 1.8 5.1 5.1 8.4 9.5 9.2 8.8 
Denmark  
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 0 0 4 3 1 3 0 5 17 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 1 2 1 1 2 3 2 13 25 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 1 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 8 14 14 11 10 34 36 41 35 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 8.0 5.5 7.9 8.1 9.0 12.1 11.5 9.7 11.1 
(Continued) 
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Table 2.5: Time series of CA’s investigations and budget allocated (continued) 
Country  Variables 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
EU 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 7 8 7 6 7 4 5 4 10 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 46 133 111 54 58 48 28 49 58 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 13 15 10 5 4 8 10 10 8 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 356 402 347 259 274 309 283 277 303 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 97.0 71.7 78.2 89.4 90.8 93.5 91.5 94.5 94.4 
Finland 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 6 1 0 6 0 1 17 2 1 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 20 116 140 206 97 97 73 7 8 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 2 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 1 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 42 35 22 19 17 28 22 20 30 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 5.0 5.2 5.3 5.7 5.3 6.2 6.2 11.3 6.2 
France 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 24 21 14 11 12 8 8 5 4 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 18 15 11 7 10 9 19 21 30 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 5 3 1 2 2 2 3 2 1 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 143 140 130 137 246 255 214 214 192 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 11.4 12.8 19.4 19.4 20.4 20.0 20.2 20.6 20.7 
 
Germany 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 2 3 7 8 8 16 17 12 15 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 16 67 79 32 45 29 38 50 29 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 34 30 15 26 15 15 16 18 22 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 1821 2231 1675 1000 987 1100 1127 1091 1188 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 17.0 17.0 18.3 22.0 23.0 25.0 25.8 26.8 27.6 
Greece 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 21 6 5 11 10 5 5 5 2 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 13 23 21 7 8 18 29 36 27 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 1 1 1 4 7 4 3 6 8 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 17 32 19 89 108 47 15 19 16 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 11.0 15.0 21.5 10.9 10.9 9.8 8.9 9.1 9.5 
Hungary 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 10 10 6 14 12 5 5 15 13 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 33 32 31 15 14 6 4 5 7 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 10 7 2 4 4 5 6 5 6 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 42 44 45 36 49 23 37 31 31 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 7.0 6.0 8.0 7.7 9.3 6.2 7.5 0.0 7.6 
Ireland 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙     2 10 1 3 6 0 1 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 6   0 0 112 92 107 89 56 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 4 3 2 2 2 1 0 0 1 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 98 72 38 27 46 40 33 37 35 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 6.0 6.1 6.7 4.7 5.1 4.6 5.1 4.9 4.9 
Israel 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 6 1 3 4 3 0 4 1 6 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 3 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 2 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 57 32 28 19 21 27 15 20 18 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 219 237 181 157 149 195 135 163 149 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 4.0 4.0 3.7 4.6 4.9 4.9 8.8 10.2 12.9 
(Continued) 
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Table 2.5: Time series of CA’s investigations and budget allocated (continued) 
Country  Variables 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Italy 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 3 8 3 11 9 5 4 8 15 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 5 6 10 5 14 7 10 5 4 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 19 22 19 23 12 14 26 2 4 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 717 864 844 503 495 532 459 57 45 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 37.0 44.0 52.8 52.6 67.3 57.7 58.8 59.3 48.9 
Japan 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 6 15 17 18 18 12 19 14 12 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 0 1 3 4 1 0 0 0 1 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 2 2 0 0 6 3 5 3 6 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 1160 1261 1117 983 390 256 348 284 271 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 50.0 50.0 55.3 71.1 67.8 79.1 65.5 61.5 84.0 
Korea 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 58 44 65 35 35 45 24 33 60 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 1 55 18 14 19 27 9 10 15 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 20 3 5 62 60 52 54 25 27 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 774 857 556 425 499 543 651 585 571 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 31.1 24.0 39.2 52.6 50.3 53.4 64.4 62.2 95.2 
Lithuania 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 4 4 3 3 6 11 1 0 2 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 6 6 6 1 6 7 2 0 2 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 0 0 0 4 0 6 3 2 8 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 61 78 54 42 40 46 29 31 52 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.0 1.3 0.9 1.0 1.6 
 
Mexico 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 11 3 0 2 8 9 7 6 2 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 13 55 6 5 4 3 3 13 1 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 8 32 14 15 15 6 15 20 7 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 164 176 119 93 91 111 96 145 129 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 11.0 9.7 9.9 10.9 9.9 10.7 12.8 16.4 28.9 
Nether-
lands 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 19 7 6 17 14 10 13 6 1 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 2 5 1 2 2 2 1 1 4 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 8 5 4 4 4 6 8 2 3 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 19 21 20 5 12 10 12 85 75 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 22.0 15.8 15.8 16.3 17.6 17.6 16.5 15.4 15.5 
New 
Zealand 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 0 4 5 11 21 15 11 5 3 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 21 18 9 7 10 1 0 3 3 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 19 20 20 5 12 10 12 12 14 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 872 561 444 294 415 461 415 12 14 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 5.0 4.4 3.8 4.7 4.5 4.4 8.6 9.2 8.0 
Norway 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 12 2 6 3 0 2 0 1 0 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 76 48 36 49 50 95 45 1 16 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 10 9 3 0 5 6 13 5 4 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 872   444 294 415 461 415 395 89 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 10.0 10.1 9.0 10.5 10.9 11.1 11.6 12.5 11.0 
(continued) 
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Table 2.5: Time series of CA’s investigations and budget allocated (continued) 
Country  Variables 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Pakistan 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙         3 6 3 2   
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒         10 3 8 10   
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ         1 3 1 0   
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 310 310 197 144 222 205 194 54   
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 0.0 
Poland 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 32 9 12 16 10 14 8 15 13 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 171 112 84 89 76 73 73 64 48 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 310 310 197 144 222 205 194 206 195 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 310 310 197 144 222 205 194 206 195 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 7.0 7.9 6.7 11.8 12.7 13.2 13.0 13.0 4.8 
Portugal 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 3 7 3 2 1 2 2 1 0 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 0 6 23 9 10 5 4 3 8 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 3 1 4 1 0 3 2 2 2 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 44 72 71 36 37 28 22 40 43 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 7.5 7.6 8.4 9.1 8.6 7.5 6.4 7.3 8.2 
South Africa 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 1 7 10 9 7 9 13 30 26 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 5 50 106 58 80 99 52 74 79 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 98 24 25 31 31 38 37 33 30 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 399 425 451 228 217 288 321 335 358 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 5.0 11.0 11.5 13.6 16.2 17.6 19.5 14.3 22.0 
Spain 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 16 7 6 44 61 57 47 54 9 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 16 9 10 23 40 35 36 61 74 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 9 7 3 2 3 1 3 4 2 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 132 115 89 43 57 63 36 59 82 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 10.0 10.0 12.0 13.4 13.5 12.6 12.8 52.7 59.0 
 
Sweden 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 0 29 32 18 3 12 21 17 14 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 52 33 20 14 18 5 8 1 8 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 1 0 3 2 1 4 3 3 2 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 29 45 40 26 34 30 28 48 67 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 10.0 9.2 11.6 13.5 14.5 14.8 16.1 14.8 18.9 
Switzer-land 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 5 3 4 5 2 5 5 4 4 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 3 5 4 1 1 0 0 2 2 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 3 5 3 5 1 1 0 0 1 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 135 108 129 90 83 98 91 32 30 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 4.0 4.8 4.5 8.4 7.4 8.8 10.2 9.4 9.1 
UK (OFT) 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 4 0 0 2 1 2 1 7 0 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 4 2 2 0 1 1 2 3 2 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 13 12 7 6 3 11 14 9 2 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 150 104 96 66 77 100 98 76 60 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 80.0 65.3 45.6 45.9 40.1 37.5 38.7 21.0 48.8 
(continued) 
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Table 2.5: Time series of CA’s investigations and budget allocated (continued) 
Country  Variables 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
US (DoJ) 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 33 40 54 37 60 90 67 51 45 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 3 3 4 1 2 1 0 1 0 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 17 32 22 23 28 37 37 26 26 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 1768 2201 1726 713 1166 1450 1429 1326 1635 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 107.0 94.5 118.0 127.4 109.7 125.0 122.8 114.0 139.4 
US (FTC) 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙                   
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 2 1 2 5 14 25 13 19 19 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 28 31 28 15 20 24 20 25 28 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 1746 2108 1656 684 1128 1414 1400 1286 1618 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 64.0 60.6 75.8 84.9 92.1 103.4 103.9 93.0 129.5 
Source: GCR Annual Enforcement Reports 
 
2.5.3 Explaining the data 
The following notes identify and account for any apparent anomalies or gaps in the GCR data. 
 
GCR started to report information for Chile, Lithuania and Pakistan only from 2008, 2009 and 2010 
respectively. In 2014, data for Pakistan was not reported. For Austria, information on the number of 
monopoly abuse cases that were closed was not available in the GCR reports, we have exceptionally 
used number of monopoly abuse cases opened to capture information on monopoly abuse data. 
Where data was not available in GCR, data from annual reports of the CAs or OECD reports were used. 
 
In 2010, a drastic increase in the number of in-depth merger reviewed from 40 to 159 in Australia was 
observed. It should however be noted that in Australia, the depth of a merger review is determined 
on a case-by-case basis and they do not use a structured tiered-based merger review system.  
 
Further to switching to a pre-merger system in 2013 in Brazil, a fall in the number of mergers notified 
was seen. It was then followed by the trimming down of the proportion of mergers that went to in-
depth review by CADE. In 2012, the CA of Chile, the Fiscalia Nacional Economica (FNE) also introduced 
a new set of guidelines aimed at fast-tracking merger approvals through courts by encouraging 
companies to discuss possible mitigation measures ahead of hearings. In-depth mergers reviewed 
were greater than the number of notified mergers; this was explained by fact that the FNE has a 
voluntary pre-merger notification and also can initiate in-depth investigations of mergers that are not 
originally notified by the companies. 
  
While Canada adopted more aggressive cartel provisions in 2010, the CA of the Czech Republic 
experienced a general drop in its output. The drop might have been due to the fall in staff level as well 
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as the possible detraction from competition matters with the CA’s mandated duty of monitoring the 
relationship between the country’s supermarkets and their suppliers.  
 
In 2013, Denmark amended its competition law with the introduction of prison sentences for convicted 
cartelists and the multiplication of the maximum fines available by 10. However, the great increase in 
its number of cartel decisions in 2014 was mostly due to a bid-rigging case in the construction industry 
where 11 decisions were issued. 
 
Both Greece and Finland came up with a new Competition Act in 2011. The Greek Antitrust Act came 
into force to remove the discrepancies between the Greek and European competition law; introducing 
a system for prioritising cases and strengthening the criminal sanctions for cartelists. The few mergers 
in Greece were mainly due to the economic crisis. Finland completed the merger of the country’s 
competition and consumer regulators in 2013. The Finnish CA made use of the provisions on 
prioritisation contained in the Competition Act to close cases of minor importance in order to enable 
the authority to better focus its efforts on the most important cases within three years, which might 
have explained the sudden drop in the monopoly abuse cases.  
 
In Hungary, the merger control guidelines were updated with the introduction of a shorter merger 
review process and a formal pre-notification system in 2011. The new rules enable merging companies 
to approach the authority before their transactions are officially notified – a practice that was already 
in place unofficially, but not formalised. The change in management at the end of 2010 and the 
consequence of the handover period may have been the reason for the fall in output.  
 
In 2010, the CA of Ireland experienced various issues such as changes in leadership, where four of the 
agency's five members had either retired or resigned within a few months of each other, as well as a 
big fall in its budget allocated. The agency only had enough resources to staff 46 of a possible 59 
positions. These issues might have contributed to the fall in the output of the CA. 
 
The fall in the merger notifications in Italy and Japan in 2012 and 2011 respectively was mostly due to 
the revision of their merger thresholds and regulatory law. Norway later followed in early 2014 by 
reviewing its merger notification threshold, significantly increasing it from €6 million to €120 million, 
which consequently caused a fall in the number of mergers notified. The fall in real budget also 
contributed to the fall in output of its CA. Moreover, Korea and Italy both experienced a change in 
leadership for the chairman position in 2009 and 2011 respectively. 
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Interestingly, Japan revised its competition law in 2010 giving the Japan Federal Trade Commission 
stronger powers. They introduced fines for exclusionary types of private monopolisation, increased 
fines by 50% for anti-competitive conduct and increased the maximum prison sentences from 3 to 5 
years. These changes might have had an impact on the number of competition cases investigated. 
Furthermore, the fall in the number of mergers notified might have been the result of the introduction 
of a pre-merger notification system and revised its notification threshold (switched from asset-based 
thresholds to Japanese turnover based thresholds).  
 
The CA of Lithuania adopted the strategy of closing complex cases in the telecoms and other regulated 
sectors in 2012, which were left open by his predecessor (too weak to guarantee the likelihood of a 
positive outcome). This might have caused the fall of its output. 
  
In 2006, Mexico was mostly engaged in a battle against oligopolies where 25% of its staff worked on 
dominance or regulated industries matters. Although the CA’s emphasis on abuse of dominance cases 
continued at a slower rate in 2008, the fall in the number of files closed was explained by fewer cases 
that were launched.  
 
From 2013 onwards, Netherlands has been experiencing changes in the trend of its CA’s output. One 
reason might have been due to the change in the CA’s structure with the creation of the new Authority 
for Consumers and Markets, the result of combining the National Competition Authority (NMa) with 
the consumer protection authority and telecoms regulator. 
 
The surprisingly zero monopoly abuse cases from the CA of New Zealand in 2012 was explained by the 
fact that it did not undertake any enforcement actions in 2011, further to the loss of the market power 
case against incumbent telecoms company. The latter indicated it did not intend to investigate or 
enforce misuse of market power rules, other than in exceptional circumstances, until the law is 
amended.  
 
Both Poland and Portugal came under new leadership in 2008. Unlike, Portugal, in Poland all notified 
mergers undergo an in-depth review. Poland also amended its law in 2014 with the introduction of 
voluntary cartel settlements, expanded range of remedies on offer, and personal liability for managers 
involved in price fixing, which might have explained the fall in its competition cases. However, the 
slowing down of Portugal's processed mergers competition authority was mostly due to the economic 
slowdown.  
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South Africa continued to prioritise cartel enforcement, and reported significant successes in its 
leniency programme in 2009. Moreover, the high number of mergers reviewed is explained by the 
mandatory pre-merger notification scheme in 2008.  
 
The fluctuations in the data for Spain can mainly be explained by the structural changes of the CA, with 
the combination of the Spain Competition Tribunal and Competition Service in 2007 and in 2013 where 
the National Competition Commission merged with six sector regulators, creating the National 
Commission of Markets and Competition (CNMC).  
 
In 2009, the fall in the number of mergers filed in Switzerland reflected global economic trends rather 
than the commission's merger review capabilities. Moreover, in 2011, the abuse of dominance work 
was slightly slower in Sweden mainly because the authority focused its attention on a case it began in 
2004 against telecoms company TeliaSonera8. 
 
There seemed to have been an overall fall in the number of merger notified in the period 2008-2010 
across the different countries, which is mostly explained by the global effect of the economic crisis. 
We also observed the comparatively large amount of merger notifications in Austria compared to the 
other countries found in our database given its country’s population. One of the reasons might be due 
to the low merger filling threshold in Austria9 compared to the merger threshold in Italy10, Japan11 or 
the UK where merger notification is not compulsory.  
 
Moreover, when comparing with the US, Germany and other European countries, it is observed that 
Korea had investigated a greater number of cartels and monopoly abuse cases. South Africa also had 
been investigating a greater number of monopoly abuse cases in comparison with other developed 
                                                          
8 It resulted in a €16 million fine from Stockholm City Court in December – the largest abuse of dominance fine 
ever levied in Sweden. 
9 The threshold for notifying mergers are (i) worldwide turnover of all undertakings concerned exceeds EUR 
300 million, (ii) combined domestic turnover of all undertakings concerned exceeds EUR 300 million and (iii) the 
individual worldwide turnover of at least two of the undertakings concerned exceeds EUR 5 million (see 
Thomson Reuters (2016)) 
10 The thresholds for merger notification in Italy are (i) the combined aggregate Italian turnover of all 
undertakings concerned exceeds EUR 492 million in the year preceding the notification and (ii) the aggregate 
Italian turnover of the target undertaking exceeds EUR 49 million in the year preceding the notification (See 
Thomson Reuters (2016)).  
11 The thresholds for merger notification in Japan are (i) The aggregate domestic turnover of all corporations 
within the combined business group of the acquiring corporation must exceed JPY 20 billion, and the aggregate 
domestic turnover of the target corporation and its subsidiaries must exceed JPY 5 billion to meet the filing 
requirement and (ii) The acquisition must result in the combined business group of the acquiring corporation 
newly holding more than 20% or 50% of the total voting rights of all shareholdings of the target (so an acquisition 
that increases a shareholding from 19% to21% is subject to a filing, while an acquisition that increases a 
shareholding from 21% to 49% does not require one). A minority ownership of over 20% may be caught 
regardless of whether or not the acquirer takes control of the target company (See Thomson Reuters (2012)). 
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countries over the years. For example, in 2014, it closed the highest number of monopoly abuse cases 
(79) compared to the US (20), Germany (29) and EU (58). The UK on the other hand surprisingly is 
among the countries which have been issuing the lowest number of cartel decisions. For example in 
2014, it issued only one cartel decision compared to Germany, 15, France, 4 or US, 45. I, however, do 
not have an exact answer to explain these differences, given that there might be different internal (e.g. 
budget, institutional design, competition law and policy) as well as external factors (e,g. governance 
issues, political crisis, social unrest among others) which may directly or indirectly have an effect on 
the CA’s output. 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
It can thus clearly be seen that different countries have different types of CAs, different legal and 
regulatory frameworks, as well as performing differently. With the aim of improving the impact of 
competition law and policy, various countries across the world have reviewed/updated their 
competition law, their merger thresholds as well as their institutional structure. Moreover, to cater for 
the individual heterogeneity of the database and consequently avoid biasness in the resulting 
estimates, a panel data analysis is chosen to be used in the chapters that follow.
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Chapter 3 What determines the reputation of a competition 
authority?*12 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Competition policy has been introduced at a remarkable pace across the world, especially in the last 
twenty years. Much has been written on the appropriate antitrust law and economics that should be 
applied when enforcing policy, and there has been a notable convergence on appropriate theoretical and 
empirical analysis of competitive effects over the period. However, there has been much less convergence 
on the design of the institutions charged with implementing this policy. There has also been very little 
research on what makes for a successful design.   
 
This is a major gap in our knowledge. Most developing countries have been introducing new agencies13 at 
the same time as new competition laws. So, which format should they adopt? For example, should it 
include an investigating agency prosecuting before a separate specialist tribunal, or before a general 
court? Or should it be an inquisitorial agency with decision making within the same institution, subject to 
light touch judicial review? Should a competition authority combine antitrust with other roles, such as 
consumer protection or ex ante regulation? These questions are important not just for developing 
countries; many long-established institutions in countries with a long antitrust tradition have recently 
redesigned their competition authorities with apparently little evidence to support the view that this will 
improve enforcement. For example, the UK merging the OFT and CC to create a single Competition and 
Markets Agency (CMA). Other recent examples include Belgium, Brazil, France, the Netherlands and Spain. 
This paper seeks to provide some evidence that takes a step towards answering some the questions and 
issues raised above.   
 
In principle, it would be desirable to assess these issues by using a direct measure of the quality of an 
agency’s processes, case selection and, especially, decisions. Unfortunately, it is not feasible to create a 
direct measure that is comparable across CAs. It is becoming accepted best practice for 
                                                          
12 *Joint paper with Professor Bruce Lyons, School of Economics and Centre for Competition Policy, University of East 
Anglia, NR4 7TJ, Norwich, United Kingdom. 
13 We use the terms ‘agency’ and ‘competition authority’ interchangeably to refer to the institutions that implement 
competition policy. 
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antitrust/competition authorities to review their decisions with a view to evaluating and improving their 
performance, as well as justifying their budgets. However, this set of methodologies does not permit 
international comparisons because so few cases are decided in multiple jurisdictions, and when they are, 
local competitive circumstances often differ substantially. Other approaches are also problematic (see 
section 3.2).   
 
Our alternative approach is to adopt a less direct measure of peer evaluation. In particular, we investigate 
the determinants of a well-known star rating of agencies which is conducted by Global Competition Review 
(GCR). This rating is based on an annual: survey of close observers of each agency (lawyers, economists, 
in-house counsel, academics and journalists); review of news stories supplemented by interviews; and 
agency statistics with self-assessment. Each agency’s rating is widely anticipated by agency heads across 
the world. A sceptic might argue that an econometric model of subjective ratings can reveal only what is 
important to those who contribute to such ratings. We believe this is too cynical. Our view, developed 
below, is that a good reputation can only be sustained if it is founded on genuinely good performance. As 
such, our statistical model reveals some of the institutional features that enhance agency performance 
and so provides the first econometric evidence on the appropriate design of an agency to support better 
antitrust enforcement.   
 
The paper is organised as follows. In section 3.2 we review the small literature on the appraisal of 
competition regimes. The theoretical relationship between reputation and performance is discussed in 
section 3.3 and section 3.4 develops our empirical model of the determinants of CA reputation. Our sample 
is discussed alongside some descriptive statistics in section 3.5. Section 3.6 sets out our econometric 
approach and how we deal with the endogeneity of budget setting. This section also includes econometric 
results on the determinants of the CA’s budget. Our main results on the determinants of agency ratings 
are presented in section 3.7 and section 3.8 provides some concluding remarks. 
 
3.2. Assessing the performance of a competition authority 
 
The measurement of performance is a prerequisite for the understanding of how a CA can be improved.  
Measurement is the first step towards appraising performance, which is a prerequisite for understanding 
how a competition authority can be improved. Some of the more established agencies have been 
attempting this for some years and international organisations such as the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), International Competition Network (ICN) and United Nations 
26 
 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) have also recently emphasised the importance of 
finding an effective method of evaluating operations and performance of competition authorities. The 
problem is how to do this systematically.    
 
A number of methodologies have been tried.14 An easy statistic to collect is a simple count of the number 
of cases tackled by an agency. Kovacic et al (2011) liken this to a count of airport departures without 
tracking landings – it conveys nothing about the quality or wider importance of decisions or long-term 
investments in methods, guidelines, staff training and retention or influence on deterrence or legislative 
reform. The number of successful appeals may appear to provide an alternative indicator of the quality of 
individual decisions but there are fundamental biases in this measure.  For example, prohibitions are more 
likely to be appealed than clearances and weak agencies do not take controversial decisions. Careful ex-
post reviews of individual cases may appear to be more useful indicators, but they are expensive to 
conduct properly and even then they are not able to generate cross-agency comparisons. Similar problems 
affect all case-centric measures of performance because such metrics are incommensurable across CAs. 
More qualitatively, international organisations such as the OECD, ICN and UNCTAD facilitate and publish 
occasional peer reviews by other regulators and individual academics, mainly as a means of support to 
newer jurisdictions, but this process does not come up with a standardised measure of current 
performance.    
 
An alternative approach is to construct an explicit set of best practice features of an ideal competition 
agency, then score each agency against these criteria. Buccirossi et al (2009) develop such an approach 
based on what they consider to be an ideal enforcement policy with a particular emphasis on the 
deterrence of anticompetitive activity. Their Competition Policy Indexes (CPIs) for 12 OECD countries are 
based on an assessment of each agency’s institutions and enforcement record.15 The institutional CPI is 
based on independence, separation of powers, quality of the law, powers during investigations, sanctions 
and damages. They supplement this by an enforcement CPI based on cases and resourcing. Although an 
interesting methodology, this approach assumes what is supposed to be a good institutional design, so it 
cannot be used to identify what works in practice. The methodology also measures only what can be 
relatively easily and objectively measured, and so may omit crucial features that help or hinder actual 
institutions. For example, independence is a key indicator in this methodology yet an agency may tick the 
                                                          
14 See OECD (2005) and critical by reviews Huschelrath & Leheyda (2010) and Davies & Ormosi (2012). 
15 In further research (Buccirossi et al, 2012), they find that this index helps to explain differences in productivity 
growth across sectors and countries. 
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box of constitutional independence but still operate in awe of the Minister; alternatively it may have to 
present its decisions to the Minister for formal approval but Ministers may have a long and stable history 
of non- interference.16  
 
A third type of methodology, which can be sensitive to the ‘softer’ nuances of institutional design, is based 
on detailed case studies of individual CAs. Fox and Trebilcock (2013) compare nine different jurisdictions 
using criteria of efficiency and fairness. We return to their classification of CAs below, but a very substantial 
research effort reveals too many important dimensions of difference for their study to draw any major 
conclusions on institutional design from their necessarily small sample of countries. A different approach 
is needed if a more comprehensive dataset is to be collected so that the underlying quality drivers can be 
identified.   
 
It is partly in response to the weakness of these approaches in answering to the questions we pose in the 
introduction that we use a measure of reputation to proxy the quality of an agency. However, a long 
established economics literature provides much more positive reasons for doing so because of the strong 
causal link between performance and reputation. We turn to this next. 
 
3.3. Performance and reputation  
 
Reputation has been widely analysed across the business-related social sciences. Management 
researchers see organisational reputation as a valuable intangible asset that contributes to organizational 
performance (Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & Sever, 2005), gives them sustainable competitive 
advantages ((Barney,1991), (Hall,1992)) which influences stakeholder’s economic choices towards the 
organization ((Benjamin & Podolny, 1999), (Dollinger et al, 1997), (Deephouse, 2000). Marketing 
academics see reputation as the perceptions and beliefs about the firm based on previous interactions 
((Campbell, 1999), (Prabhi & Steward, 2001)). Industrial organization economists define reputation as the 
consumers’ expectations and beliefs about a firm’s product quality ((Shapiro, 1982,1983), (Allen, 1984)). 
 
The game theoretic literature highlights the importance of credibility if a reputation is to be sustained 
((Kreps and Wilson, 1982), (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982)). For example, Klein and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro 
(1982, 1983) show how reputation enables a premium to be earned on high quality products, and how this 
                                                          
16 See Hanretty and Koop (2012, 2013) for an analysis of de jure and de facto independence of regulators. 
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provides the incentive to invest in quality17. Although information available to buyers is imperfect, a high 
reputation cannot be sustained in the absence of genuine underlying quality. Mailath and Samuelson 
(2013) provide a recent review of the incomplete information game theoretic literature which provides 
rigorous foundations for how reputations establish links between past behaviour and expectations of 
future behaviour. This provides a rigorous foundation for the intuition that we expect good service in the 
future when good service has been provided in the past, and we can expect fair treatment in the future 
when fairly treated in the past. These models explain how reputation signals information to uninformed 
players. Jin and Leslie (2009) provide empirical support for some direct predictions from the theory of 
reputation in the context of restaurant hygiene; for example, restaurant chains have a better hygiene 
record than independent restaurants because they have more to lose if their standards fall.   
 
The potential loss of reputation or credibility can similarly be the source of motivation for the policy maker 
to invest in high quality procedures. This investment is valuable due to the repeated interactions that 
regulators have with the private agents. The regulator benefits from a reputation for high quality case 
selection, evidence gathering and decision making. She gains direct utility from the admiration of her peers 
and there are also long term benefits of deterrence which makes her future job easier due to enhanced 
business compliance. The reputation of an agency feeds back to enable a highly reputed agency to achieve 
more than if it is held in low regard. Kovacic (2009) makes this point particularly clearly: “Perceptions of a 
competition agency’s quality directly influence judicial decisions about whether to defer to the agency’s 
positions, legislative decisions about the agency’s budget and statutory authority, the willingness of 
companies to comply with laws entrusted to the agency’s enforcement, and the agency’s ability to hire 
and retain capable staff. A competition agency that enjoys an excellent brand is also likely to inspire citizen 
confidence in government by showing that public institutions truly ‘work’.”18    
 
In the context of this chapter, we draw on the above analysis to claim that reputation is highly correlated 
with genuine quality. We also rely on a further role for reputation, this time for the rating agency. Our 
direct ratings measure is compiled by a commercial publisher which specialises in reporting on global 
                                                          
17  Another well-known and influential application of reputation theory is in monetary policy; e.g. Barro et al (1983) 
and Backus and Driffil (1985).  See also Grief (1989) for a historical view of the importance of a reputation for honest 
trade.  Other applications include Beatty (1989) on auditors, Carter et al (1990, 1998) and Fang (2005) on finance. 
18 Management researchers also see organisational reputation as a valuable intangible asset that: contributes to 
organizational performance (Rindova, et al., 2005); gives them sustainable competitive advantages ((Barney ,1991), 
(Hall, 1992)); and influences stakeholder’s economic choices towards the organization ((Benjamin & Podolny, 1999), 
(Dollinger, et al., 1997), (Deephouse, 2000)). 
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competition policy. This raises a potential issue about the incentive for the rating agency to tell the truth. 
This issue has been explored theoretically by Mathis et al (2009) in the context of credit rating agencies. 
They show that even an opportunistic rating agency, which is paid by the sellers of financial assets to rate 
its own products, has the incentive to report truthfully unless a sufficiently large fraction of its income is 
provided by such payments. In the case of GCR, it relies on the cooperation of agencies to provide it with 
raw data, but there are no payments by the agency to be rated. GCR is funded by practitioner subscriptions 
for its specialist news and information service. The annual rating exercise is only a small, though high 
profile, part of GCR’s business. Thus, it is highly unlikely that it would be willing to undermine its wider 
reputation by publishing ratings that it did not believe were appropriate based on the evidence it gathers 
from those engaging regularly with the agencies19. We conclude that GCR quality ratings are founded on 
genuine quality.20   
 
3.4. Determinants of reputation (and performance) 
 
In this section, we set out some of the features that we expect to influence the performance and so 
reputation of a competition authority. Some of these are beyond any control by a hypothetical agency 
designer (e.g. population) and others are clearer choices if only in the long term (e.g. within-agency 
decision making versus prosecuting cases before a court). Some have clear ex ante predicted signs (e.g. 
budget) while others are theoretically ambiguous (e.g. specialised competition agency versus agency also 
encompassing consumer protection and/or regulation). Before considering the specifics of institutional 
design, we consider two controls for economy- wide features that are hard to change. These follow in the 
spirit of Douglass North’s (1990) work highlighting the role of property rights and the rule of law in 
economic development.  
 
 
                                                          
19 While it could be thought that there are potential biases from involving private sector evaluations in the rating 
process (notably a potential bias to rate authorities highly that adopt the same view on behaviour and deals as the 
private sector) and observing that many checks and balances are put in place by GCR to ensure such biases are not 
reflected in final results. The GCR sends a detailed questionnaire to the competition authorities canvassing all 
aspects of enforcement. The head of each agency are also asked to submit their own assessment of their agency’s 
performance for the year. People who know the authority best: antitrust lawyers and economists, in-house counsel, 
academics, and local journalists who routinely cover the agency’s work are then asked for feedback. Those responses 
are further supplemented by interviews – conducted in person and over the phone – with leading international 
competition practitioners.  
20 Even if the reader is unconvinced of the link between performance and reputation, she may still find interest in 
knowing what institutional features result in positive practitioner perceptions of an agency. 
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Governance  
We expect that a CA will be more effective if it is embedded in an economic system with strong positive 
governance. Governance has been found to be important for other dimensions of economic performance. 
For example, Rodrik and Subramanian (2003) find that the quality of national institutions is the only 
significant determinant of international differences in income levels; e.g. economic integration has no 
additional explanatory power. Institutional quality is measured by a composite indicator that captures 
features such as the protection afforded to property rights and the strength of the rule of law. 
 
We measure the general quality of institutions in each country by the World Bank governance index. This 
is a measure based on the control of corruption, political stability, government effectiveness, voice and 
accountability, regulatory quality and rule of law indicators. This includes the process by which 
governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively 
formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that 
govern economic and social interactions among them. Our specific measure is Governance, which is the 
average of the World Bank indicators of control of corruption, political stability, government effectiveness, 
voice and accountability, regulatory quality and rule of law (see Appendices 3.B).   
 
Common law versus civil law  
Another potentially important fundamental institution is the type of legal system. Common law regimes 
give more rulemaking powers to the judiciary while civil law regimes reserve greater power to the 
legislature giving less discretion to the judiciary (Dainow, 1966/7). Posner (1973) has claimed that the 
common law system is superior largely because it can act more like a market in adapting to change.  Others 
support the legal certainty provided by a civil code. There is no a priori expectation of which is better and 
the benefits of each may be context- specific. For example, Arrunada and Andonova (2005) argue that the 
common law is good for stable, slowly evolving law in the context of a democracy with independent legally 
trained judges, while civil law is better for countries where rapid change is necessary, often after a major 
political change following a long-established autocracy supported by a corrupt judiciary.  
 
We characterise these two legal systems by a simple dichotomous variable, Common Law. We use Tetley 
(1999/2000) for our classification but fully recognise that few systems are pure common law or civil law in 
practice, so it is mainly a matter of emphasis (see Appendices 3.C). We adopt no prior on whether common 
law should be better or worse for the implementation of competition policy. Finally, we note that the 
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common law is strongly associated with Anglo-Saxon countries which may share other characteristics that 
we do not fully capture in our other variables.     
 
Agency design   
Moving down from these macro-institutional measures, we next consider the broad design of the set of 
institutions specifically responsible for evidence gathering and decision making in competition 
enforcement. We follow Fox and Trebilcock (2013) in identifying three basic institutional models which we 
represent as zero-one dummy variables: 
a. Judicial =1 if the competition agency must go to court for enforcement,   
b. Bifurcated agency =1 if the agency goes to a specialised tribunal for enforcement, and  
c. Integrated agency =1 if the first-level adjudication is made within the agency (e.g. by executives 
or a board of commissioners).   
These three classifications embrace another important institutional feature, which is the prosecutorial (or 
adversarial) versus the inquisitorial approaches. In an adversarial system, the parties to competition 
litigation produce and present evidence and arguments to an independent judge or jury, who then decide 
the case. This encourages the agency to emphasise the evidence they find on lessening competition, which 
is balanced by the incentives for the firms to provide evidence of procompetitive behaviour. In contrast, 
inquisitorial decision makers rely on an internal information gathering process and its interpretation. This 
search for the ‘truth’ is more balanced but it may not reveal as much of the relevant evidence. Froeb and 
Kobashi (2001, 2012) compare the high incentives that parties have to provide more information in an 
adversarial system but with greater selection/bias as compared with the inquisitorial system where parties 
may, however, produce less information. We have no prior that there is an ex ante superior system. The 
nature of Fox and Trebilcock’s three institutional models is that the first two are naturally prosecutorial, 
while the third is naturally inquisitorial, so we combine judicial and bifurcated agencies to identify 
prosecutorial systems. This dichotomy with the inquisitorial integrated agency is used as an alternative 
categorisation of institutional designs.   
 
A second feature of agency design is the range of activities the agency has to cover. We define a specialised 
agency as one which enforces only competition law. Other agencies cover a wider portfolio of activities, 
sometimes including consumer protection and/or economic regulation of utilities. Standard transaction 
cost arguments suggest there may be a trade-off between the higher powered incentives to get 
competition enforcement right in a specialised agency, and the advantages of operating in an agency with 
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wider scope and access to specialist knowledge. We measure the specialisation of an agency by the 
percentage of staff devoted to competition.   
 
The third feature we try to capture is institutional knowledge and experience measured by the age of 
institution, including any natural predecessor independent institution. An older competition authority may 
achieve a better performance through accumulated institutional memory and fine tuning of design. On 
the other hand, it may develop a sclerosis and be slow to adapt to new ideas. 𝑐𝑎𝑔𝑒 is measured in years 
since first operation.  
 
Economies of scale   
A competition authority in a large country may have four advantages. First, for a given (small) proportion 
of the population employed by the competition authority, there are more human resources available to 
consider each market. Second, a larger economy has room for more firms of efficient scale and has fewer 
pockets of natural monopoly which are hard to deal with effectively using the standard tools of 
competition policy. This allows large-country competition authorities to focus on activities that are both 
suitable for appropriate intervention and of international interest.21 Third, multinational firms can, in 
principle, walk away from a small market if they consider locally imposed remedies are too onerous, so a 
small competition authority faces more constraints. Fourth, a larger economy usually enjoys a greater 
range of economic activities, so the CA may see a wider variety of cases, including those which are more 
interesting and have a higher profile. Population is used to measure potential scale and the associated 
advantages of large scale.   
 
Resourcing  
We expect that the funding of a competition authority will have a major influence on its ability to do its 
job well. In particular, an agency with a larger budget is better able to recruit high quality staff, conduct 
research and complete inquiries in a timely manner. It is also likely to have greater continuity in human 
resources and is better able to perform an advocacy role with consequent advantages for deterrence. A 
poorly funded competition authority must choose between greater selectivity in pursuing cases (opening 
it up to Type 2 errors of omission), or reduced depth of economic analysis, data collection and processing 
(opening up Type 1 decision errors). We use the agency’s annual budget to measure its funding.   
 
                                                          
21 We note that this ability to invest more in cases of international interest may have an enhanced effect on 
reputation.  
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Population and wider institutional features are slow to change and, when they do, it is not due to CA 
reputation. They are, therefore, likely to be exogenous to our dependent variable. However, budget is 
unlikely to be exogenous because highly reputed agencies have a stronger voice in arguing for funding. 
Consequently, we pay particular attention to the endogeneity of budget in our econometrics.  
 
3.5. Sample and data collection 
 
GCR has published its annual assessment of the performance of a substantial number of competition 
agencies since 200622. These are mostly the larger and more established regimes. GCR’s research is based 
on information provided by the agencies, questionnaires and selected interviews to agencies, and 
feedback from antitrust lawyers, economists, in-house counsel and academics, mainly through 
questionnaires. They also draw on presentations and debate at conferences and reports in the GCR daily 
news review and briefings. The information gathered is then subjectively aggregated by an editorial panel 
to a star rating on a scale of one to five, sometimes including fractional stars. A full description of the GCR 
methodology is given in Appendices 3.A. 
 
Our sample consists of 35 competition authorities from 32 countries over a period of 9 years from 2006 to 
2014 (see Table 3.1). This is the full set of available countries with at least six years of data. 
Table 3.1: Sample jurisdictions 
Australia Finland Korea Spain 
Austria France Mexico Sweden 
Belgium (CC) Germany New Zealand Switzerland 
Brazil (CADE) Greece Norway Netherlands 
Brazil (SDE) Hungary Poland UK (CC) 
Canada Ireland Portugal UK (OFT) 
Czech Republic Israel Russia US (DoJ) 
Denmark Italy Slovakia US (FTC) 
EU (EC) Japan South Africa   
 
                                                          
22 See Global Competition Review (2013). 
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3.5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Data sources and variable definitions are given in Table 3.223. The full set of GCR ratings is reported in Table 
2.4 and Table 3.3 shows the main evolution for the highest and lowest rated agencies between 2006 and 
2012.  
Table 3.2: Definition of variables and data sources (yearly data) 
Variables Proxy Used in Analysis Data Source 
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 GCR Ordinal Star Ratings GCR Annual Reviews 
𝑙𝑛#𝑝𝑜𝑝  Natural log of population GCR Annual Reviews 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡  Natural log of budget in million euros GCR Annual Reviews 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑃𝐶 Natural log of gross national income per 
capita 
World Bank 
𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
Average estimate of control of corruption, 
political stability, government 
effectiveness, voice and accountability, 
regulatory quality and rule of law index 
World Bank 
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑤 Common law= 1 
Civil Law= 0 
Mixed Jurisdictions: Common 
Law v. Civil Law by W. Tetley24 
𝑏𝑖𝑓𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 Bifurcated Agency =1 
Judicial =0 
Integrated Agency (Base case =0) 
The Design of Competition Law 
Institutions by E. Fox and M.J. 
Trebilcock 
𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 Judicial Agency =1 
Bifurcated Agency =0 
Integrated Agency (Base case =0) 
The Design of Competition Law 
Institutions by E. Fox and M.J. 
Trebilcock 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 Prosecutorial =1: If Bifurcated =1 
                                   Judicial = 1 
The Design of Competition Law 
Institutions by E. Fox and M.J. 
Trebilcock 
𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑔𝑒 Natural log age of the CA 
Competition Laws Outside the 
US, Volume 1 by S. Harris25 and 
CA's website 
𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  % staff devoted to competition GCR Annual Review 
 
                                                          
23 A small amount of interpolation was required for missing years of some independent variables.  Brazil’s SDE and 
SEAE integrated to form CADE in 2012, so SDE is a missing value for that year. Also, GCR did not report information 
for Slovakia for 2012, 2013 and 2014. 
24 See Tetley (1999-2000). 
25 See Harris (2001). 
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The EC and the US FTC have maintained their Elite performance throughout the 9 years while there has 
been a big improvement to the reputation of France, Germany and US (DOJ). There has been more 
turbulence in the lowest rankings. The main movers were Brazil, France, Germany, Greece, Japan, Korea, 
Spain and Russia each of which moved up by 1*. Denmark and Ireland experienced the greatest fall (one 
full star) but four other fell by a half star. Overall, 12 out of 35 competition authorities had changed ratings 
during the 9-year period. 
The evolution of GCR rating for each competition authority for period 2006 to 2014 used in our analysis is 
reported in Table 2.4.  
Table 3.3: GCR * Rating in 2014 and 2006 
Elite 5*(Highest Rating) Fair 𝟐
𝟏
𝟐
*26 Movers 
2014 2006 2014 2006 UP(+1) DOWN (-
𝟏
𝟐
) 
EC EC Belgium Greece (2*) Brazil Czech 
France UK CC Czech Russia (2*) France Denmark (-1*) 
Germany US FTC Denmark Belgium Germany Finland 
US DOJ   Ireland Israel Greece (+1.5*) Ireland (-1*) 
US FTC   Lithuania Mexico Japan New Zealand 
     Slovakia Korea Portugal 
      South Africa Spain   
    Russia  
Source: GCR Annual review 
 
Table 3.4 provides pooled summary statistics for all our variables. Note that 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑤, 𝑏𝑖𝑓𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑, 
𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 and 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 are time invariant.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26 Greece and Russia were the two jurisdictions having a 2* rating in 2006. 
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Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 Overall 3.456 0.782 2.000 5.000 N =     308 
  Between  0.749 2.333 5.000 n =      35 
  Within   0.271 2.678 4.401 T =     8.8 
𝑙𝑛#𝑝𝑜𝑝 Overall 3.385 1.394 1.411 6.590 N =     312 
  Between  1.411 1.452 6.059 n =      35 
  Within   0.104 1.746 3.917 T = 8.914 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 Overall 2.633 1.116 -1.386 4.937 N =     305 
  between  1.095 0.408 4.712 n =      35 
  Within   0.360 0.267 4.112 T-bar = 8.714 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑃𝐶 Overall 10.303 0.690 8.457 11.555 N =     314 
  between  0.686 8.778 11.399 n =      35 
  Within  0.126 9.683 10.644 T = 8.971 
𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 overall 1.053 0.638 -0.740 1.910 N =     315 
  between  0.644 -0.722 1.856 n =      35 
  Within   0.063 0.786 1.332 T =       9 
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑤 overall 0.286 0.452 0.000 1.000 N =     315 
  between  0.458 0.000 1.000 n =      35 
  Within   0.000 0.286 0.286 T =       9 
𝑏𝑖𝑓𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 overall 0.171 0.377 0.000 1.000 N =     315 
  between  0.382 0.000 1.000 n =      35 
  Within   0.000 0.171 0.171 T =       9 
𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 overall 0.171 0.377 0.000 1.000 N =     315 
  between  0.382 0.000 1.000 n =      35 
  Within   0.000 0.171 0.171 T =       9 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 overall 0.343 0.475 0.000 1.000 N =     315 
  between  0.482 0.000 1.000 n =      35 
  Within   0.000 0.343 0.343 T =       9 
𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑔𝑒 overall 3.132 0.697 1.099 4.710 N =     315 
  between  0.685 1.868 4.673 n =      35 
  Within  0.166 2.363 3.662 T =       9 
𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 overall 0.650 0.293 0.000 1.000 N =     315 
  between  0.251 0.010 1.000 n =      35 
  Within   0.157 0.014 1.335 T =       9 
 
 
Table 3.5 provides simple correlations with the GCR rating.  The highest correlations are with the age of 
institution, budget and population. As we shall see, however, our regression results suggest some of these 
correlations may be misleading so we offer no further discussion at this stage.  
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Table 3.5: Linear correlation with rating 
Variables 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 0.674 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑃𝐶 0.369 
𝑙𝑛#𝑝𝑜𝑝 0.520 
𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 0.293 
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑤 0.371 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 -0.123 
𝑏𝑖𝑓𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 -0.213 
𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 0.056 
 
 
3.6. Methodology 
 
The star ratings provide a discrete ordinal dependent variable so we adopt a random effects ordered probit 
model. We use random effects because we have panel data and some of our key independent variables of 
interest (𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑤, 𝑏𝑖𝑓𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑, 𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 and 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙l) have no time series variation so we 
would not be able to identify their contribution if we used fixed effects estimation. 
 
3.6.1. Random effects ordered probit 
An ordered probit is a generalization of the probit analysis to the case of more than two naturally 
ordered outcomes. It assumes no cardinality in the number of stars awarded. The ordered probit 
is built around a latent regression in the same manner as the binomial probit model (Greene, 
2003) and is normally estimated using maximum likelihood:27:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,   𝜖𝑖 ~ 𝑁(0,1),  for 𝑖 = 1,… . . , 𝑁, where 𝑡 = 1,……… . , 𝑇 
where 𝑦∗ is the latent variable (unobserved) exact and 𝑢𝑖 is the random disturbance characterising the ith 
observation and is constant through time (i.e allows between-agency variation). 𝑦𝑖   is the observed ordinal 
variable which takes on values 0 through m according to the following scheme:   
                                                          
27 See Green (2003) and Jackman (2000). 
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𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗    𝜇𝑗−1 < 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝜇𝑗, 
Where 𝑗 = 0,… . ,𝑚 having the probabilities of each ordinal outcome as  
𝑝[𝑦𝑖 = 𝑚] =  (𝜇𝑚 − 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖) −  (𝜇𝑚−1 − 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖)  
                                                              = 1 −  (𝜇𝑚−1 − 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖)         For 𝑗 = 𝑚 (the highest category.) 
In our case, 𝑦∗is the latent index of reputation, 𝑦𝑖  is the ordinal GCR rating (2, 2.5,3, 3.5, 4, 4.5 and 5); 𝑥𝑖 
is the vector of independent variables (national, budget and institutional design characteristics), 𝛽 is the 
vector of regression coefficients and 𝑚 = 7.  
 
Our two central specifications differ only in the classification of agency design. Integrated agency (= 
inquisitorial model) is the excluded category in both cases. We call the following the ratings equations: 
 
Specification 1 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛾1𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛#𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖 +
𝛽5𝑏𝑖𝑓𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑐𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽8𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖                Equation 3.1 
Specification 2  
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿1 + 𝜇1𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑙𝑛#𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖 +
𝛿5𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛿6𝑐𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿7𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖       Equation 3.2 
In specification 2, the 𝑏𝑖𝑓𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 and 𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 variables are combined to obtain the prosecutorial 
variable.  
     
3.6.2. Endogeneity of budget 
Although budget is widely considered to be important for high quality enforcement, it is also possible that 
a high reputation helps in the political process of budget allocation. This potentially creates an 
econometric bias due to a correlation between 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 and the error term.  
 
We therefore adopt an instrumental variable approach.  We first estimate a budget equation by OLS and 
use that to create predicted values (𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡) for use in the ordered probit ratings equation. The key to 
such an estimator is to find a variable that is both an informative determinant of 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 and is valid in 
the sense that it is uncorrelated with the error term in the ratings equation. Our identifying instrument is 
𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑃𝐶. The wealthier the country, the more funding the government is able to provide to a competition 
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agency to perform its function. However, we have no reason to expect gross national income per capita 
(𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑃𝐶) to be a direct determinant of the performance of a competition agency, other than through being 
a determinant of the agency’s budget. We therefore use 𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑃𝐶 as our identifying instrument in the 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 equation alongside all the other independent variables.    
 
We also considered an alternative method, the control function methodology (see Wooldridge, 2010), to 
solve the endogeneity problem. Since the estimated budget equation residuals are significant in our 
control function estimates so it can be claimed that they correct for endogeneity.28 The results are shown 
in the Table 3.8. 
 
Given the nature of our variables, we provide the estimates under both the random and fixed effects. 
More specifically, under the random effects, we regress 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 against the explanatory variables for each 
specification so as to get the best fitted budget instrument and is given by29: 
 
Specification 1 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 = ∝1 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + ∝2 𝑙𝑛#𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 +  ∝3 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  ∝4 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑡 +
 ∝5 𝑏𝑖𝑓𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 +∝6 𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 +∝7 𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  ∝8 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖    Equation 3.3 
Specification 2 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃1𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑙𝑛#𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 +  𝜃3𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝜃4𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑡 +
𝜃4𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃5𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃6𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡+ 𝜗𝑖                                  Equation 3.4            
and under the fixed effects, we regress 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 against the explanatory variables excluding the time 
invariant ones i.e 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑙𝑎𝑤, 𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 and 𝑏𝑖𝑓𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 for specification 1 and 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 for 
specification 2. For the US, we used the budget which was separately allocated to each agencies (FTC and 
DOJ) and the GNIPC of the US for each agency. As for EU, the budget of allocated to DG com and the GNIPC 
from World Bank database were used. 
 
                                                          
28 The control function is another way of dealing with endogeneity issue in models which are linear in parameters. It 
ﬁrst estimates the model of endogenous regressors as a function of instruments, like the ‘ﬁrst stage’ of 2SLS, then 
use the residuals from this model as an additional regressor in the main model. It relies on the same kinds of 
identification conditions as IV/2SLS. The difference is that in the 2SLS, we use the predicted value of the endogeneous 
variables and under the control function approach we include residuals to control for the endogeneity of the 
dependent variable in the original equation.  
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Our estimates for the first stage 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 regressions for both random and fixed effects are reported in 
Table 3.6. The two regressions complement the two specifications for the ratings equation according to 
the inclusion of either 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 or 𝑏𝑖𝑓𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 and 𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 separately. In this chapter, we have 
not attempted to specify a full structural equation grounded in the political economy of budget setting. 
Nevertheless, the results do have some intrinsic interest.  
Table 3.6: Budget equations results 
Dependent Variable: 𝒍𝒏𝒃𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆𝒕 
Variables 
Specification 1 Specification 2 
RE FE RE FE 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑃𝐶 1.059*** 1.143*** 1.073*** 1.143*** 
 (0.168) (0.244) (0.170) (0.244)    
𝑙𝑛#𝑝𝑜𝑝 0.393*** 0.137 0.381*** 0.137    
 (0.082) (0.098) (0.085) (0.098)    
𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 -0.627** -0.047  -0.565** -0.047    
 (0.247) (0.462) (0.262) (0.462)    
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑤 0.609*  0.626*  
 (0.337)  (0.348)  
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙                  -0.606*  
                  (0.334)  
𝑏𝑖𝑓𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑  -0.834**    
 (0.389)    
𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 -0.354    
 (0.366)    
𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.296* 0.370 0.304* 0.370    
 (0.171) (0.223) (0.176) (0.223)    
𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  -0.220 -0.288 -0.223 -0.288    
 (0.334) (0.359) (0.337) (0.359)    
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 -9.717*** -10.530*** -9.909*** -10.530*** 
 (1.536) (2.298) (1.518) (2.298)    
Observations 305 305 305 305    
Number of agencies 35 35 35 35 
Number of time periods 9 9 9 9 
Wald chi2 (RE)/F test (FE) 185.61 13.12 118.41 13.12 
Prob > chi2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Within 0.254 0.273 0.257 0.273 
Between 0.707 0.276 0.681 0.276 
Overall 0.658 0.243 0.635 0.243 
 Note: Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
As expected, the coefficients on country size (𝑙𝑛#𝑝𝑜𝑝) and wealth (𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑃𝐶) are both positive and highly 
significant. Interestingly, the coefficient on 𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑃𝐶 indicates an elasticity of 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 with respect to 
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𝐺𝑁𝐼𝑃𝐶 that is not significantly different to one. This contrasts with a much lower elasticity with respect 
to 𝑙𝑛#𝑝𝑜𝑝. This may reflect the availability of economies of scale even when workload rises in a larger 
economy. 
 
We also find a significant negative effect of good governance on budget, which is consistent with a view 
that good governance is consistent with a more law-abiding business community that is also more 
cooperative with competition authorities (who therefore require less resourcing). We further find that 
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑤 countries are more generous in their funding. This may reflect the requirement for more 
detailed analysis in a less codified legal system. 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 systems, especially those with a bifurcated 
agency model, are less well funded than integrated/investigative agencies. In part, this may reflect that 
the agency does not have to fund the decision makers at the tribunal. The positive estimated coefficient 
on the age of the agency (𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑔𝑒) provides weak evidence that budget creep increases funding over the 
years, but this effect is only marginally significant. Finally, we find no budgetary effect of 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
so there is no evidence of any dilution of funding due to the aggregation of activities. 
 
3.7. Econometric results 
 
While these budget results have some intrinsic interest, our main purpose of estimating a budget equation 
is to facilitate the estimation of our ratings model. In the following section, we draw on the above results 
for our IV estimators. Table 3.7 reports results using predicted budget, 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡, which should be 
independent of the error term in the ratings equation. We also report results using the control function 
(CF) approach in the same table. We report both random effects (RE) and fixed effects (FE) estimates. 
Under fixed effects, the time invariant variables in the model cannot be estimated separately. Table 3.7 
presents our main results and Table 3.8 reports the marginal effects. Bearing in mind that the ordered 
probit is calibrated in units of ‘half a star’, the marginal effects can be understood in terms of the impact 
of a unit rise in an explanatory variable on marginal ‘half stars’. 
 
Turning to factors that are specific to CAs, we find that the most easily adjusted of our variables, 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡, 
has a highly significant positive impact on how a CA is rated. Once the endogeneity of budget is taken into 
account, we find that an 80% increase in budget results in an extra half-star rating.  This is a much greater 
impact than is suggested by the simple ordered probit that ignores the endogeneity issue. This may be 
because the political process provides an enhanced budget for inherently weaker CAs in order to (partially) 
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compensate for their deficiencies. The IV and CF estimates take account of this and provide a better 
estimate of the positive impact of an exogenous change in budget. 
 
Finally, we find much very much weaker evidence that the design features of the specific institutions of 
competition enforcement affect their reputation once the above factors have been taken into account. 
There is a consistent pattern of negative signs associated with 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 systems (and with 
𝑏𝑖𝑓𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 and 𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 systems separately), but these estimated coefficients are not statistically 
significant. Variables measuring the age of institutions (𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑔𝑒) and their 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 were never 
significant so are not included in our Table 3.7 models and results.30 We conclude that no robust evidence 
is found to claim that one type of institutional design is inherently better than another. 
                                                          
30 Results including these variables are reported in Appendices, Table 3.D.1 and Table 3.D.2. 
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Table 3.7: Set of regressions results  
Dependent Variable: rating 
Variables  
  
Specification 1  Specification 2 
No IV 
2SLS Control function 
No IV 
2SLS Control function 
RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 0.510**     1.304** 1.363*** 0.522*    1.301** 1.363*** 
  (0.259)   (0.541) (0.318) (0.238)   (0.521) (0.318) 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡  1.275** 1.290***    1.277** 1.290***   
  (0.555) (0.316)    (0.533) (0.316)   
𝑣ℎ𝑎𝑡    -1.007*  -1.055***    -0.992*                    -1.055*** 
    (0.569) (0.347)    (0.559)                    (0.347)    
𝑙𝑛#𝑝𝑜𝑝 1.394*** 1.028*** 1.356*** 1.017*** 1.248*** 1.383*** 1.030*** 1.354*** 1.022*** 1.248*** 
  (0.175) (0.311) (0.207) (0.304) (0.217) (0.162) (0.293) (0.207)  (0.288)         (0.217) 
𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 2.269*** 1.826*** 1.253* 1.873*** 1.431** 2.313*** 1.805*** 1.253** 1.848*** 1.431*** 
  (0.487) (0.564) (0.510) (0.595) (0.519) (0.439) (0.554) (0.510) (0.577)            (0.519) 
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑤 1.661*** 1.264*  1.219*  1.662*** 1.260*  1.213*  
  (0.606) (0.686)  (0.681)  (0.607) (0.704)  (0.692)  
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙                      -1.054* -0.493                 -0.459  
                      (0.560) (0.769)                 (0.752)  
𝑏𝑖𝑓𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 -1.201 -0.438  -0.376       
  (0.859) (1.122)  (1.104)       
𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 -0.909* -0.556  -0.550       
 (0.507) (0.587)  (0.597)       
                                         
cut1_cons 3.824*** 4.076*** 4.274*** 4.143*** 4.318*** 3.867*** 4.067*** 4.274*** 4.128*** 4.318*** 
 (0.748) (0.792) (0.891) (0.790) (0.886) (0.679) (0.715) (0.891) (0.709) (0.886) 
cut2_cons 5.609*** 5.917*** 6.168*** 5.987*** 6.217*** 5.651*** 5.906*** 6.168*** 5.971*** 6.217*** 
 (0.960) (0.898) (0.870) (0.919) (0.866) (0.906) (0.843) (0.870) (0.857) (0.866) 
cut3_cons 7.980*** 8.292*** 8.599*** 8.380*** 8.663*** 8.026*** 8.289*** 8.599*** 8.367*** 8.663*** 
 (1.129) (1.033) (0.910) (1.082) (0.907) (1.075) (0.980) (0.910) (1.017)           (0.907)    
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cut4_cons 10.040*** 10.411*** 10.720*** 10.531*** 10.81*** 10.08*** 10.406*** 10.720*** 10.519*** 10.809*** 
 (1.265) (1.151) (1.011) (1.200) (1.011) (1.233) (1.115) (1.011) (1.158) (1.011) 
cut5_cons 11.740*** 12.169*** 12.401*** 12.292*** 12.498*** 11.776*** 12.160*** 12.402*** 12.276*** 12.498*** 
 (1.437) (1.320) (1.092) (1.369) (1.092) (1.411) (1.292) (1.092) (1.335)         (1.092)    
cut6_cons 12.700*** 13.185*** 13.362*** 13.299** 13.453*** 12.736*** 13.171*** 13.363*** 13.280***       3.453***  
 (1.436) (1.306) (1.137) (1.353) (1.137) (1.414) (1.282) (1.137) (1.323) (1.137) 
sigma2_u_cons 0.940** 1.123* 1.196** 1.095** 1.175** 0.939** 1.136* 1.196** 1.097** 1.175** 
  (0.350) (0.438) (0.386) (0.424) (0.380) (0.351) (0.444) (0.386) (0.425) (0.380) 
Observations 305 305 305    305 305 305 305 308 305 305 
Number of 
agencies 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Number of time 
periods 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Wald chi2 114.09 133.32 112.47 133.54 115.29 113.29 131.22 112.47 134.35 115.29 
Prob > chi2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log 
pseudolikelihood -280.242 -277.7432 -279.689 -276.429 -278.517 -280.333 -277.975 -279.689 -276.521 -278.517 
Note: Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 3.8: Marginal effects 
Dependent Variable: rating 
Variables  
  
Specification 1     Specification 2   
No IV 
2SLS Control function 
No IV 
2SLS Control function 
RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 0.510**     1.304** 1.363*** 0.522*    1.301** 1.363*** 
  (0.259)   (0.541) (0.318) (0.238)   (0.521) (0.318) 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 1.275** 1.290***    1.277** 1.290***   
  (0.555) (0.316)    (0.533) (0.316)   
𝑣ℎ𝑎𝑡    -1.007*  -1.055***    -0.992*                     -1.055*** 
    (0.569) (0.347)    (0.559)                    (0.347)    
𝑙𝑛#𝑝𝑜𝑝 1.394*** 1.028*** 1.356*** 1.017*** 1.248*** 1.383*** 1.030*** 1.354*** 1.022*** 1.248*** 
  (0.175) (0.311) (0.207) (0.304) (0.217) (0.162) (0.293) (0.207)  (0.288)         (0.217) 
𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 2.269*** 1.826*** 1.253* 1.873*** 1.431** 2.313*** 1.805*** 1.253** 1.848*** 1.431*** 
  (0.487) (0.564) (0.510) (0.595) (0.519) (0.439) (0.554) (0.510) (0.577)            (0.519) 
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑤 1.661*** 1.264*  1.219*  1.662*** 1.260*  1.213*  
  (0.606) (0.686)  (0.681)  (0.607) (0.704)  (0.692)  
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙                     -1.054* -0.493  -0.459                 
                      (0.560) (0.769)                 (0.752)  
𝑏𝑖𝑓𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 -1.201 -0.438  -0.376       
  (0.859) (1.122)  (1.104)       
𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 -0.909* -0.556  -0.550       
 (0.507) (0.587)  (0.597)       
Note: Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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3.8. Conclusion 
 
We argue that it is important to measure the success of competition authorities in order to inform the 
debate on agency design and funding. In the absence of any feasible direct measures of performance, peer 
ratings are highly informative. Although our measure of reputation is necessarily subjective, we have 
argued that there is good theoretical backing for this to be highly correlated with actual performance.  In 
the absence of any other objective measures of agency quality, we believe this chapter provides some 
much needed objective guidance to countries considering reform. Many countries have recently made 
major changes to the design of their competition enforcement institutions and their range of activities 
(e.g. Belgium, Brazil, France, the Netherlands, Spain, UK). There has been very little research to guide these 
major changes. 
 
Some of our findings relate to the importance of deeply embedded institutions that are fundamental to a 
country’s legal system. These national features are almost impossible to change and, anyway, no country 
is going to switch from civil law to common law to improve its competition enforcement rating!  
Nevertheless, it is important to understand that there are important economies of scale in competition 
enforcement so small population countries find it harder to excel. We also find general good governance 
institutions to be highly influential on performance. It further appears that common law regimes have an 
advantage.   
 
Other factors are easier to change.  For example, there is a serious medium term choice to be made 
between designing a prosecutorial or an inquisitorial system. This choice was hotly debated in the run-up 
to the recent UK reforms, particularly in relation to the enforcement of antitrust (i.e. anticompetitive 
agreements and abuse of dominance). The debate was based more on opinion than fact and it was a very 
close decision to continue with an inquisitorial, integrated agency approach. Many countries have also 
considered the advantages of either specialised or encompassing institutions (e.g. competition law 
enforcement alongside consumer protection). Our findings suggest that there would be little benefit to 
making disruptive changes.  
 
Finally, a CA’s budget is normally set annually and in this sense it is the easiest feature to change.  We find 
that budget allocation has a very direct payoff in terms of improving a CA’s effectiveness/reputation. 
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Appendices 
3.A The GCR - Introduction 
Research 
Each year, GCR sends a detailed questionnaire to the competition authorities canvassing all aspects of 
enforcement. The data covers everything from the size of the authority to the average age and tenure of 
the staff, as well as the methodology for setting priorities and ensuring transparency, stability and 
procedural fairness. We also ask for information about the number of merger filings an agency has 
received and how it has handled those deals, as well as obtaining a detailed breakdown of cartel and abuse 
of dominance work. Those statistics help to paint a picture of the authority as we begin to assess the 
results of its work. We also ask the head of each agency to submit their own assessment of their agency’s 
performance in 2012. Next, we seek feedback from the people who know the authority best: antitrust 
lawyers and economists, in-house counsel, academics, and local journalists who routinely cover the 
agency’s work. Local competition counsels were asked to fill out an online survey airing their views on the 
authority’s performance in each of its enforcement duties, as well as the level of professionalism and 
independence at the agency. Those responses were supplemented by interviews – conducted in person 
and over the phone – with leading international competition practitioners.  
 
Add to that information gathered by Global Competition Review during the course of the year. We publish 
more than 1,500 news stories annually through our daily briefing. Those articles cover developments at 
competition authorities the world over, from the launch of the COMESA Competition Commission in Africa 
to the Google investigations in the US and the EU. The breadth and depth of our news coverage provides 
an unparalleled resource for determining the strengths and weaknesses of the agencies we review. 
 
Global Competition Review also conducts monthly surveys of the competition landscape in different 
jurisdictions, meeting with prominent figures in the local antitrust bar and interviewing the head of the 
national competition agency. Since the last edition of Rating Enforcement, we have visited or surveyed 
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, the United Kingdom and, in the United States, 
California, Miami, New York, and Washington, DC. 
We also attend every major competition conference, including the International Competition Network 
meeting, as well as hosting our own conferences in Europe, the USA and Asia. 
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Reading the results 
We begin our analysis by rating each authority on a scale of one to five. The results show how each 
authority compares to its international counterparts. Though no authority is perfect, we believe those that 
earned five stars are at the forefront of antitrust enforcement worldwide. Similarly, a low ranking doesn’t 
indicate that an authority is failing or ineffectual – quite the opposite. Appearing in the survey at all is an 
indication that the authority is a meaningful enforcer. 
 
But it is impossible to compare all authorities on an absolute scale. Each agency has different 
responsibilities and vastly differing resources at its disposal. The combined budgets of the two US antitrust 
agencies, for example, is more than double the combined budgets of the 20 most poorly funded 
authorities. 
 
Although the survey we give agencies is a one-size-fits-all template, we understand that the performance 
of each agency is pegged to its budget, resources and the competition culture in each country. As such, in 
our write-up of each agency, we also include a performance indicator in addition to our star ranking. If an 
agency is thought to make excellent use of its resources and has surpassed its previous accomplishments, 
this is indicated with an “up” arrow. Horizontal arrows show that an authority performed as expected, 
while a “down” arrow reflects a disappointing year. 
 
Our analysis of the quantitative data collected this year includes comparative tables, which show how the 
authorities measure up in terms of size, budget, staff retention, mergers challenged, fines imposed and 
the length of investigations. We also include information on other influential factors such as a country’s 
population or its gross national product, to place the raw data in a more useful context. All monetary 
statistics are presented in euros for comparative purposes. 
 
The remainder of the report consists of individual statistical analyses of each country’s performance in 
2012, supplemented by a commentary.  
 
Where we present staffing statistics, we are referring to the number of non-administrative, competition-
focused employees, unless otherwise stated. Also, where we break down the number of staff departures 
into those who retired and who remained in the civil service, our percentages are a proportion of the staff 
departure figures, rather than the entire organisation. 
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Furthermore, where we provide figures for dawn raids and for cartel decisions, we are referring to the 
number of separate matters, not the number of companies involved. 
 
3.B Governance index31 
 
Governance consists of the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This 
includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the 
state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. 
 
Voice and Accountability 
Voice and accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a 
free media. 
 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence  
Political stability and absence of violence measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will 
be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically motivated 
violence and terrorism. 
 
Government Effectiveness  
Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. 
 
Regulatory Quality  
Regulatory Quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 
 
Rule of law  
Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, 
as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
                                                          
31 See World Bank (2013). 
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Control of Corruption  
Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and 
private Interests. 
 
3.C Civil v/s Common Law 
 
From Dainow (1966-1967), page 424: 
a) Legislation as the basis of the civil law  
Generally, in civil law jurisdictions the main source or basis of the law is legislation, and large areas are 
codified in a systematic manner. These codes constitute a very distinctive feature of a Romanist legal 
system, or the so-called civil law. Although in the form of statutes duly enacted by the proper legislative 
procedure, these codes are quite different from ordinary statutes. A civil code is a book which contains 
the laws that regulate the relationships between individuals. Generally it contains the following topics: 
persons and the family, things and ownership, successions and donations, matrimonial property regimes, 
obligations and contracts, civil responsibility, sale, lease, and special contracts, as well as liberative 
prescription (statute of limitations) and acquisitive prescription (adverse possession).A code is not a list of 
special rules for particular situations; it is, rather, a body of general principles carefully arranged and 
closely integrated. A code achieves the highest level of generalization based upon a scientific structure of 
classification. A code purports to be comprehensive and to encompass the entire subject matter, not in 
the details but in the principles, and to provide answers for questions which may arise. 
 
b) Judicial decisions as the basis of the common law 
Looking at the law in England, the picture is a totally different one. During the formative period of English 
legal history, there was no strong central legislative body, but there were the powerful king's courts. When 
a court decided a particular case, its decision was not only the law for those parties, but had to be followed 
in future cases of the same sort, thereby becoming a part of the general or common law. Thus, the 
common law, as a body of law, consisted of all the rules that could be generalized out of judicial decisions. 
New problems brought new cases, and these enriched the rules of the common law. Actually, the common 
l aw was conceived as being all-inclusive and complete; if a rule had not already been formulated, it was 
the judge's responsibility to declare it. Thus, judicial decisions were both the source and the proof of the 
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law, pronounced in connection with actual cases. What gave stability and continuity to this system was 
the doctrine of "precedent”. Once a point had been decided, the same result had to be reached for the 
same problem; the judge was obliged to "follow" the earlier decision, the precedent. However, since courts 
are jealous of their prerogatives, the rule of precedent was applied only to the "ratio decidendi" or the 
exact point which was indispensable and necessary to reach a decision. Non-essential points were 
classified as "obiter dicta" and were not binding. If a new situation resembled a prior case but was not 
exactly the same, then two possibilities were open to the judge. If he felt that it would be the socially 
desirable result to have the same solution, he could "apply" the rule of the earlier case. However, if the 
judge felt the other way, he could "distinguish" the previous decision and leave its application limited to 
the specific fact situation which it con-trolled. In extreme situations, a court could brand an earlier case as 
erroneous and "overrule" it, thereby providing a new precedent for the point involved. 
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3.D Regression results 
Table 3.D.1: Regression results- age of competition authority and specialisation 
Variables 
  
Dependent Variable: 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 
Specification 1 Specification 2 
2SLS Control function 2SLS Control function 
RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡   1.352** 1.285***   1.351* 1.285*** 
   (0.592) (0.432)   (0.565) (0.432) 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 1.335** 1.240***   1.332** 1.240***   
 (0.602) (0.435)   (0.572) (0.435)   
𝑣ℎ𝑎𝑡   -1.052* -0.977**   -1.040 -0.977** 
   (0.553) (0.461)   (0.541) (0.461) 
𝑙𝑛#𝑝𝑜𝑝 1.029*** 1.366*** 1.023*** 1.252*** 1.031*** 1.366*** 1.029*** 1.252*** 
  (0.293) (0.217) (0.290) (0.228) (0.275) (0.217) (0.274) (0.228) 
𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 1.829*** 1.290** 1.877*** 1.482*** 1.804*** 1.290** 1.850** 1.482*** 
  (0.573) (0.535) (0.607) (0.544) (0.551) (0.535) (0.574) (0.544) 
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑤 1.268*  1.229*  1.262*   1.222 
  (0.678)  (0.675)  (0.700)   (0.687) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙     -0.490  -0.467  
      (0.728)  (0.715)  
𝑏𝑖𝑓𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 -0.426  -0.378      
  (1.098)  (1.089)      
𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 -0.568  -0.569      
  (0.567)  (0.577)      
𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.094 0.028 -0.086 0.074 -0.101 0.028 -0.090 0.074 
 (0.534) (0.419) (0.523) (0.419) (0.547) (0.419) (0.530) (0.419) 
𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 -0.059 -0.190 -0.096 -0.173 -0.051 -0.189 -0.093 -0.173 
  (0.516) (0.473) (0.493) (0.473) (0.521) (0.473) (0.494) (0.473) 
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cut1_cons 3.901*** 4.181*** 3.957*** 4.301*** 3.884*** 4.181*** 3.936*** 4.301*** 
 (1.080) (1.091) (1.065) (1.084) (1.071) (1.091) (1.050) (1.084) 
cut2_cons 5.744*** 6.074*** 5.802*** 6.198*** 5.725*** 6.074*** 5.780*** 6.198*** 
 (0.962) (1.070) (0.935) (1.066) (0.954) (1.070) (0.914) (1.066) 
cut3_cons 8.121*** 8.501*** 8.196*** 8.639*** 8.111*** 8.501*** 8.178*** 8.639*** 
 (0.976) (1.098) (0.964) (1.096) (0.964) (1.098) (0.932) (1.096) 
cut4_cons 10.245*** 10.627*** 10.350*** 10.790*** 10.233*** 10.627*** 10.340*** 10.790*** 
 (1.129) (1.174) (1.108) (1.174) (1.130) (1.174) (1.097) (1.174) 
cut5_cons 12.003*** 12.304*** 12.110*** 12.470*** 11.985*** 12.304*** 12.090*** 12.470*** 
 (1.292) (1.245) (1.279) (1.246) (1.297) (1.245) (1.272) (1.246) 
cut6_cons 13.018*** 13.262*** 13.120*** 13.420*** 12.997*** 13.262*** 13.090*** 13.420*** 
 (1.273) (1.286) (1.255) (1.286) (1.283) (1.286) (1.251) (1.286) 
_cons 1.137* 1.176** 1.106* 1.149** 1.151* 1.176** 1.108* 1.149** 
 (0.459) (0.388) (0.440) (0.380) (0.463) (1.286) (0.440) (0.380) 
Observations 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 
Number of agencies 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Number of time periods 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Wald chi2 151.64 113.99 150.91 116.54 145.86 113.43 150.5 116.54 
Prob > chi2  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log pseudolikelihood -277.702 -281.069 -276.375 -278.441 -277.932 -279.610 -276.467 -278.441 
Note: Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 3.D.2: Marginal effects results- age of institution and agency specialisation 
Variables 
 
Dependent Variable: 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈 
Specification 1 Specification 2 
2SLS Control function 2SLS Control function 
RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡   1.352** 1.285***   1.351* 1.285*** 
   (0.592) (0.432)   (0.565) (0.432) 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 1.335** 1.240***   1.332** 1.240***   
 (0.602) (0.435)   (0.572) (0.435)   
𝑣ℎ𝑎𝑡   -1.052* -0.977**   -1.040 -0.977** 
   (0.553) (0.461)   (0.541) (0.461) 
𝑙𝑛#𝑝𝑜𝑝 1.029*** 1.366*** 1.023*** 1.252*** 1.031*** 1.366*** 1.029*** 1.252*** 
  (0.293) (0.217) (0.290) (0.228) (0.275) (0.217) (0.274) (0.228) 
𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 1.829*** 1.290** 1.877*** 1.482*** 1.804*** 1.290** 1.850** 1.482*** 
  (0.573) (0.535) (0.607) (0.544) (0.551) (0.535) (0.574) (0.544) 
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑤 1.268*  1.229*  1.262*   1.222 
  (0.678)  (0.675)  (0.700)   (0.687) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙     -0.490  -0.467  
      (0.728)  (0.715)  
𝑏𝑖𝑓𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 -0.426  -0.378      
  (1.098)  (1.089)      
𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 -0.568  -0.569      
  (0.567)  (0.577)      
𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.094 0.028 -0.086 0.074 -0.101 0.028 -0.090 0.074 
 (0.534) (0.419) (0.523) (0.419) (0.547) (0.419) (0.530) (0.419) 
𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 -0.059 -0.190 -0.096 -0.173 -0.051 -0.189 -0.093 -0.173 
 (0.516) (0.473) (0.493) (0.473) (0.521) (0.473) (0.494) (0.473) 
Note: Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Chapter 4 Modelling the time path of cartel detection and 
deterrence**32 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Over recent years, competition authorities and academic researchers have become increasingly 
interested in the evaluation of competition policy. Nearly always, evaluations are based on counts of 
activities – the number of cartels or abuses detected and prohibited, and the number of anti-
competitive mergers remedied or prohibited in a period of time. However, competition policy involves 
more than just policing actual antitrust cases and violations; it also involves deterrence (Barros, 
Clougherty & Seldeslachts, 2010). As Buccirossi et al (2009) wrote “…the most effective competition 
policy regime is one in which the competition authority (CA) achieves total deterrence and, hence, 
never has to block a merger, never has to uncover a cartel or any other anticompetitive agreement, 
and never has to condemn a firm for abusing its dominant position. In an ideal regime firms do not 
dare to propose an anticompetitive merger, do not attempt to form a cartel, never enter into an 
anticompetitive agreement.”33 This raises obvious doubts about evaluation methods based solely on 
counts of cases convicted. While a CA that detects many cases might be interpreted as efficient, this 
may be the result of very weak deterrence.  Other CAs which are better at deterring may investigate 
fewer cases because fewer transgressions occur. Ideally then, an evaluation of policy should aim to 
measure success in deterrence, as well as purely counting how many cases the CA intervenes. But, of 
course, this is intensely difficult because it requires measuring how the law has impacted on intentions, 
which have not been materialised into actions.  
 
While a number of recent studies have made important contributions to understanding the role of 
deterrence in competition policy and its impact on cartels (see section 4.2), none has attempted to 
assess the success of CAs in detection and deterrence. The purpose of this chapter is to help fill this 
gap, by providing a theoretically understanding of how the age profile of the number of cartels 
convicted by a CA can be interpreted in terms of both its efficiency in detection and success in 
deterrence. A theoretical model of a competition authority that administers a deterrence based-
                                                          
32 ** Joint paper with Professor Stephen Davies and Dr. Franco Mariuzzo, School of Economics and Centre for 
Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, NR4 7TJ, Norwich, United Kingdom. 
33 But they add the footnote “There is no reason to believe that the ideal competition policy regime is the one 
that a jurisdiction should strive for. Indeed the ideal regime, even if it were feasible, would entail very high 
implementation costs, and those are probably much higher than the ones society would be rationally willing to 
bear: the ideal competition policy regime may not be the most efficient one.” 
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competition policy in the presence of uncertainty is developed- using a framework that allows risk-
neutral firms and the CA take uncertainty into account when deciding their actions. The model is then 
tailored to provide predictions about the age profile of the number of cartels convicted, whose 
empirical analysis is the core of next chapter.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 reviews the literature on cartel 
deterrence and detection. Section 4.3 develops a theoretical model of composition-based deterrence. 
Section 4.4 expands this to encompass frequency deterrence. Section 5 concludes. 
 
4.2. Literature review 
 
“Deterrence is a central theme in the theory and practice of law enforcement, and the enforcement 
of competition law is no exception” (Buccirossi et al, 2009). The aim of any competition law is to 
promote a healthy environment where market competition is maintained by forbidding and regulating 
any type of anti-competitive conduct (cartels, abuses of monopoly position and anti-competitive 
mergers). The CA has the main mission of enforcing its competition law and policy effectively, by 
detecting and deterring any anti-competitive behaviour. As a CA grows and acquires experiences, it is 
expected to become more efficient in detecting cartels, preventing repeating offenders and deterring 
individuals/firms from engaging in anti-competitive conducts over time. Cartels may be of two types: 
cartels that are easy to capture and sophisticated cartels, which require experience in order to be 
tackled. 
 
There has recently been an increasing amount of studies looking at the different aspects of cartel 
detection and deterrence effect of competition laws and policies when assessing how good a CA is in 
achieving its aims. Among the various methods employed to evaluate the performance of a CA, the 
count activity remains the most common and easiest one (Davies & Ormosi, 2012). It involves a simple 
counting of the number of cartels detected and investigated (investigation rate). This method has 
however been victim of criticism (Kovacic, 2011) and one should be cautious when interpreting the 
results of this analysis.  
 
When analysing the detection efficiency of CA, a rise in the investigation rate implies that the CA is 
very efficient in detecting cartels and a fall in detection indicates that the CA is not very efficient. On 
the other hand, from the deterrence angle, a rise in the number of cartel cases indicates that the CA 
has failed to deter them and a fall shows that the CA is successful in deterring cartels and is doing well. 
So, how can one interpret a rise in the number of cartels convicted, given that both efficiencies 
contradict each other?  
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The existing literature actually looks at both detection and deterrence efficiencies but not usually 
together, which is what we attempt to do in this study. Although, the literature surveys are still at an 
early stage, numerous attempts have recently been made to measure these efficiencies.   
 
As a CA establishes, it starts working towards detecting competition cases. The secretive nature of 
cartels makes it very difficult for CAs to detect, prove34 and consequently measure in full their 
performance. Despite the non-availability of data of cartels that go undetected, few attempts have 
nevertheless been made in estimating the probability of cartel detections. Bryant & Eckard (1991) use 
a model on statistical birth and death process to base their estimations on conspiracy durations in the 
US.35 Using the same methodology Combe et al (2008) then later use detection durations, birth and 
death processes to estimate the probability of a cartel getting caught in the EU.36 Miller (2009) uses a 
different method to show that the introduction of leniency programme in 1993 increased cartels’ 
detection rate. More recently, drawing from a capture-recapture analysis, Ormosi (2014) estimates 
time-dependent cartel discovery rates, while allowing for heterogeneity across ﬁrms37.  
 
Detection plays an essential role in the enforcement of competition law and policy as it leads to 
deterrence (Bryant & Eckard (1991) and Combe et al (2008)). A CA detecting cartels successfully will 
also have the effects of preventing cartelised behaviour from firms. The deterrence theory states that 
people do not commit crimes because they are afraid of getting caught, rather than being motivated 
by some deep moral sense. Thus, for deterrence to be successful, it is essential that the law is 
effectively enforced and that punishment is sufficiently severe so that individuals/firms are deterred 
from breaking the law. 
 
According to Buccirossi et al (2009), deterrence depends on three features of the competition law and 
policy, namely: (i) the level of the loss that firms and individuals expect to suffer if they are convicted; 
(ii) the perceived probability of wrongdoers being detected and convicted; and (iii) the perceived 
probability of being wrongly convicted. It therefore largely depends on the probability of getting 
caught and the magnitude of the punishment (Baker, 2003).  In these studies, Connor (2007) found 
that in order to ensure optimal deterrence of global cartels, total financial sanctions should be four 
times the expected global cartel profits (the overcharge). More recently, Connor & Lande (2011) 
                                                          
34 Only a fraction of them are detected (Bryant and Eckard (1991), Combe et al. (2008) and Werden, Barnett, & 
Hammond (2012)). 
35 The estimated probability of price fixing conspiracies getting caught was between 13% and 17% in a given year 
in the US between 1961 and 1988. 
36 They estimate the annual probability of cartels getting caught as between 12.9 and 13.3% in the EU. 
37 His results suggest that the European Commission’s detection rate was 15%-20% between 1967 and 2007. 
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suggest that the collective level of existing sanctions should be multiplied by a factor of at least five so 
as to protect cartel victims.  
 
Alternatively, advocacy38 and education of firms and consumers can also contribute to deterrence of 
cartelised behaviour. In their paper, Davies & Ormosi (2012) argue that the benefits of advocacy 
activities may exceed those from enforcement actions. The more people and firms will be aware of the 
competition policy and risks involved when breaching the law, the less likely they will be to engage in 
anti-competitive conduct.  
 
4.3. A model of composition deterrence 
 
4.3.1. The model 
The purpose of this chapter, then, is to model the behaviour of competition authorities and firms in 
order to unravel the functional form of how the number of cartels convicted changes over the lifetime 
of the CA. This will depend on the interaction between detection and deterrence.  
 
We distinguish between frequency-based and composition-based deterrence. Frequency-based 
deterrence refers to a case where a potential cartel is deterred from even forming, while composition-
based deterrence refers to the case where the cartel is not deterred from forming, but chooses to 
change its behaviour (typically, through reducing price) so as to avoid being caught. Initially, in this 
section, we focus on composition-based deterrence and then in section 4.4, we model two alternative 
frameworks to study frequency-based deterrence. 
 
The model that is proposed is based on a two-stage game. In stage one, the CA chooses the effort to 
put in investigating cartels– its aim is to maximise consumer welfare. Its effort then determines, the 
probability that a cartel is investigated. In stage two, the cartel firms take this uncertain probability 
into account when setting output to maximise their expected profit. We examine how deterrence 
changes over time, as the CA becomes more efficient in convicting cartels.  
 
                                                          
38 Competition advocacy refers to those activities conducted by the CA related to the promotion of a competitive 
environment for economic activities by means of non-enforcement mechanisms, mainly through its relationships 
with other governmental entities and by increasing public awareness of the benefits of competition (Advocacy 
Working Group, 2002). Advocacy is therefore closely linked to communication functions carried out by 
authorities to promote a competitive environment among government agencies, legislators and courts, as well 
as among business and consumer associations, academics and society as a whole. 
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We consider a single cartelised market. Budget is allocated by the government and is independent of 
CA’s performance. Both firms and the CA are risk-neutral agents. The CA’s objective is to maximise 
consumer welfare, which, in this context, means limiting cartel abuse.  
Throughout the chapter, we denote random variables with tilde.  
 
Demand side  
The inverse demand function for a given market is:  
𝑝 = 1 − 𝑞,                                                                    Equation 4.1 
where 𝑞 as the total industry output.  
 
The investigation probability 
The CA receives and monitors various signals from different players in the economy in the form of 
complaints from customers, rivals or other trade sources. These sources of complaint are combined in 
our model into one single signal and are assumed to increase with the price set by the cartel. The 
probability that the CA instigates an investigation also increases with the ‘effort’, 𝑔, which the CA 
chooses to expend on investigation of cartels.  
 
The conviction probability 
Once the firms are investigated, they are prosecuted and successfully convicted with probability 𝛾, 
with 0 <𝛾 ≤ 𝛾 ≤ 1. The parameter 𝛾 is treated as exogenous, with value known to the firms and to the 
CA. If convicted, the cartel is punished (via a fine or/and imprisonment), denoted by 𝑓.  
 
Thus, the expected fine faced by a cartel is given by  
𝐸(𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠) = 𝜏(𝑝)𝛾𝑓                                  Equation 4.2 
where 𝜏(𝑝) is the probability that a cartel is investigated. Firms know the probability distribution that 
a cartel is investigated, which is: 
                            𝜏(𝑝) = 𝑔𝑝, with 0 ≤ 𝑔 ≤ 1,                                     Equation 4.3 
where 𝑔 is the CA’s decision variable and captures the CA’s effort. The greater the ‘effort’ put in by the 
CA, the higher the probability that a cartel is investigated. The higher the price the higher the 
probability the CA investigates the cartels.  
 
Firms’ behaviour 
Cartelists are risk neutral and maximise their joint expected profit 𝐸[?̃?]. For expositional simplicity, 
and without loss of generality, we set the marginal cost of production to be zero. The expected profit 
function for the cartel is then given by: 
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        𝜋 ≜ 𝐸[?̃?] = 𝑝𝑞 − 𝐸(𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠)                                     Equation 4.4 
  
and substituting Equation 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 into Equation 4.4, yields the expected profits: 
𝜋 ≜ 𝐸[?̃?] = (1 − 𝑞)𝑞 − (1 − 𝑞)𝑔𝛾𝑓.                 Equation 4.5 
 
The first order condition for expected profit maximisation is 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑞
= 1 − 2𝑞 + 𝑔𝛾𝑓 = 0.                                            Equation 4.6 
And the second order derivative is 
 
𝜕2𝜋
𝜕𝑞2
= −2. 
The level of optimal output for the cartel is: 
𝑞(𝑔) =
1
2
(1 + 𝑔𝛾𝑓)                                       Equation 4.7 
Where quantity is increasing in 𝑔, as shown below: 
𝑑𝑞(𝑔)
𝑑𝑔
=
𝛾𝑓
2
> 0.                                                Equation 4.8 
Thus, if the CA increases its ‘effort’ (𝑔), the cartel will increase its output and hence lower its price.  
 
Competition authority’s problem 
In deciding how much effort to expend, it is assumed the CA aims to maximise consumer welfare, net 
of its enforcement costs. Its costs are assumed to be a strictly convex function of 𝑔, and given by 
𝑔2
2
. 
The explanation for cost convexity is that an investigation becomes increasingly costly once the 
relatively easy first steps have been completed.   
 
               𝑤(𝑞(𝑔)) ≜ 𝐸(?̃?(𝑞(𝑔)) = ∫ [𝑝(𝑞) − 𝑝(𝑔)]
𝑞(𝑔)
0
𝑑𝑞 −
𝑔2
2
                      Equation 4.9 
                                              = ∫ [(1 − 𝑞) − (1 − 𝑞(𝑔))]
𝑞(𝑔)
0
𝑑𝑞 −
𝑔2
2
.  
Substituting 𝑞(𝑔) (from Equation 4.7) in Equation 4.9 and integrating yields:  
=
1
8
((1 + 𝑔𝛾𝑓)2 − 4𝑔2). 
 
Solving for optimal 𝑔, and setting the first order condition equal to zero gives:  
 
𝑑𝑤(𝑞(𝑔))
𝑑𝑔
= −𝑔 +
𝛾𝑓(1+𝑔𝛾𝑓)
4
= 0. 
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The second order derivative for consumer welfare maximization is satisfied, as  
 
𝜕2𝑤
𝜕𝑔2
= (
𝛾2𝑓2
4
− 1)<0. 
The solution 
Summing up, the optimal effort set by the CA is: 
      𝑔∗ =
𝛾𝑓
4−𝛾2𝑓2
                                                 Equation 4.10     
Substituting Equation 4.10 into Equation 4.7, the optimal quantity (𝑞∗) produced by firms is 
     𝑞∗ =
2
4−𝛾2𝑓2
 .                                       Equation 4.11 
Finally, substituting Equations 4.10 and 4.11 into Equation 4.3, the optimal probability of detection is: 
                   𝜏∗ =
𝛾𝑓(2−𝛾2𝑓2)
(4−𝛾2𝑓2)2
                              Equation 4.12 
and it follows that the optimum probability that a cartel is convicted is  
    𝑃𝐶∗ = 𝜏∗𝛾                                                    Equation 4.13 
and substituting Equation 4.12 into Equation 4.13,  
𝑃𝐶∗ = −
𝛾2𝑓(𝛾2𝑓2−2)
(𝛾2𝑓2−4)2
                                 Equation 4.14 
 
Proposition 1: As the CA gains more experience, (i.e. 𝛾 rises), this increases both the probabilities of 
investigation and detection. This results in an unambiguous increase in the probability of conviction. 
  
Proof: Increased experience leads to an increased probability of investigation: from Equation 4.12: 
𝑑𝜏∗
𝑑𝛾
=
𝑓(𝛾4𝑓4+6𝛾2𝑓2−8)
(𝛾2𝑓2−4)3
> 0, and as both ϒ and τ increase, so must PC*: from Equation 4.13: 
∂PC∗
∂γ
=
4𝛾𝑓(3𝛾2𝑓2−4)
(𝛾2𝑓2−4)3
> 0.  
 
The intuition for this is that an increase in the efficiency of conviction is equivalent to an increase in 
the expected fine, prompting an increase in output, 
𝜕𝑞∗
𝜕𝛾
=
4𝛾𝑓2
(𝛾2𝑓2−4)2
> 0 and subsequent drop in 
prices.  This also leads to: 
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Corollary 1: Increased CA experience leads to increased output and lower price, and thus increased 
consumer welfare:  
𝑑𝑤∗
𝑑𝛾
=
𝛾𝑓2
(𝛾2𝑓2−4)2
>0. 
 
To summarise, the CA sets its investigation effort so as to maximise consumer welfare (net of CA costs). 
This determines the probability of triggering a cartel investigation (𝜏), which depending on the CA’s 
exogenous efficiency, determines the probability that the cartel is convicted. If effort is optimised, it is 
shown that an increase in the CA’s conviction efficiency (or an increase in the fine), will lead to 
increased effort, and probabilities of investigation and conviction. This results in a lower cartel price 
and increased consumer welfare.  
 
We also present an alternative way of modelling the behaviour of CAs and firms in the presence of 
detection and deterrence, in Appendices 4.C. This model differs in terms of its non-deterministic the 
demand function, the composition of the probability that a cartel is investigated and the cost function. 
It is also found that as the CA becomes more efficient in detecting and convicting cartels, the 
probability that cartels are convicted increases. This consequently causes cartels to reduce their prices 
so as not to be detected. The age profile of cartels convicted is also expected to be of an inverted U-
shape. 
 
4.3.2. The implications for the number of cartels convicted and age of CA 
In spite of its static nature this model provides straightforward predictions for how things might change 
over time, as the CA develops, and gains more experience.  
 
 In general, we would expect any CA to gather more experience over time, and in this context we can 
model this simply as increased efficiency in detection. If so, the above comparative statics with respect 
to the probability of a successful investigation,𝛾 , translate directly into the following dynamic 
predictions. With the passage of time, as the CA gains more experience, its detection efficiency 
increases. This causes it to increase its effort (as 
𝑑𝑔∗(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
> 0), and the probabilities of investigation and 
conviction will both increase. Hence, the probability that a given cartel will be convicted increases over 
the lifetime of the CA. 
 
4.3.3. Changes in the CA’s budget over time 
However, this way of introducing the time dimension might be misleading if there are other factors 
changing simultaneously over time. The most relevant such other factor is the CA’s budget: we should 
also expect the CA’s budget to impact on its efficiency probability (𝛾). A CA with a relatively generous 
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budget is more likely to have the necessary resources to train its staffs and hence exploit its greater 
potential efficiency in detecting more cartels. This suggests that inter-temporally, 𝛾 may not 
necessarily always increase at the same rate over time. More realistically, this could be reversed, or 
the rate of increase in efficiency slowed, in times of tightened CA budget constraints, and vice versa of 
course.  
 
This, although it is reasonable to assume that in general a CA may acquire increasing experience 
overtime, in the presence of limited financial resources, the rate of increase may also be sensitive to 
changes in its budget allocation. Indeed, in extreme cases of extreme budget cuts, experience may 
even decay. We will capture this possibility in the econometric estimation of the next chapter. 
 
4.4. Modelling frequency deterrence 
 
In this section, we study the second form of deterrence: frequency-based deterrence - where the fear 
of detection and punishment deters cartels from forming, or persuades them to disband where they 
already exist.  
 
4.4.1. Identical cartels 
We proceed by extending the model of section 4.3 to a multi-market economy. The probability that a 
given cartelised market is convicted is denoted by 𝑃𝐶.  
 
In the economy there are M markets, which are either cartelised or deterred from cartelising.  
Denoting the number of deterred markets by D(t), the expected number of convicted cartels (𝐸𝑁𝐶) is 
then given by: 
     𝐸𝑁𝐶(𝑡) =  𝑃𝐶(𝑡){𝑀 − 𝐷(𝑡)}.                   Equation 4.15 
 
Deterrence is assumed to be increasing in 𝑃𝐶(𝑡): the higher is the probability of conviction, the more 
cartels are deterred from forming: thus,  𝐷(𝑡) is some increasing function of 𝑃𝐶(𝑡), 
𝑑𝐷
𝑑𝑃𝐶
> 0. 
 
Special case 
For expositional simplicity, assume 
                 𝐷(𝑃𝐶(𝑡)) = 𝛽𝑃𝐶(𝑡)                                  Equation 4.16 
where 𝛽 > 0 measures the strength of the deterrence effect. 
Substituting Equation 4.16 into Equation 4.15, then  
𝐸𝑁𝐶(𝑡) =  𝑃𝐶(𝑡){𝑀 − 𝛽𝑃𝐶(𝑡)}.                    Equation 4.17 
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Proposition 2: The expected number of convicted cartels is a quadratic function of PC(t), with a 
maximum at 𝑃𝐶 =
𝑀
2𝛽
. Since P𝐶(𝑡), is continuous and strictly increasing in 𝑡 (as shown in Proposition 
1); this means that over time ENC(t) will first increase up some maximum and thereafter decrease. 
  
Proof:  
𝑑𝐸𝑁𝐶
𝑑𝑃𝐶
= 𝑀 − 2𝛽𝑃𝐶 = 0 where 𝐸𝑁𝐶 =
𝑀
2𝛽
 and 
𝜕2𝐸𝑁𝐶
𝜕𝑃𝐶2
< 0 and any higher order derivative is zero.  
 
Summary of results 
We therefore find that the final effect on the age profile of the number of cartel cases convicted by 
the CA will depend on the magnitude of detection, efficiency and deterrence: the number convicted 
cartels first increases because the effect of the detection efficiency outweighs that of deterrence, but 
after some point, this reverses and the number of convicted cartels decreases. 
 
4.4.2 Heterogeneous cartels 
An alternative way in which deterrence can be modelled is to allow for market-level heterogeneity, in 
which the firms choose whether or not to leave the cartel, and opt instead for oligopolistic 
competition. In this way, as will be seen, we make deterrence depend endogenously on PC, rather than 
merely assuming it as above. 
  
There are different ways of introducing market asymmetries; the one that we opt for here allows 
market structure to vary across different markets.39  Consider the situation where each market m has 
𝑁𝑚 ≥ 2 firms, allocated according to the probability mass function ℎ(𝑁). For simplicity, we assume 
that within each market, firms are symmetric, hence, the number of firms in the market is the only 
source of heterogeneity. Firms prefer to coordinate their behaviour if the collusive market profit is 
greater than the oligopoly market profit, otherwise they compete ‘à la Cournot’. This is the only source 
of instability we allow for, but at the end of the section we will discuss another cause of cartel 
instability. 
 
Maintaining the assumption of a unitary (linear) demand and zero marginal cost of production, a cartel 
is preferred by its members to oligopoly competition, if and only if, the cartel profit (𝜋), is larger than 
the aggregate Cournot 𝑁-poly profit. We express the oligopoly profit  in terms of total number of firms 
                                                          
39 Another possibility is to include heterogeneous demand shocks across markets. 
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(𝑁), and leave, momentarily, the cartel profit undetermined (See Appendices 4.B for proof). Hence, 
the inequality of interest is 
𝜋 ≥
𝑁
(𝑁+1)2
.                                                        Equation 4.18 
Solving for 𝑁, it is easily shown that 𝑁(𝑡) =
1−2𝜋(𝑡)
2𝜋(𝑡)
+
√1−4𝜋(𝑡)
2𝜋(𝑡)
 is the positive root of the inverse 
function of the equality form of Equation 4.18. 𝑁(𝑡) is a function of time because it depends on the 
cartel expected profit (𝜋(𝑡)) via 𝛾(𝑡). The top left panel in Figure 4.1 depicts this relationship. If the 
cartel profit is above the curve, then firms prefer a cartel for a given market structure (number of 
firms), otherwise they are deterred. This clearly shows that as the expected cartel profits fall, fewer 
cartels will form, especially those in small number markets.  
 
Moreover, one can easily show that the cartel profit is a decreasing function of the conviction 
probability (
𝜕𝜋
𝜕(𝛾)
< 0) when combining Equation 4.540, and Equations 4.10- 4.1241. This relationship is 
displayed in the top right panel of Figure 4.1, which is drawn for a fine set to 1.4.  
 
Now, remember that the market structure follows a well behaved distribution function, 𝐻(𝑁) which 
is concave and non-decreasing in 𝑁. An example of a realistic and well-behaved function we choose is 
a poisson distribution with lamda = 3 (but of course, in principle, any value of lambda, indeed any well 
behaved distribution could have been chosen). The cumulative density of the discrete Poisson 
distribution function is shown in the bottom left panel of Figure 4.1. 
 
As the cartel profit 𝜋(𝑡) is a function of the time varying conviction probability, 𝑃𝐶(𝑡),as shown in 
Equation 4.5, 𝑁(𝑡) can, in turn also be formulated as function of the probability that a cartel is 
convicted, following the equality 𝑁(𝑡) =
1−2𝜋(𝑡)
2𝜋(𝑡)
+
√1−4𝜋(𝑡)
2𝜋(𝑡)
. The monotonically strictly decreasing and 
convex relationship between market structure and cartel profit displayed in the top panel of Figure 4.1 
guarantees that a value of 𝑁(𝑡) has a corresponding value of 𝜋(𝑡). Given the linear (and negative) 
relationship between cartel profit and conviction probability 𝑁(𝑡)  has an analogous value of 
𝑃𝐶(𝑡). It follows that the density function of the market structure can itself be represented as 
a function of 𝑃𝐶(𝑡). 
 
This yields 𝐻(𝑃𝐶(𝑡)), which is the cumulative density function of cartels breakdown i.e the firms that 
stops to be cartels and start competing in the oligopolistic profit. The logic is the following. Assume 
                                                          
40 𝜋 ≜ 𝐸[?̃?] = (1 − 𝑞)𝑞 − (1 − 𝑞)𝑔𝛾𝑓. 
41 Where 𝑔∗ =
𝛾𝑓
4−𝛾2𝑓2
 , 𝑞∗ =
2
4−𝛾2𝑓2
 and 𝜏∗ =
𝛾𝑓(2−𝛾2𝑓2)
(4−𝛾2𝑓2)2
. 
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then that for an initial value of 𝑃𝐶, say 𝑃𝐶 = 0, the cartel is above the function plotted in the top left 
panel of Figure 4.1 for any market structure >1. Then follow 𝑃𝐶 to increase steadily until the cartel 
profit drops to a level that guarantees the equality 𝑁(𝑡) =
1−2𝜋(𝑡)
2𝜋(𝑡)
+
√1−4𝜋(𝑡)
2𝜋(𝑡)
. The first time the quality 
is met with is with the lowest market structure>1, say duopoly in the discrete case. This implies that 
there exists a low enough value of conviction probability that satisfies 
2=1−2𝜋𝑃𝐶(𝑡)2𝜋(𝑃𝐶𝑡)+1−4𝜋𝑃𝐶(𝑡)2𝜋𝑃𝐶(𝑡), telling us that for that level of conviction probability, 
duopolies are no longer profitable: 𝐻(2) proportion of cartels are deterred. For a sufficiently higher 
value of the conviction probability we have 3 =
1−2𝜋(𝑡)(𝑃𝐶(𝑡)
2𝜋(𝑡)
+
√1−4𝜋(𝑡)
2𝜋(𝑡)
n indicating that 
𝐻(3)proportion of cartels are deterred, and so on. The formula for the expected number of convicted 
cartels in the period (Equation 4.15) can be adjusted to accommodate to this deterrence rule: 
     𝐸𝑁𝐶(𝑡) =  𝑃𝐶(𝑡)[1 − 𝐻(𝑃𝐶(𝑡))].                              Equation 4.19 
 
We plot the lifetime dynamics of the expected number of cartels detected and convicted on the 
bottom right panel of Figure 4.1. We notice an inverse U-shape functional form, which can be explained 
as follows. There is a steady growth in the number of cartels detected at the beginning of the period 
because of increasing efficiency. It is the duopolies which are first deterred, because duopolies earn 
higher profits in oligopoly than do larger oligopolies. They are also more likely to charge higher prices 
(Fonseca & Normann, 2014), which increases their probability of being detected and convicted. Hence, 
with a higher probability of being caught, they are likely to be the first ones to be deterred in the 
existence of the enforcement of competition law and policy (Davies et al, 2014). Then increasing 
efficiency continues to affect the number of cartel detected until triopolies are discouraged. The 
process continues until deterrence dominates efficiency, causing an overall drop in the number of 
cartels detected over time. With the intervention of CA, as cartelised profits fall, more firms are 
deterred from forming cartels and the economy moves to the competitive market. The process gives 
an invert U-shape as when efficiency raises sufficiently the expected number of cartel convicted, 
deterrence of duopolies kicks in and brings the number down. Then when efficiency continues to grow, 
triopolies are discouraged, but interestingly the increase in efficiency to deter triopoly is less than that 
needed to discourage duopolies, and even less the one required to dissuade quadriopolies. This 
asymmetry is the reason behind the inverse U shape. This is the result stated in the following 
proposition. 
  
Proposition 3: For cartels with heteregenous market, if 𝐺(PC(t)) ≡ [1 − H(PC(t))] be a decreasing 
and strictly convex function of the probability of conviction and let PC(t) be strictly increasing over 
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time, then the expected number of cartels detected and convicted reaches an inverse U-shape function 
over time. 
 
Proof: First notice that 
dPC(t)
dt
> 0 by construction. Thus, it is a continuous and strictly increasing 
function of t. Then, note that the probability of conviction has a maximum at a certain value of PC. This 
is confirmed as the first order condition of the expected number of convicted cartels with respect to 
the probability that a cartelised market is convicted has internal solution, 𝐺 = −𝑃𝐺′, and negative 
second order derivative by reason of the strict convexity of 𝐺. It follows that the expected number of 
convicted cartels has a maximum at a certain number of periods after CA’s establishment. 
 
Note that in this explanation of deterrence, it is the small number cartels which are deterred first, 
because their oligopoly profits are the largest. In itself, this result is interesting. Although superficially 
counter-intuitive, it is consistent with the well-established finding in the previous literature that 
duopolistic cartels are relatively infrequent (Levenstein & Suslow (2006), Fonseca & Norman (2014)42).  
 
Acknowledging one of the main findings in the existing literature:  that large cartels are more unstable 
because of the higher gains from deviation. This change brings in interesting results. In this situation, 
we expect cartels with an intermediate number of firms to be more resistant to a deterrence effect. 
As previously explained, duopolies tend to enjoy more profit than larger cartels. However, with the 
intervention of the CA, if caught, duopolies run the risks of paying heavy fines which may even offset 
the benefits obtained from being a cartel. With an effective competition enforcement, smaller cartels 
are therefore more likely to be first detected due to the high profit and deterred due to the offsetting 
effect of being caught over the cartelised profit. 
                                                          
42 They found that four-firm oligopolies form more cartels than duopolies. 
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 Figure 4.1: Relationship between cartel profit (π) and the number of firms (N) 
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On the other hand, as the number of firms in the cartels increases, the more unstable the cartels due 
to the benefits they may derive form deviating. Bigger cartels tend to get lower profits than smaller 
cartels, hence if caught, the loss that they may incur is not substantial compared to the profit that they 
make by staying in the cartel. This consequently makes the intermediate cartels more resistant to 
deterrence effects. However, it is only with time that they are deterred as the CA gains detection 
efficiency and enforces its competition law and policy.  
 
Thus, although a CA is efficient in detecting cartels, the CA will only progressively be able to deter the 
larger cartels in the markets. As the CA detects cartels, it is first able to deter smaller cartels and then 
progressively deters the intermediate cartels in the markets. For a sufficiently large interaction 
between the probability of detection, conviction and level of fines, the relationship between 
deterrence and the market structure (number of firms in the market) has a U shape when the detection 
efficiency is outweighed by the deterrence effects. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter models the behaviour of competition authorities and firms under imperfect incomplete 
information to unravel the functional form of how the number of cartels convicted changes over the 
life of the CA. A theoretical model of a competition authority that administers a deterrence based-
competition policy in the presence of uncertainty is developed. It provides a theoretical understanding 
of how the age profile of the number of cartels convicted by a CA can be interpreted in terms of both 
its detection efficiency and success in deterrence. In this chapter, we distinguish between frequency-
based and composition-based deterrence but also look at the heterogeneous deterrence.    
 
First, focusing on a composition-based deterrence and considering a single cartelised market, the 
proposed model is based on a two-stage game. In stage one, the CA chooses the effort to put in 
investigating cartels – its aim is to maximise consumer welfare. In stage two, firms take the CA’s effort 
into account when setting output to maximise profit as a cartel.  
 
Next, the model is widened with the second form of deterrence- frequency based. We then consider 
a multi-market economy. The possibility that not all markets are cartelised is now allowed for.   
 
Lastly, deterrence is alternatively modelled by allowing for market-level heterogeneity and 
internalisation of cartelist firms’ decision on whether or not to disband the cartel for oligopolistic 
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competition. This model accommodates for market asymmetries that allow for market structure to 
vary across different markets.  
 
Across the three ways of modelling deterrence, the results reveal that, while an increase in the 
detection efficiency pushes up the count of convicted cartels, the existence of deterrence effects has 
the opposite effect. The outcome on the age profile of cartel cases is found to depend on the 
magnitudes of deterrence effects and efficiency. While the efficiency acquired outweighs the 
deterrence effects, the CA will experience a positive influence in the number of cartels convicted. On 
the other hand, eventually deterrence effects outweigh detection efficiency, and the number of 
convicted cartel cases is expected to fall over time. If a CA is successful in its detection and deterrence 
policy, the age profile of cartel cases of a CA can then be expected to have an inverse U-quadratic 
shape. 
 
This chapter therefore provides the theoretical background which may explain the age profile of cartel 
cases convicted by a CA by looking at the interactions of detection efficiency and deterrence effects. 
In the next chapter, this theoretical background is tested empirically to determine the age profile of 
competition authorities.  
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Appendices  
4.A Comparative statics results 
This section relates to the proof of Proposition 1 of section 4.3, page 71. We show the workings for the first and second order derivatives for the optimum 
solutions of (i) price threshold (𝑔∗), (ii) quantity produced by firms (𝑞∗), (iii) probability of convicting a cartel by the CA (𝜏∗), (iv)  number of cartel convicted 
(𝑃𝐶∗) and (v) welfare function (𝑤∗) with respect to the probability that a cartel is detected (𝛾) and the level of fines (𝑓) in Table 4.A.1.  
Table 4.A.1: Comparative statics 
Optimum Solutions First-order derivative with 
respect to 𝜸 
Second-order derivative 
with respect to 𝜸 
First-order derivative with 
respect to 𝒇 
Second-order derivative 
with respect to 𝒇 
𝑔∗ = −
𝛾𝑓
𝛾2𝑓2−4
 for 0 < 𝑔∗ <
1 
𝑑𝑔∗
𝑑𝛾
=
𝑓(𝛾2𝑓2+4)
(𝛾2𝑓2−4)2
> 0  
𝑑2𝑔∗
𝑑𝛾2
= −
2𝛾𝑓3(𝛾2𝑓2+12)
(𝛾2𝑓2−4)3
> 0 . 
𝑑𝑔∗
𝑑𝑓
 =
𝛾(𝛾2𝑓2+4)
(𝛾2𝑓2−4)2
> 0 
𝑑2𝑔∗
𝑑𝑓2
= −
2𝛾3𝑓(𝛾2𝑓2+12)
(𝛾2𝑓2−4)3
> 0  
𝑞∗ =
2
4−𝛾2𝑓2
 for 0 < 𝑞∗ < 1 𝑑𝑞
∗
𝑑𝛾
=
4𝛾𝑓2
(𝛾2𝑓2−4)2
> 0. 
𝑑2𝑞∗
𝑑𝛾2
= −
4𝑓2(3𝛾2𝑓2+4)
(𝛾2𝑓2−4)3
> 0.  
𝑑𝑞∗
𝑑𝑓
=
4𝛾2𝑓
(4−𝛾2𝑓2)2
> 0  
𝑑2𝑞∗
𝑑𝑓2
= −
4𝛾2(3𝛾2𝑓2+4)
(𝛾2𝑓2−4)3
>0 
𝜏∗ = −
𝛾𝑓(𝛾2𝑓2−2)
(𝛾2𝑓2−4)2
  
𝑑𝜏∗
𝑑𝛾
=
𝑓(𝑓4𝛾4+ 6𝛾2𝑓2−8)
(𝛾2𝑓2−4)3
> 0  
𝑑2𝜏∗
𝑑𝛾2
= −
2𝛾3𝑓5(𝛾2𝑓2+20)
(𝛾2𝑓2−4)4
< 0. 
𝑑𝜏∗
𝑑𝑓
=
𝛾(𝛾4𝑓4+6𝛾2𝑓2−8)
(𝛾2𝑓2−4)3
> 0  
𝑑2𝜏∗
𝑑𝑓2
= −
2𝛾5𝑓3(𝛾2𝑓2+20)
(𝛾2𝑓2−4)4
< 0  
 
 
 
𝑃𝐶∗ = −
𝛾2𝑓(𝛾2𝑓2−2)
(𝛾2𝑓2−4)2
  
𝑑𝑃𝐶∗
𝑑𝛾
=
4𝛾𝑓(3𝛾2𝑓2−4)
(𝛾2𝑓2−4)3
>0 for 
(0 < 𝛾 ≤
2
3
(−2 + √7), 0 <
𝑓 < 1) and (
2
3
(−2 + √7) <
𝛾 < 1, 0 < 𝑓 <
2
3
√7√
1
𝛾2
−
4
3𝛾
)      
𝑑2𝑃𝐶∗
𝑑𝛾2
=
−
4𝑓(9𝛾4𝑓4+16𝛾2𝑓2−16)
(𝛾2𝑓2−4)4
< 0 
for 2 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑠. 
 
𝑑𝑃𝐶∗
𝑑𝑓
=
𝛾2(𝛾4𝑓4+6𝛾2𝑓2−8)
(𝛾2𝑓2−4)3
>0. 
𝑑2𝑃𝐶∗
𝑑𝑓2
= −
2𝛾6𝑓3(𝛾2𝑓2+20)
(𝛾2𝑓2−4)4
<0 
𝑤∗ =
1
8
(
4𝛾𝑓
𝛾2𝑓2−4
)2 + (1 −
𝛾2𝑓2
𝛾2𝑓2−4
)2)   
𝑑𝑤∗
𝑑𝛾
=
𝛾𝑓2
(𝛾2𝑓2−4)2
>0  
𝑑2𝑤∗
𝑑𝛾2
= −
𝑓2(4+3𝛾2𝑓2)
(𝛾2𝑓2−4)3
> 0   
𝑑𝑤∗
𝑑𝑓
=
𝛾2𝑓
(𝛾2𝑓2−4)2
>0  
𝑑2𝑤∗
𝑑𝑓2
= −
𝛾2(3𝛾2𝑓2+4)
(𝛾2𝑓2−4)3
>0 
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4.B Expressing the oligopoly profit  in terms of total number of firms (𝑵) 
Let,  
Firm 𝑖’s output: 𝑞𝑖 
Total output: 𝑞 = 𝑞1 + 𝑞2 +⋯……+ 𝑞𝑛  
Opponent’s output: 𝑞−𝑖 = 𝑞 − 𝑞𝑖 = ∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑗≠𝑖  
Constant marginal costs of firm 𝑖: 𝑐 is assumed to be zero 
The inverse demand function is 𝑝(𝑞). 
The firm 𝑖′ s profit is then given by:  
𝜋𝑖(𝑞−𝑖, 𝑞𝑖) = (𝑝(𝑞) × 𝑞𝑖 )𝑞𝑖 = (𝑝(𝑞−𝑖 + 𝑞𝑖))𝑞𝑖 
 
Assuming that the demand function is linear: 𝑝 = 1 − 𝑞 = 1 − (𝑞−𝑖 + 𝑞𝑖). 
The first order condition is 
  
𝑑𝜋𝑖
𝑑𝑞𝑖
= −𝑞𝑖 + (1 − 𝑞). 
 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium 
1. Every firm maximizes profit given her expectation of 𝑞−𝑖.  
2. The expectation is correct.  
This yields the simultaneous system of equations 
For all 𝑖 = 1,… . , 𝑛.  
In the linear case the FOC yields 𝑞𝑖 + 𝑞−𝑖 = 𝑞. 
−𝑞1 + (1 − 𝑞) = 0 
−𝑞2 + (1 − 𝑞) = 0 
. 
. 
−𝑞𝑛 + (1 − 𝑞) = 0 
 
The summation for total number of firms (𝑛) in the industry yields 
−𝑞 + 𝑛(1 − 𝑞) = 0. 
 
Thus, we can deduce that the total quantity produced and the price in the market is 
(𝑛 + 1)𝑞 = 𝑛 
𝑞 =
𝑛
𝑛 + 1
 
𝑝 = 1 − 𝑞 = 1 −
𝑛
𝑛 + 1
 
            =
1
𝑛 + 1
. 
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Therefore, the profit function is 
𝜋 = 𝑝𝑞= 
𝑛
𝑛+1
×
1
𝑛+1
=
𝑛
(𝑛+1)2
. 
 
4.C Alternative theoretical model 
 
In this section, we look at an alternative way of modelling composite deterrence. In this model, 
uncertainty is brought in the demand function as sketched in Martin (2000). The relationship between 
the demand function and the probability of being convicted, will be determined by the cumulative 
density function of demand function. In this model, the uncertainty in the demand function is first 
assumed to follow a triangular distribution and the model is later presented using a quadratic 
distribution. However, since non-linear solutions are obtained, the calculations get more complicated 
as shown below.  
 
This model also differs in terms of  
(i) the composition of the probability that a cartel is investigated.  
In the previous model, the probability that a cartel is investigated was a positive function of CA’s effort 
whereas in this model, it a function of a price threshold which is set by the CA and is negatively related. 
It is such that the lower the CA sets its price threshold, the higher will be the probability that a cartel 
is investigated. 
  
(ii) the cost function. 
In the previous model, costs are assumed to be a strictly convex function of the CA’s effort, 𝑔, and 
given by 
𝑔2
2
. The explanation for cost convexity is that investigation becomes increasingly costly once 
the relatively easy first steps have been completed.  However, in this model, cost is assumed to be a 
strictly convex function of 𝑔, the price threshold, but is given by 
(1−𝑔)2
2
.  This is explained by the fact 
that in the real world as the CA decreases its price threshold, it investigates more complex cartels. This 
situation causes the CA to incur higher costs of investigation given the nature of these cartels. Hence, 
the lower the price threshold, the greater the number of cartels the CA investigates and detects, the 
higher investigation cost it incurs. 
 
We find that as the CA becomes more efficient in detecting and convicting cartels, the probability that 
cartels are convicted increases. This consequently causes cartels to reduce their prices so as not to be 
detected. The age profile of convicted cartels is found to be determined by the magnitude of detection 
and deterrence efficiency. The age profile of the convicted cartels increases when detection efficiency 
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offsets the deterrence effects and decreases if the latter outweighs the detection efficiency. Hence 
overtime, the age profile is expected to be of an inverted U-shape. 
 
a. Triangular distribution 
The discussion of the model begins with the demand side.  
Demand side 
We describe the inverse demand function for each market to be separable in an observable component 
of inverse demand, 𝑝(𝑞), and a random element, 𝜀: 
       ?̃?(𝑞, 𝜀) = 𝑝(𝑞) + 𝜀,                                                   Equation I 
with 𝑝′ < 0, 𝑝′′ ≥ 0. The total industry output is denoted by 𝑞, and the random variable 𝜀 is described 
by a well-behaved density function 𝑔(𝜀), with zero mean, and defined over the interval −∞ < 𝜀 ≤
𝜀 ≤ 𝜀 < ∞. The lower limit 𝜀 is such that the price is not less than the marginal cost if the quantity 
supplied is sufficiently small, that is, 𝑝(0) + 𝜀 ≥ 𝑐, where 𝑐 is the firms’ constant marginal cost of 
production (later on set to zero). 
 
In practice, the CA receives and monitors various signals from different industries in the economy in 
terms of complaints from customers, rivals or other trade sources. All these sources of complaint are 
combined in our model into one single signal, which is the optimal price chosen by the firms. Below 
we describe how the threshold price leads to the detection probability.  
 
The detection probability 
Suppose that the competition agency chooses the threshold price 𝑔 for potential competition breaches 
(only cartels in this model). The competition authority investigates the market if the optimal price 
chosen in that market is greater than the threshold price 𝑔. Then, the probability of detection is given 
by:  
                       𝜏 ≜ 𝑝𝑟 [𝑝(𝑞) +  𝜀⏟   
?̃?
≥ 𝑔] = 1 − 𝑃𝑅[𝑔 − 𝑝(𝑞)], with 0 ≤ 𝜏 ≤ 1,              Equation II 
where 𝑝𝑟 and 𝑃𝑅 denote the probability density function and cumulative density function, 
respectively. 
 
Thus, the detection probability, 𝜏, is a function of the difference between the price threshold set by 
the competition authority and the price chosen by the cartelized firms. A low price threshold 𝑔 leads 
to a high probability of detection 𝜏, which, all else equal, results in a larger number of cartel 
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investigations, and vice-versa. The threshold 𝑔 is the strategic variable in the model under the control 
of the CA, whose behaviour will be further discussed.  
 
The conviction probability 
Once the firms are detected in a cartel illegal behaviour, they are prosecuted and successfully 
convicted with probability 𝛾, with 𝛾 ≤ 𝛾 ≤ 1, with 𝛾 > 0. If convicted, the cartel is punished (via a fine 
or/and imprisonment), denoted by 𝑓. The parameters 𝛾 and 𝑓 are treated as exogenous, hence 
determined outside the model, with values known to the firms and to the CA. 
 
To retain simplicity, we exclude the possibility that the CA makes type I and type II errors in the 
model43.  
 
Firms’ behaviour 
The expected profit function for the risk –neutral cartel is given by: 
𝜋 ≜ 𝐸[?̃?] = 𝑝𝑞 − 𝜏𝛾𝑓.                                           Equation III 
For analytical tractability, it is assumed that the random noise 𝜀 has support [−𝑎, 𝑎], where −𝑎 ≡ 𝜀 ≤
0 ≤ 𝜀̅  ≡ 𝑎 and follows a triangular probability distribution given by  
(i) 𝑃𝑅(𝜀) =
(𝜀+𝑎)2
2𝑎2
 for −𝑎 ≤ 𝜀 ≤ 0                                      Equation IV (a)     
(ii) 𝑃𝑅(𝜀) = 1 −
(𝑎−𝜀)2
2𝑎2
 for 0 ≤ 𝜀 ≤ 𝑎.                                                                        Equation IV (b)       
                                                                  
In more general terms the random variable 𝜀 could take different forms. The triangular distribution 
has the nice feature to be a discrete approximation of a Gaussian distribution, hence it gives lower 
probability to extreme values. One easier functional form would be the uniform distribution. However, 
when we tried that distribution we found it was problematic, as it did not allow for a linkage between 
the price threshold set by the competition authority and the cartelized firms’ output. We also 
attempted to use the uniform distribution by allowing fines to be a function of revenue but became 
too complex when calculating for optimal price threshold (𝑔)44. Other distributions would require the 
use of simulations and numerical solutions, which would complicate the calculus, without adding much 
                                                          
43 Type I errors refer to the probability that the CA acquits wrongdoers. Type II errors refer to the probability 
that agents are unjustly sanctioned despite having complied with the law. 
44 We obtained two levels of optimum output (i) 𝑞 =
−2𝑎+4𝛾𝜙−2𝑔𝛾𝜙−√−12𝛾𝜙(−𝑎+𝛾𝜙−𝑔𝛾𝜙)+(2𝑎−4𝛾𝜙+2𝑔𝛾𝜙)2
6𝛾𝜙
 for 
𝑑𝑞
𝑑𝑔
< 0 and (ii) 𝑞 =
−2𝑎+4𝛾𝜙−2𝑔𝛾𝜙+√−12𝛾𝜙(−𝑎+𝛾𝜙−𝑔𝛾𝜙)+(2𝑎−4𝛾𝜙+2𝑔𝛾𝜙)2
6𝛾𝜙
 for 
𝑑𝑞
𝑑𝑔
> 0.  (i) is chosen for 
𝑑𝑞
𝑑𝑔
< 0. 
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insight. In the next section, the results relying on a U-quadratic probability distribution, which has the 
opposite shape of the triangular distribution45 are replicated. 
 
Letting the demand function being unit linear we have that the probability of detection given in 
Equation ii can be written as 
                                             𝜏 = 1 −  𝑃𝑅(𝑔 − 1 + 𝑞),                                                Equation V 
and substituting Equations IV(a) and IV(b) into Equation V yields the probabilities a cartel is detected, 
depending on which side of the modal value of the distribution we are: 
(i) 𝜏 = 1 −
(𝑎−1+𝑔+𝑞)2
2𝑎2
                                                                                                   Equation VI(a)           
(ii) 𝜏 =
(𝑎+1−𝑔−𝑞)2
2𝑎2
.                                                                                                          Equation VI(b)           
Next, substituting Equations VI(a) and VI(b) into Equation II yields the expected profits: 
(i) 𝜋 = (1 − 𝑞)𝑞 − [1 −
(𝑎−1+𝑔+𝑞)2
2𝑎2
]𝛾𝑓                                                                             Equation VII(a)  
(ii) 𝜋 = (1 − 𝑞)𝑞 −
(𝑎+1−𝑔−𝑞)2
2𝑎2
𝛾𝑓.                                                                                      Equation VII(b)    
As it can be seen above, one side effect of using the triangular distribution is that there are two possible 
values for the expected profits. The cartel monopolist chooses its optimal output under the constraints 
of non-negative demand and prices, 0 ≤ 𝑞 ≤ 1 + 𝑎, (1 − 𝑎) ≥ 𝑐 = 0. 
 
The two first order conditions for the expected profit maximisation are 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑞
= 1 − 2𝑞 +
(𝑎−1+𝑔+𝑞)𝛾𝑓
𝑎2
= 0  
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑞
= 1 − 2𝑞 +
(𝑎+1−𝑔−𝑞)𝛾𝑓
𝑎2
= 0.  
 
And the corresponding second order derivatives for the profit maximisation are 
(i)   
𝜕2𝜋
𝜕𝑞2
= −2 +
𝛾𝑓
𝑎2
 
(ii)   
𝜕2𝜋
𝜕𝑞2
= −2 −
𝛾𝑓
𝑎2
. 
From (i) above it is noticed that a sufficient condition for a maximum is that 𝑎 ≥
√𝛾𝑓
√2
, which holds if 
either the range of the random variable is large (large value of the left hand side of the inequality), or 
if the fines or the conviction probability are low (small value of the right hand side of the inequality). 
                                                          
45 Although this has an appropriate shape, it brings the complexity of having a cumulative density function which 
changes shape at the modal value. 
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On the other hand, the second condition (ii) always leads to a maximum. Hence the problem has 
potentially two maxima, with one of the two perhaps being a global maximum. We remain temporarily 
agnostic on which of the two solutions may be the global maximum and solve for the optimal threshold 
set by the competition authority. Only then the implications of the two maxima are discussed.  
 
The two levels of optimal output produced by the cartel are: 
(i) 𝑞(𝑔) =
𝑎2−𝛾𝑓+𝑎𝛾𝑓+𝑔𝛾𝑓
2𝑎2−𝛾𝑓
                                                                                      Equation VIII(a)       
(ii) 𝑞(𝑔) =
𝑎2+𝛾𝑓+𝑎𝛾𝑓−𝑔𝛾𝑓
2𝑎2+𝛾𝑓
.                             Equation VIII(b) 
We are interested in studying the relationship between the optimal output produced by the firms and 
the threshold set by the competition authority. Hence, below the sign of the change in the optimal 
level of 𝑞 as a response to a change in 𝑔 are studied: 
(i) 
𝑑𝑞(𝑔)
𝑑𝑔
=
𝛾𝑓
2𝑎2−𝛾𝑓
< 0, which holds for 0 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
.                Equation IX (a)   
(ii) 
𝑑𝑞(𝑔)
𝑑𝑔
= −
𝛾𝑓
2𝑎2+𝛾𝑓
< 0.                                                                                                 Equation IX (b) 
                                                                                                  
The above inequalities suggest that if the CA reduces the price threshold of detection, the cartel will 
increase its output and hence lower its price. This is the first source of deterrence captured by the 
model.  
 
Competition authority’s problem 
The cost incurred by a CA when investigating and detecting cartels plays a very important role in 
determining the efficiency and the effective running of CA’s operations. The cost of detecting a cartel 
is assumed to be a strictly convex function of 𝑔, and given by 
(1−𝑔)2
2
. One possible explanation for the 
cost being strictly convex in the price threshold is that, in the real world as the CA decreases its price 
threshold, it investigates more complex cartels. This situation causes the CA to incur higher costs of 
investigation given the nature of these cartels. Hence, the lower the price threshold, the greater the 
number of cartels the CA investigates and detects, the higher investigation cost it incurs.  
 
It is assumed that the aim of the competition authority is to maximise consumer welfare net of 
enforcement cost. The total welfare generated in the economy in the cartelised markets in a period is 
consumer welfare minus cost of investigations given by 
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       𝑤(𝑞(𝑔)) ≜ 𝐸(?̃?(𝑞(𝑔)) = ∫ [𝑝(𝑞) − 𝑝(𝑔)]
𝑞(𝑔)
0
𝑑𝑞 −
(1−𝑔)2
2
        Equation X 
                                                = ∫ [(1 − 𝑞) − (1 − 𝑞(𝑔))]
𝑞(𝑔)
0
𝑑𝑞 −
(1−𝑔)2
2
.  
It is noted that the competition authority deals with contingent welfare maximization depending on 
which side of the error term the realization of the error is drawn from. This is due to the fact that when 
the cartel maximizes its profit it does choose a different optimal output during recessions (random 
draws from the left side of the random demand side) than during booms (random draws from the right 
side of the random demand).  
 
Substituting 𝑞(𝑔) (from Equations VIII(a) and VIII(b) respectively) in Equation X, we solve for the 
optimal 𝑔 and set it to zero, and get the equalities 
(i) 
𝑑𝑤(𝑞(𝑔))
𝑑𝑔
= 1 − 𝑔 +
𝛾𝑓(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓(𝑎+𝑔−1))
(𝛾𝑓−2𝑎2)2
= 0 
(ii) 
𝑑𝑤(𝑞(𝑔))
𝑑𝑔
= 1 − 𝑔 −
𝑓𝛾(𝑎2+𝑎𝑓𝛾−𝑓𝛾(𝑔−1))
(2𝑎2+𝑓𝛾)2
= 0. 
The corresponding second order derivatives for the consumer welfare maximization are 
(i) 
𝜕2𝑤
𝜕𝑔2
= −1+
𝛾2𝑓2
(𝛾𝑓−2𝑎2)2
.  
 (ii)         
𝜕2𝑤
𝜕𝑔2
= −1 +
𝛾2𝑓2
(2𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)2
. 
The first of the two second-order conditions is a maximum for 𝑎 ≥ √𝑓𝛾. The second one is a 
maximum for any value of 𝑎. The optimal equilibrium thresholds set by the CA are: 
(i) 𝑔∗ =
4𝑎3−3𝑎𝛾𝑓+𝛾2𝑓2
4𝑎3−4𝑎𝛾𝑓
                                   Equation XI (a)        
(ii) 𝑔∗ =
4𝑎3+3𝑎𝛾𝑓−𝛾2𝑓2
4𝑎3+4𝑎𝛾𝑓
.                         Equation XI (b) 
As mentioned earlier, I opted for remaining agnostic about the optimal output chosen by the cartel 
and solved accordingly for the optimal threshold chosen by the CA. From Equation X(a), it is known 
that a low threshold set by the competition authority leads to a low output chosen by the cartel (for 
the case the cartel maximizes the profit, i.e. for 𝑎 ≥
√𝛾𝑓
√2
). In this situation the best the CA can do to 
increase the output and decrease prices is not to set any threshold. This intuition is proven by the 
optimal threshold in Equation g* (i), which is always >1 for 𝑎 ≥ √𝛾𝑓.  Not only this is true, but also we 
have that the optimal quantity found in Equation IX(i) is a local maximum for 𝑎 ≥
√𝛾𝑓
√2
, hence the cartel 
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will prefer the second solution (Equation IX(ii)) to the first one (for any value of 𝑔). Onwards, only the 
second solution is retained and the first one is disregarded. 
 
Substituting Equation XI(ii) into Equation XIII(ii), the optimal quantity (𝑞∗) produced by firms is 
(ii) 𝑞∗ =
(𝑎+𝛾𝑓)(2𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)
4(𝑎3+𝑎𝛾𝑓)
 .                            Equation XII 
Next, substituting Equations XI and XII into Equation VI(b), the optimal probability of detection 
𝜏∗obtained is 
(ii) 𝜏∗ =
(𝑎−2𝑎2−𝛾𝑓)2
8(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)2
.                         Equation XIII 
Finally, substituting Equations XIII into Equation I, the optimal probability of cartels convicted 𝑦∗ 
retrieved is  
(ii) 𝑦∗ =
𝛾(𝑎−2𝑎2−𝛾𝑓)2
8(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)2
.                         Equation XIV 
To summarise, the CA sets its cartel threshold price by choosing a value of 𝑔 which maximises total 
consumer welfare. This determines the probability of triggering a cartel investigation (𝜏), which 
combined with the efficiency of conviction, leads to the number of cartels convicted. The nature of the 
relationship between 𝑔 and 𝜏 depends on the cumulative density function PR(𝑔) through the 
distribution of 𝜀. Here it is assumed that the random error term 𝜀 has a triangular distribution. If so, 𝑔 
will also have a triangular distribution and there will be a mapping between 𝑃𝑅[𝑔] and 𝑃𝑅[𝜏].  
        
Lemma 1: As the CA becomes more efficient in detecting and convicting cartels, the probability that 
cartels are convicted increases. This consequently causes cartels to reduce their prices so as not to be 
detected. 
  
Comparative statics results 
The workings for the first and second order derivatives for the optimum solutions are shown as: 
The optimum price threshold (𝑔∗) is  
𝑔∗ =
4𝑎3+3𝑎𝛾𝑓−𝛾2𝑓2
4𝑎3+4𝑎𝛾𝑓
 for 0 < 𝑔∗ < 1 . 
The first-order and second-order derivative of 𝑔∗ with respect to 𝛾 are 
𝑑𝑔∗
𝑑𝛾
= −
𝑓(𝑎3+2𝑎2𝛾𝑓+𝛾2𝑓2)
4𝑎(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)2
< 0, for 0 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
. 
𝑑2𝑔∗
𝑑𝛾2
= −
(𝑎−1)𝑎2𝑓2
2(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)3
< 0, for  𝑓 >
2
𝛾
, 1 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
 . 
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The first-order and second-order derivative of 𝑔∗ with respect to 𝑓 are 
𝑑𝑔∗
𝑑𝑓
 = −
𝛾(𝑎3+2𝑎2𝛾𝑓+𝛾2𝑓2)
4𝑎(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)2
< 0, for 0 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
. 
𝑑2𝑔∗
𝑑𝑓2
 =−
(𝑎−1)𝑎2𝛾2
2(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)3
> 0, for 𝑓 >
2
𝛾
, 1 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
. 
 
The first-order and second-order derivative of 𝑔∗ with respect to 𝑎 are 
𝑑𝑔∗
𝑑𝑎
=
𝛾𝑓(2𝑎3+3𝑎2𝛾𝑓+𝛾2𝑓2)
4(𝑎3+𝑎𝛾𝑓)2
> 0, for 0 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
. 
𝑑2𝑔∗
𝑑𝑎2
= −
𝛾𝑓(3𝑎5−𝑎3𝛾𝑓+6𝑎4𝛾𝑓+3𝑎2𝛾2𝑓2+𝛾3𝑓3)
2(𝑎3+𝑎𝛾𝑓)3
> 0, for 0 < 𝛾 ≤
1
2400
, 0 < 𝑓 < 1, 
𝑎 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 2 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑠 or 
1
2400
 < 𝛾 < 1, 0 < 𝑓 <
1
2400𝛾
,  𝑎 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 2 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑠.  
 
2. The optimum quantity produced by firms (𝑞∗) is  
𝑞∗ =
(𝑎+𝛾𝑓)(2𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)
4(𝑎3+𝑎𝛾𝑓)
 for 0 < 𝑞∗ < 1 + 𝑎. 
The first-order and second-order derivative of 𝑞∗ with respect to  𝛾 are 
𝑑𝑞∗
𝑑𝛾
=
𝑓(2𝑎4−𝑎3+2𝑎2𝛾𝑓+𝛾2𝑓2)
4𝑎(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)2
> 0 for 0 < 𝛾 ≤
1
50
, 0 < 𝑓 < 1, 0 < 𝑎 < 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡 or  
1
50
 <
𝛾 < 1, 0 < 𝑓 <
1
50𝛾
, 0 < 𝑎 <  𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡 or 
1
50
 < 𝛾 <
1
32
(−17 + 7√7, 0 < 𝑓 <
1
50𝛾
, 0 <
𝑎 < 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡 or (
1
50𝛾
< 𝑓 < 1, 0 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
))) or (
1
32
(−17 + 7√7) ≤ 𝛾 < 1, ((0 < 𝑓 <
1
50𝛾
, 0 < 𝑎 < 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡 for  (
1
50𝛾
≤ 𝑓 < 1, 0 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
))). 
𝑑2𝑞∗
𝑑𝛾2
= −
𝑎2𝑓2(𝑎−1)
2(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)3
> 0 for 0 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
.  
 
The first-order and second-order derivative of 𝑞∗ with respect to 𝑓 are 
𝑑𝑞∗
𝑑𝑓
=
𝛾(2𝑎4−𝑎3+2𝑎2𝛾𝑓+𝛾2𝑓2)
4𝑎(𝑎2+𝑓𝛾)2
< 0 for (0 < 𝛾 ≤
1
50
, 0 < 𝑓 < 1, 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
) or 
(
1
50
< 𝛾 < 1, 0 < 𝑓 <
1
50𝛾
, 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
). 
𝑑2𝑞∗
𝑑𝑓2
= −
(𝑎−1)𝑎2𝛾2
2(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)3
> 0, for 0 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
. 
The first-order and second-order derivative of 𝑞∗ with respect to 𝑎 are 
  
𝑑𝑞∗
𝑑𝑎
= −
𝛾𝑓(−2𝑎3+2𝑎4+𝑎2𝛾𝑓+𝛾2𝑓2)
4(𝑎3+𝑎𝛾𝑓)2
> 0 for (0 < 𝛾 ≤
1
8
, 0 < 𝑓 < 1, 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
) or (
1
8
< 𝛾 < 1, 0 < 𝑓 <
1
8𝛾
, 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
). 
𝑑2𝑞∗
𝑑𝑎2
=
𝛾𝑓(−3𝑎5+2𝑎6+𝑎3𝛾𝑓+3𝑎2𝛾2𝑓2+𝛾3𝑓3)
2(𝑎3+𝑎𝛾𝑓)3
> 0 for (0 < 𝛾 ≤
1
288
(61 − 23√7), 0 < 𝑓 < 1, 
𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
) or  (
1
288
(61 − 23√7) < 𝛾 ≤
1
242
, ((0 < 𝑓 ≤ −
23
288
√7√
1
𝛾2
+
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61
288𝛾
, 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
)or (−
23
288
√7√
1
𝛾2
+
61
288𝛾
< 𝑓 < 1, 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡 <
𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
))) or  (
1
242
< 𝛾 < 1, ((0 < 𝑓 ≤ −
23
288
√7√
1
𝛾2
+
61
288𝛾
, 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
) or 
 (−
23
288
√7√
1
𝛾2
+
61
288𝛾
< 𝑓 <
1
242𝛾
, 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
))). 
 
3. Optimum probability of detecting a cartel by the CA (𝜏∗) is 
𝜏∗ =
(𝑎−2𝑎2−𝛾𝑓)2
8(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)2
. 
The first-order and second-order derivative of  𝜏∗with respect to 𝛾 are 
𝑑𝜏∗
𝑑𝛾
= −
(𝑎−1)𝑎𝑓(2𝑎2+𝛾𝑓−1)
4(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)3
> 0 for (0 < 𝛾 ≤
1
8
, 0 < 𝑓 < 1, 0 < 𝑎 <
1
4
−
1
4
√1 − 8𝛾𝑓) or (
1
8
< 𝛾 < 1, ((0 <
𝑓 ≤
1
8𝛾
, 0 < 𝑎 <
1
4
−
1
4
√1 − 8𝛾𝑓)or  (
1
8𝛾
< 𝑓 < 1, 0 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
). 
𝑑2𝜏∗
𝑑𝛾2
=
(𝑎−1)𝑎𝑓2(5𝑎2+2𝛾𝑓−3𝑎)
4(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)4
< 0 for (0 < 𝛾 ≤
2
9
, 0 < 𝑓 < 1, 0 < 𝑎 <
3
10
−
1
10
√9 − 40𝛾𝑓) or (
2
9
< 𝛾 ≤
9
40
, ((0 < 𝑓 ≤
2
9𝛾
, 0 < 𝑎 <
3
10
−
1
10
√9 − 40𝛾𝑓) or  (
2
9𝛾
< 𝑓 < 1, (0 < 𝑎 <
3
10
−
1
10
√9 − 40𝛾𝑓 
     or 
3
10
+
1
10
√9 − 40𝛾𝑓 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
)))) or  (
9
40
< 𝛾 < 1, ((0 < 𝑓 ≤
2
9𝛾
, 0 < 𝑎 <
3
10
−
1
10
√9 − 40𝛾𝑓) or  (
2
9𝛾
<
𝑓 <
9
40𝛾
, (0 < 𝑎 <
3
10
−
1
10
√9 − 40𝛾𝑓 or 
3
10
+
1
10
√9 − 40𝛾𝑓 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
)) or  (𝑓 ==
9
40𝛾
, (0 < 𝑎 <
3
10
−
1
10
√9 − 40𝛾𝑓or  
3
10
−
1
10
√9 − 40𝛾𝑓 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
)) or (
9
40𝛾
< 𝑓 < 1, 0 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
))). 
 
The first-order and second-order derivative of  𝜏∗ with respect to 𝑓 are 
𝑑𝜏∗
𝑑𝑓
= −
(𝑎−1)𝑎𝛾(2𝑎2+𝛾𝑓−1)
4(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)3
> 0 for (0 < 𝛾 ≤
1
8
, 0 < 𝑓 < 1, 0 < 𝑎 <
1
4
−
1
4
√1 − 8𝛾𝑓) or (
1
8
< 𝛾 <
1, ((0 < 𝑓 ≤
1
8𝛾
, 0 < 𝑎 <
1
4
−
1
4
√1 − 8𝛾𝑓) | |(
1
8𝛾
< 𝑓 < 1, 0 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
))).   
𝑑2𝜏∗
𝑑𝑓2
=
(−1+𝑎)𝑎𝛾2(−3𝑎+5𝑎2+2𝛾𝑓)
4(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)4
< 0 for (0 < 𝛾 ≤
2
9
, 0 < 𝑓 < 1, 0 < 𝑎 <
3
10
−
1
10
√9 − 40𝛾𝑓) or (
2
9
< 𝛾 ≤
9
40
, ((0 < 𝑓 ≤
2
9𝛾
, 0 < 𝑎 <
3
10
−
1
10
√9 − 40𝛾𝑓) or (
2
9𝛾
< 𝑓 < 1, (0 < 𝑎 <
3
10
−
1
10
√9 − 40𝛾𝑓𝑜𝑟 
3
10
+
1
10
√9 − 40𝛾𝑓 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
)) or (
9
40
< 𝛾 < 1, ((0 < 𝑓 ≤
2
9𝛾
, 0 < 𝑎 <
3
10
−
1
10
√9 − 40𝛾𝑓) or (
2
9𝛾
< 𝑓 <
9
40𝛾
, (0 <
𝑎 <
3
10
−
1
10
√9 − 40𝛾𝑓𝑜𝑟 
3
10
+
1
10
√9 − 40𝛾𝑓 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
)) or (𝑓 ==
9
40𝛾
, (0 < 𝑎 <
3
10
−
1
10
√9 − 40𝛾𝑓or 
 
3
10
−
1
10
√9 − 40𝛾𝑓 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
)) or (
9
40𝛾
< 𝑓 < 1, 0 < 𝑎 <
√𝑓𝛾
√2
). 
 
The first-order and second-order derivative of  𝜏∗ with respect to 𝑎 are 
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𝑑𝜏∗
𝑑𝑎
=
(−𝑎+2𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)(𝑎2−𝛾𝑓+2𝑎𝛾𝑓)
4(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)3
> 0 for (0 < 𝛾 ≤
1
8
, 0 < 𝑓 < 1,
1
4
−
1
4
√1 − 8𝛾𝑓 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
) or 
(
1
8
< 𝛾 < 1, )or (0 < 𝑓 <
1
8𝛾
,
1
4
−
1
4
√1 − 8𝛾𝑓 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
) or (
1
8𝛾
< 𝑓 < 1,−𝛾𝑓 + √𝛾𝑓 + 𝛾2𝑓2 <
𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
). 
  
𝑑2𝜏∗
𝑑𝑎2
=
20𝑎3𝛾𝑓−4𝑎5+𝑎4(3−12𝛾𝑓)+2𝑎2𝛾𝑓(𝛾𝑓−4)+𝛾2𝑓2(1+2𝛾𝑓)
4(𝑎2+𝛾)4
 for (0 < 𝛾 ≤
1
8
, 0 < 𝑓 <
1, 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
)  or  (
1
8
< 𝛾 < 1, 0 < 𝑓 <
1
8𝛾
, 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
).  
 
4. The optimum probability that a cartel is convicted (𝑃𝐶∗) by the CA is 
𝑃𝐶∗ =
𝛾(𝑎−2𝑎2−𝛾𝑓)2
8(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)2
  
The first-order and second order derivative of 𝑃𝐶∗ with respect to 𝛾 is 
𝑑𝑃𝐶∗
𝑑𝛾
=
(2𝑎2+𝛾𝑓−𝑎)(−𝑎3+2𝑎4+𝑎𝛾𝑓+𝑎2𝛾𝑓+𝛾2𝑓2)
8(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)3
>0 for (0 < 𝛾 ≤
1
8
, 0 < 𝑓 < 1, 0 < 𝑎 <
1
4
−
1
4
√1 − 8𝛾𝑓) or 
 (
1
8
< 𝛾 < 1, ((0 < 𝑓 ≤
1
8𝛾
, 0 < 𝑎 <
1
4
−
1
4
√1 − 8𝛾𝑓) | |(
1
8𝛾
< 𝑓 < 1, 0 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
))). 
𝑑2𝑃𝐶∗
𝑑𝛾2
= −
(𝑎−1)𝑎2𝑓(−2𝑎2+4𝑎3+𝛾𝑓+𝑎𝛾𝑓)
4(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)4
> 0 for 0 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
. 
 
The first-order and second-order derivative of 𝑃𝐶∗ with respect 𝑓 is 
𝑑𝑃𝐶∗
𝑑𝑓
= −
(𝑎−1)𝑎𝛾2(2𝑎2+𝛾𝑓−𝑎)
4(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)3
< 0 for (0 < 𝛾 ≤
1
8
, 0 < 𝑓 < 1,
1
4
−
1
4
√1 − 8𝛾𝑓 < 𝑎 <
1
4
+
1
4
√1 − 8𝛾𝑓) or 
 (
1
8
< 𝛾 < 1, 0 < 𝑓 <
1
8𝛾
,
1
4
−
1
4
√1 − 8𝛾𝑓 < 𝑎 <
1
4
+
1
4
√1 − 8𝛾𝑓). 
𝑑2𝑃𝐶∗
𝑑𝑓2
=
(𝑎−1)𝑎𝛾3(−3𝑎+5𝑎2+2𝛾𝑓)
4(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)4
  for (0 < 𝛾 ≤
2
9
, 0 < 𝑓 < 1, 0 < 𝑎 <
3
10
−
1
10
√9 − 40𝛾𝑓) or (
2
9
< 𝛾 ≤
9
40
, ((0 < 𝑓 ≤
2
9𝛾
, 0 < 𝑎 <
3
10
−
1
10
√9 − 40𝛾𝑓) or (
2
9𝛾
< 𝑓 < 1, (0 < 𝑎 <
3
10
−
1
10
√9 − 40𝛾𝑓 or 
3
10
+
1
10
√9 − 40𝛾𝑓 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
 or (
9
40
< 𝛾 < 1, ((0 < 𝑓 ≤
2
9𝛾
, 0 < 𝑎 <
3
10
−
1
10
√9 − 40𝛾𝑓) or (
9
40
< 𝛾 < 1, ((0 <
𝑓 ≤
2
9𝛾
, 0 < 𝑎 <
3
10
−
1
10
√9 − 40𝛾𝑓) or (
2
9𝛾
< 𝑓 <
9
40𝛾
, (0 < 𝑎 <
3
10
−
1
10
√9 − 40𝛾𝑓 or 
3
10
+
1
10
√9 − 40𝛾𝑓 <
𝑎 <
9
40𝛾
 or (0 < 𝑎 <
3
10
−
1
10
√9 − 40𝛾𝑓 
3
10
−
1
10
√9 − 40𝛾𝑓 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
)). 
 
The first-order and second-order derivative of 𝑃𝐶∗ with respect to 𝑎 are 
𝑑𝑃𝐶∗
𝑑𝑎
 = 
𝛾(2𝑎2+𝛾𝑓−1)(𝑎2−𝛾𝑓+2𝑎𝛾𝑓)
4(𝑎2+𝑓𝛾)3
< 0 for (0 < 𝛾 ≤
1
8
, 0 < 𝑓 < 1,
1
4
−
1
4
√1 − 8𝛾𝑓 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
) or  (
1
8
<
𝛾 < 1, 
((0 < 𝑓 <
1
8𝛾
,
1
4
−
1
4
√1 − 8𝛾𝑓 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
) | |(
1
8𝛾
< 𝑓 < 1,−𝛾𝑓 + √𝛾𝑓 + 𝛾2𝑓2 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
)))   
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𝑑2𝑃𝐶∗
𝑑𝑎2
=
𝛾(20𝑎3𝛾𝑓−4𝑎5+𝑎4(3−12𝛾𝑓)+2𝑎2𝛾𝑓(𝛾𝑓−4)+𝛾2𝑓2(1+2𝛾𝑓))
4(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)4
> 0, for  
(0 < 𝛾 ≤
1
8
, 0 < 𝑓 < 1, 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
) or (
1
8
< 𝛾 < 1, 0 < 𝑓 <
1
8𝛾
, 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
). 
 
4. The optimum function maximising total welfare (𝑤(𝑞)) is  
𝑤∗ =
(𝑎+𝛾𝑓)2
8(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)
.  
The first-order and second-order derivative of 𝑤∗with respect to  𝛾 are 
𝑑𝑤∗
𝑑𝛾
=
𝑓(𝑎+𝛾𝑓)(2𝑎2+𝛾𝑓−𝑎)
8(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)2
> 0, for (0 < 𝛾 ≤
1
8
, 0 < 𝑓 < 1, 0 < 𝑎 <
1
4
−
1
4
√1 − 8𝛾𝑓) or (
1
8
< 𝛾 < 1, ((0 <
𝑓 ≤
1
8𝛾
, 0 < 𝑎 <
1
4
−
1
4
√1 − 8𝛾𝑓) or (
1
8𝛾
< 𝑓 < 1, 0 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
))). 
𝑑2𝑤∗
𝑑𝛾2
=
(𝑎−1)2𝑎2𝑓2
4(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)3
> 0, for  𝑓 >
2
𝛾
, 1 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
 . 
 
The first-order and second-order derivative of 𝑤∗with respect to 𝑓 are 
𝑑𝑤∗
𝑑𝑓
 =
𝛾(𝑎+𝛾𝑓)(2𝑎2−𝑎+𝛾𝑓)
8(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)2
>0, for (0 < 𝛾 ≤
1
8
, 0 < 𝑓 < 1, 0 < 𝑎 <
1
4
−
1
4
√1 − 8𝛾𝑓) or (
1
8
< 𝛾 < 1, ((0 < 𝑓 ≤
1
8𝛾
, 0 < 𝑎 <
1
4
−
1
4
√1 − 8𝛾𝑓) or (
1
8𝛾
< 𝑓 < 1, 0 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
))). 
𝑑2𝑤∗
𝑑𝑓2
= 
(𝑎−1)2𝑎2𝛾2
4(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)3
> 0, for 𝑓 >
2
𝛾
, 1 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
. 
 
The first –order and second-order derivative of 𝑤∗with respect to 𝑎 are 
𝑑𝑤∗
𝑑𝑎
= −
(𝑎−1)𝑓𝛾(𝑎+𝛾𝑓)
4(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)2
> 0, for 0 < 𝑎 <
√𝛾𝑓
√2
. 
𝑑2𝑤∗
𝑑𝑎2
=
𝛾𝑓(2𝑎3−6𝑎𝛾𝑓+𝛾𝑓(1−𝛾𝑓)+3𝑎2(𝛾𝑓−1))
4(𝑎2+𝛾𝑓)3
< 0  for 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡 < 𝑎 < √
𝛾𝑓
√2
. 
b. Quadratic distribution 
It is now assumed that the uncertainty in the demand function follows a quadratic distribution. The 
same assumptions under the triangular distribution are applied.  
 
Firms’ Behaviour 
The expected profit function for the risk –neutral cartel is given by: 
              𝜋 ≜ 𝐸[?̃?] = 𝑝𝑞 − 𝜏𝛾𝑓                       Equation a 
It is assumed that the random noise 𝜀 has support [−𝑎, 𝑎], where −𝑎 ≡ 𝜀 ≤ 0 ≤ 𝑎 ≡ 𝜀  ̅and follow a 
U-quadratic distribution given by  
        𝑃𝑅(𝜀) =
1
2𝑎3
   (𝜀3 + 𝑎3)  for −𝑎 < 𝜀 < 𝑎             Equation b 
84 
 
 
Letting the demand function being unit linear, the probability of detection given in Equation 2 can be 
written as 
   𝜏 = 1 −  𝑃𝑅(𝑔 − 1 + 𝑞),        Equation c 
and substituting Equation b into Equation c yields the probabilities a cartel is detected: 
                     𝜏 = 1 −
1
2𝑎3
{[𝑔 − 1 + 𝑞]3 − 𝑎3}= 1 −
(𝑔+𝑞−1)3+𝑎3
2𝑎3
.                 Equation d                                     
 
Next, substituting Equations c into Equation a yields the expected profits 
                           𝜋 = (1 − 𝑞)𝑞 − [1 −
(𝑔+𝑞−1)3+𝑎3
2𝑎3
]𝛾𝑓.           Equation e 
The first order conditions for the expected profit maximization are  
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑞
= 1 − 2𝑞 +
3(𝑔+𝑞−1)2𝛾𝑓
2𝑎3
= 0. 
 
And the corresponding second order derivatives for the profit maximization are 
𝜕2𝜋
𝜕𝑞2
= −2+
3(−1+𝑔+𝑞)𝛾𝑓
𝑎3
≤ 0,   for (0 < 𝑞 ≤ 1, 0 < 𝑔 ≤ 1 − 𝑞)or (1 − 𝑞 < 𝑔 < 1, 𝑎 >
𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡) or (𝑞 > 1, ((0 < 𝑓 ≤
−2+6𝑞−6𝑞2+2𝑞3
−3𝛾+3𝑔𝛾+3𝑞𝛾
, 𝑎 > −1 + 𝑞) or (𝑓 >
−2+6𝑞−6𝑞2+2𝑞3
−3𝛾+3𝑔𝛾+3𝑞𝛾
, 𝑎 >
𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡). 
 
The two levels of optimal output produced by the cartel are: 
Either (i) 𝑞(𝑔) =
2𝑎3+3𝛾𝑓−3𝑔𝛾𝑓−√2√2𝑎6+3𝑎3𝛾𝑓−6𝑎3𝑔𝛾𝑓
3𝛾𝑓
                           Equation f(i) 
Or      (ii) 𝑞(𝑔) =
2𝑎3+3𝛾𝑓−3𝑔𝛾𝑓+√2√2𝑎6+3𝑎3𝛾𝑓−6𝑎3𝑔𝛾𝑓
3𝛾𝑓
.                       Equation f(ii) 
The change in the optimal 𝑞 as a response to a change in 𝑔 are: 
𝑑𝑞(𝑔)
𝑑𝑔
= −1 +
𝑎3
√𝑎6−
3
2
𝑎3𝛾𝑓(2𝑔−1)
< 0, which holds for 0 < 𝑔 <
1
2
, 0 < 𝛾 < 1, 𝑎 > 0.         
                                                                Equation g(i) 
(i) 
𝑑𝑞(𝑔)
𝑑𝑔
= −1 +
√2√𝑎3(2𝑎3+3(1−2𝑔)𝛾𝑓)
−2𝑎3+3(2𝑔−1)𝛾𝑓
< 0 which holds for 0 < 𝑔 ≤
1
2
, 0 < 𝛾 < 1, 𝑎 > 0 and 
(
1
2
< 𝑔 < 1, 0 < 𝛾 < 1, 𝑎 > 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡).                                       Equation g(ii)       
 
The above relationships suggest that if the CA reduces the price threshold of detection, the cartel will 
increase its output and hence lower its price. This is the first source of deterrence captured by the 
model.  
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We want 0 ≤ 𝑔 ≤ 1, and from Equation  g(i) and g(ii), 𝑞 is a decreasing function of 𝑔. It is known that 
a low threshold set by the competition authority leads to a high output chosen for the cartel, hence 
decreasing prices. The preferred 𝑞 is Equation f(ii) and is retained onwards. Equation f(i) is disregarded. 
 
Competition Authority’s problem 
The total welfare generated in the economy in the cartelised markets in a period is consumer welfare 
minus cost of investigations given by 
                    𝑤(𝑞(𝑔)) ≜ 𝐸(?̃?(𝑞(𝑔)) = ∫ [(1 − 𝑞) − (1 − 𝑞(𝑔))]
𝑞(𝑔)
0
𝑑𝑞 −
(1−𝑔)2
2
.      Equation h 
 
Substituting 𝑞∗(𝑔) (from Equation f(ii), the optimal 𝑔 is solved and set it to zero, and get the equalities 
𝑑𝑤(𝑞(𝑔))
𝑑𝑔
= −
𝑎3(4√2𝑎3+3√2𝑓(2−3𝑔)𝛾+4√𝑎3(2𝑎3+3𝛾𝑓−6𝑔𝛾𝑓))
3𝛾𝑓√𝑎3(2𝑎3+3(1−2𝑔)𝛾𝑓)
= 0.   
 
The corresponding second order derivatives for the consumer welfare maximization are 
 
𝜕2𝑤
𝜕𝑔2
=
√2𝑎6(2𝑎3+3(1−3𝑔)𝛾𝑓)
(𝑎3(2𝑎3+3(1−2𝑔)𝛾𝑓))3 2⁄
≤ 0 for (
1
3
< 𝑔 ≤
1
2
, 0 < 𝑎 < 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡)and (
1
2
< 𝑔 <
1, 𝑎 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 2 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑠). 
Hence the optimal equilibrium thresholds set by the CA are: 
(i) 𝑔∗ =
2(2𝑎3+9𝛾𝑓−√2√2𝑎6−9𝑎3𝛾𝑓)
27𝛾𝑓
                                                  Equation i(i)       
(ii) 𝑔∗ =
2(2𝑎3+9𝛾𝑓+√2√2𝑎6−9𝑎3𝛾𝑓)
27𝛾𝑓
.          Equation i(ii) 
The preferred solution is 𝑔∗ =
2(2𝑎3+9𝛾𝑓+√2√2𝑎6−9𝑎3𝛾𝑓)
27𝛾𝑓
, Equation j for 
𝑑𝑔
𝑑𝛾
< 0.  
Substituting Equation i(ii) into Equation f(ii), we find that the optimal quantity (𝑞∗) produced by firms 
is 
𝑞∗ =
14𝑎3+9𝛾𝑓−2√4𝑎6−18𝑎3𝛾𝑓+3√2√𝑎3(10𝑎3−9𝛾𝑓−4√4𝑎6−18𝑎3𝛾𝑓)
27𝛾𝑓
 .                            Equation j 
Next, substituting Equations i(ii) and j into Equation c, the optimal probability of detection 𝜏∗ 
obtained is 
𝜏∗ = 1 −
𝑎3+
(6𝑎3+√2√𝑎3(10𝑎3−9𝛾𝑓−4√4𝑎6−18𝑎3𝛾𝑓))
3
729𝛾3𝑓3
2𝑎3
.                           Equation k 
                
Finally, substituting Equations k into Equation a, the optimal probability of convicted 𝑃𝐶∗retrieved is  
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𝑃𝐶∗ =
(
 
 
1 −
𝑎3+
(6𝑎3+√2√𝑎3(10𝑎3−9𝛾𝑓−4√4𝑎6−18𝑎3𝛾𝑓))3
729𝛾3𝑓3
2𝑎3
)
 
 
𝛾.                           Equation l 
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Chapter 5 The age profile of the number of convicted cartels by a 
competition authority: Empirical evidence 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Various studies have shown that detection and deterrence are closely linked. Empirically, however, 
there is an obvious measurement problem. While the detection rate can easily be captured through 
the count of activities, it is more difficult to assess deterrence, given that it is unobservable. Different 
methods such as surveys, count of activities, difference-in-differences or econometric impact studies 
or surveys have been used to assess the performance of a CA in deterring cartels.  
 
As stated by Bryant & Eckard (1991) and Combe et al (2008), detection plays an essential role in the 
enforcement of competition law and policy as it leads to deterrence. A CA successfully detecting cartels 
will also have the effects of preventing cartelised behaviour from firms. Although an increasing amount 
of work has recently been done by researchers and academics in looking at the role of deterrence in 
competition policy, very few empirical studies have been made in assessing either detection or 
deterrence or both across the different competition authorities. As a follow up to the theoretical model 
of the previous chapter, in this chapter, I study the age profile of cartel cases detected and convicted 
by a CA, in order to deduce results concerning efficiency in detection and success in deterrence over 
time. 
 
In terms of the different methodologies used in assessing the detection of cartels, Bryant & Eckard 
(1991) estimated the conspiracy durations in the US46 by using a model on statistical birth and death 
process. Combe et al (2008) then later used the same methodology, the birth process, death process 
and detected process to estimate the probability of a cartel getting caught in the EU47. Miller (2009) 
used a different method to show that the introduction of leniency programme in 1993 increased the 
cartels’ detection rate. More recently, drawing from a capture-recapture analysis, Ormosi (2014) 
estimates time-dependent cartel discovery rates, while allowing for heterogeneity across ﬁrms48. 
 
Moreover, still remaining as a very difficult task to obtain an absolute value for the number of cases 
deterred, researchers have attempted to measure deterrence by mostly making inferences about 
                                                          
46 They estimated probability of price fixing conspiracies getting caught is estimated to be at most between 13% 
and 17% in a given year in the US between 1961 and 1988. 
47They estimated the annual probability of cartels getting caught to fall between 12.9 and 13.3% in the EU. 
48 His results suggest that the European Commission’s detection rate has improved to 15%-20% between 1967 
and 2007. 
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changes in the ‘unobservables’ based on observed changes in the number of detected cartels (Miller 
(2009)) like ours, using difference-in-differences (Buccirossi et al., 2006), econometric impact studies 
or surveys (Harding (2011) and Davies and Majumdar (2002), OFT (2011)49, and NMa (2011)50). 
Moreover, Buccirossi et al (2011) developed the Competition Policy Indexes (CPIs), a set of indicators 
of the quality/intensity of competition policy to measure the deterrence effects of a competition policy 
in a jurisdiction. The CPIs is then applied to 13 OECD jurisdictions capturing any changes than happened 
between years 1995-200551. In investigating how anti-cartel enforcement deters consumer harm, 
Davies and Ormosi (2014) found that (i) the harm detected by the CA really is only the tip of the iceberg, 
accounting for only a small fraction (at most one sixth) of total potential harm; (ii) deterrence is at least 
twice as effective as detection as a means for removing harm; and (iii) undetected harm is at least 
twice as large as detected harm.  
 
In this chapter, I empirically assess the magnitude of detection and deterrence by looking at 
competition authorities’ age profile of cartel cases detected and convicted. The study of age profile is 
very commonly used in social sciences to analyse consumers, firms and institutions behaviour. Famous 
economic theories such as the product life cycle by Vernon (1966) and the life cycle theory of 
consumption by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) have been developed based on age profiling. Political 
scientists have also used age profiling theories when studying regulatory authorities (Lierson (1949), 
Bernstein (1955), Huntington (1966) and Downs (1967)52). Kahn (1988)53 and Martimort (1999)54 
reported that regulatory authorities do also tend to go through a life cycle.  
 
The empirical analysis is based on a panel data set of 32 countries over 9 years (2006-2014). I use the 
random effects maximum likelihood estimator and include an age, period cohort analysis (to better 
isolate the impact of the CA’s age, as opposed to the other time dimensions of time itself and the 
                                                          
49 In the UK, the Office of Fair Trading found that for every cartel case investigated, 28 large firms were deterred 
[See (OFT, 2011), page 7]. 
50 In the Netherlands, 60% of cartels were deterred and about a third of the undeterred cases was detected 
[Survey conducted by der Noll et al. (2011)]. 
51 They identified sanctions and damages; 2) financial and human resources; 3) powers during the investigation; 
4) quality of the law; 5) independence; and 6) separation of power as the factors that are likely to affect the 
degree of deterrence. See page 6-22 for structure of CPI. 
52 They put forward that government efficiency should be judged and be understood as a dynamic rather than a 
static phenomenon over time. 
53 According to Kahn (1988), regulatory agencies would   start out as “vigorous, imaginative, and enthusiastic 
protagonists of the public interest” and “defining their responsibilities broadly and creatively”. They would then 
gradually becoming devitalized, limited in their perspective, routinized and bureaucratized in their policies and 
procedures and increasingly solicitous and protective of the interests of the companies they are supposed to 
regulate, resistant to changes, wedded to status quo and organizations for collective action over time. 
54 Martimort (1999) adopted a dynamic perspective to explain the life cycle of regulatory agencies overtime also 
found that agencies start to behave in the public interest and then become increasingly inefficient, 
bureaucratized and more eager to please private interests. 
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cohort to which the CA belongs). It is found that the age of the cartel law does impact on the number 
of convicted cartels over time. The results indicate that there is an inverted U-shape trend in the 
number of cartels prosecuted over the life of the CA. Importantly, it is observed that this result remains 
robust once changes over time in the CA’s budget is controlled for. This is interpreted as evidence of 
increasing deterrence as a consequence of the increased efficiency of detection. Thus, over time, 
initially and potentially for many years, the CA is observed to successfully convict more cartels as a 
consequence of its growing experience. However, this increased efficiency also increasingly deters new 
cartels from forming. Eventually, the latter outweighs the former, and a downturn in cartel cases 
convicted is observed. It is important to stress that this interpretation indicates that competition 
authorities are successful in deterring cartels, even though the number of cases eventually declines. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 recalls the theoretical model of the 
previous chapter to establish hypotheses and explanatory variables. Section 5.3 presents the data and 
descriptive statistics. Section 5.4 explains the empirical model and methodology. Section 5.5 reports 
the results and discusses the implications, and this is followed by concluding remarks in Section 5.6. 
 
5.2. Hypotheses and explanatory variables 
 
As captured by the propositions of the main theoretical result from the previous chapter, over the CA’s 
lifetime, the number of cartels convicted rises for (potentially many) years, before hitting a ceiling and 
thereafter declining. The period of decline can be interpreted as a maturity stage, in which the fruits 
of deterrence are dominant.  
 
Although this is the main prediction, the theoretical model also includes some pointers as to other 
potential explanatory variables. Below, these are identified as (i) potential resource constraints, (ii) 
penalties, and (iii) legal/institutional features of the jurisdiction which might affect the efficiency of 
CAs. 
 
5.2.1. Potential resource constraints 
Budget 
Most obviously, appropriate budget is essential in order for a CA to be able to perform its day to day 
activity and achieve its objectives. This will have a direct effect on the level of detection efficiency of a 
CA (refer to page 71 of Chapter 4). A generous budget enables a CA to more effectively and efficiently 
enforce its law, train its staff and be engaged in advocacy. It is normally very costly to run a cartel 
investigation given that it may take many years to gather evidence and conclude one. Budget can be 
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expected to be both positively and negatively related to the number of cartel cases. While, a higher 
budget is likely to enable the CA to convict more cartels, a higher budget can also help a CA to be more 
efficient in deterring cartels (perhaps by engaging in more aggressive compliance programmes) hence 
reducing the number of cartels available to be convicted. 
 
Merger cases 
In most countries, merging firms are obliged to notify the CA if the merger is beyond a certain 
threshold. The CA then has no choice than to go through every merger case notified (Phase I) and 
launch investigations (Phase II) if need be. Merger referrals can therefore be considered to be 
exogenous to the CA. And since in the real world, CAs operate with resource (including human and 
financial) constraints, the number of merger cases referred to the CA might negatively impact on its 
ability to convict cartels. The higher the number of mergers notified, the lower the number of cartel 
cases the CA is likely to detect and convict. On the other hand, if the CA has a generous budget, merger 
cases are unlikely to have any impact on the number of convicted cartels. 
 
Fines and imprisonment 
A CA can also exercise its powers to impose punishment such as fines and imprisonment so as to 
discourage firms from engaging in anti-competitive behaviour. Elzinga & Breit (1973), Posner (1985), 
Shavell (1985) and Werden, Barnett, & Hammond(2012) found that monetary sanctions are best ways 
to deter cartels. Moreover, years of imprisonment give an indication to firms of what they risk if they 
are caught to be guilty when engaged in cartels. The higher is the maximum number of years of 
imprisonment that firms risk, the less likely they are to engage in cartels. Equation 4.4 of Chapter 4 
clearly demonstrates how an increase in the level of punishment impacts negatively on the level of 
profit of cartels. This consequently causes firms to reduce their prices so as not to be detected.  
 
Institutional/legal characteristics 
Leniency policy 
Leniency policy55 is now the most important tool either for detecting cartels or for developing the 
necessary evidence to convict them (Werden, Barnett, & Hammond (2012), Bos (2006) and Motta & 
Polo (2003)). Firms will come forward under the leniency program only if their chance of being 
successfully prosecuted is sufficiently high (Chang & Harrington, 2008). Leniency is believed to increase 
the rate of detection at substantially lower cost, so that enforcement resources are saved (Bos (2006), 
                                                          
55 Leniency programs provide cartel members with the opportunity to report their collusive practices in 
exchange for a reduction of fines or even full amnesty. 
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Miller (2009)). At the early years of the adoption of the leniency policy, a positive relationship between 
leniency policy and convicted cartel cases can be expected.  
 
On the other hand, if the leniency policy is successful in deterring cartels, it can be expected to be 
negatively related to the number of convicted cartel overtime. Miller (2009)56 empirically theoretically 
found that the number of discoveries increases immediately following the leniency introduction and 
then falls below pre-leniency levels. Therefore, leniency policy can be expected to have both a positive 
or/and negative influence on the cartel activities of a CA overtime. 
 
Legal system- Common law versus civil law  
The type of legal system adopted by a country may also affect the number of cartels convicted.  As 
explained in chapter 3, page 32, common law regimes give more rulemaking powers to the judiciary 
while the civil law regimes reserve greater power to the legislature giving less discretion to the judiciary 
(Dainow, 1966/7). Posner (1973) has claimed that the common law system is superior, largely because 
it can act more like a market in adapting to change. Others support the legal certainty provided by a 
civil code.  There is no a priori expectation of which is better and the benefits of each may be context- 
specific. We therefore adopt no prior on whether common law should be better or worse for 
competition policy in deterring cartels.   
 
Agency design- prosecutorial versus integrated agency 
The broad design of the set of institutions responsible for evidence gathering and decision making in 
competition enforcement is also considered. Following Fox and Trebilcock (2013), three basic 
institutional models are identified: 
(i) judicial, if the competition agency must go to court for enforcement 
(ii) bifurcated if the agency goes to a specialised tribunal for enforcement 
(iii) integrated agency57 if a commission within the agency makes the first-level 
adjudication. 
These three classifications embrace another important institutional feature, which is the prosecutorial 
(or adversarial) versus the inquisitorial approaches. The nature of Fox and Trebilcock’s three 
institutional models is that the first two are naturally prosecutorial, while the third is naturally 
inquisitorial, so we combine judicial and bifurcated agencies to identify prosecutorial systems. This 
                                                          
56 Cartel detection rate increased by about 62% and that the rate of cartel formation fell by about 59% between 
1985 and 2005 after leniency policy was introduced. 
57 See chapter 3, page 33. 
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dichotomy with the inquisitorial integrated agency is used as an alternative categorisation of 
institutional designs and used in this study. We have no prior that there is an ex ante superior system.   
 
5.3. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
A panel data set of 34 competition authorities from 33 countries58 (plus the EU) over the period 2006 
– 2014 is used. It is the full set of available countries with at least six years of country data, with the 
exception of Pakistan which set up its CA in 2010, and Chile where CA data is available from 2008. Data 
has mainly been collected from the GCR Enforcement reports, the World Bank, the George Washington 
Competition Law Center Database (GWCLC), and the website and annual reports of the competition 
authorities. The variables have been downloaded based on their availability.  
 
The definitions and data sources of the variables are shown in Table 5.159 (refer to chapter 2 for 
detailed information pertaining to the data). 
Table 5.1: Definition of variables and data sources (yearly data) 
Dependent 
variable 
Definition Form60 Source 
#𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒍 Number of cartel decisions: It is used as a 
measure of the number of cartel 
prosecuted by the CA. 
Log61 GCR 
Independent variables     
𝒂𝒈𝒆 Number of years a country has had a 
cartel law.  
Level Annual reports and 
CA's website 
𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒚 Whether or not the country has a leniency 
programme in the year concerned62 
1 or 0 Annual reports and 
CA's website 
#𝒎𝒆𝒓𝒈𝒆𝒓 Number of mergers notified to the CA Log GCR 
𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒔  
 
Three year moving average of fines 
(million Euros)63 
Log GCR 
𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒐𝒏 
 
Maximum number of years of 
imprisonment for individuals found guilty 
of engaging in cartels 
Log GCR 
                                                          
58 The jurisdictions are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Czech, Denmark, EU, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Lithuania, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and US (D0J). 
59A small amount of interpolation was required for missing years of some independent variables. Also, GCR did not 
report information for Slovenia for 2012, 2013 and 2014. 
60 The form of the variables has been chosen based on the most robust results.  
61 To avoid losing observations when the number of cartel decisions are converted in log form, one is added to 
the number of cartel decisions. 
62 An alternative measure - the number of years the CA has had a leniency policy - is infeasible given extreme 
multicollinearity with the age of the of the cartel law. 
63 A three year moving average of average fine is used because of huge variations in the data over the years. 
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𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒎𝒐𝒏𝒍𝒂𝒘 Common law =1 v/s Civil Law=0  1 or 0 Mixed Jurisdictions: 
Common Law v. Civil 
Law by W. Tetley64 
𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒍 Prosecutorial =1, Integrated =0 
 
1 or 0 The Design of 
Competition Law 
Institutions by E. Fox 
and M.J. Trebilcock 
𝒃𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆𝒕 CA expenditure (millions of euros) Log GCR 
 
 
Table 5.2 provides the pooled summary statistics for these variables. US is the oldest and Pakistan is 
the youngest CA in the database. US made the highest cartel decisions, 90 in 2011, while Germany had 
the highest number of merger notified in 2007. EU in 2010 had the highest average fine. Canada is the 
country having the highest number of years of imprisonment if found guilty of being engaged in cartels. 
In 14 countries65, there is no imprisonment punishment for cartels. US is the country which had its first 
leniency policy in 1993. 
Table 5.2: Summary statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 300 11.777 7 14.1665 1 91 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 306 39.529 32.5 25.419 3 124 
𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 306     8.552     8 5.866           0 37 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 301 269.973 115 377.129 0 2231 
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 275 63.882 2 63.8817 0 471 
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛 298 3.279 2 3.936 0 14 
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑤 305 0.266 0 0.442 0 1 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 305 0.354 0 0.479 0 1 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 294 2.507 2.389 1.123 -1.386 4.937 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the year that countries first established their cartel laws. The US was the first in 1890, 
followed by Norway in 1926. Most big European countries then followed by 1965.  However, 50% of 
the countries in our database introduced their first cartel law after 1980 and 33% after 1990. 
 
                                                          
64 See Tetley (1999-2000). 
65 They are Austria, Belgium, EU, Finland, Lithuania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, 
South Africa, Slovakia, Sweden and Switzerland. 
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Figure 5.2 shows the number of cartel prohibition decisions taken by a sample of the CAs, 2006-2014. 
Only a sample of countries is used - as illustrative and to maintain clarity of the figure. Thus, the oldest, 
youngest and average aged CA have been selected. It is observed that US had the highest number of 
cartel decisions (reflecting the size of economy of the US) and the UK has the lowest number.   
Figure 5.1: Evolution of cartel law establishment 
 
Figure 5.2: Number of cartel decisions (2006-2014) 
 
However, when standardising the number of cartel decisions by GDP, it is found that Netherlands and 
Pakistan are well above the rest of countries as seen in Figure 5.3. This can be explained by the fact 
that cartels have recently become illegal in Pakistan and Netherlands. Since, it is only recently that 
cartels are illegal in these countries, it can be expected that cartel population would be greater 
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compared to the rest of countries. The greater cartel population also implies a higher probability that 
cartels are being detected, hence resulting to a greater number of detected cartels.  
Figure 5.3: Number of cartel decisions/Billion GDP (US$) (2006-2014) 
 
 
Figure 5.4 presents a scatter diagram of the #cartel variable across countries, taking the number per 
annum. This suggests a positive but probably non-linear relationship, but is, of course, not multivariate 
– it is included here merely to set the scene. 
Figure 5.4: Number of cartel decisions p.a. v/s Cartel law age 
 
 
96 
 
The strength and direction of a relationship between the different variables are also shown in the 
correlation matrix in Appendices, Table 5.A.1. It is observed there seems to be almost no correlation 
between (i) cartel and abuse and fines, prison, common, law and prosecutorial. Some moderate 
positive correlation if however found between cartel and age, leniency, merger and budget. 
 
5.4. The empirical model and methodology 
 
To empirically study the age profile of the cartel cases prosecuted by a CA, the maximum likelihood 
random effects estimators (MLE) is used66. The random effects is applied because I have a panel data 
and the individual specific effects are assumed to be uncorrelated with the independent variables.  
 
5.4.1. Age, period and cohort effects 
One important feature of our empirical model is the application of age-period-cohort analysis. Given 
that the focus of this chapter is to determine the age profile of cartel cases prosecuted, and I have 
panel data such that that the CA’s established their cartel law at different times, and are observed at 
several point in time, and come from different cohorts, it is important that the age effects are not 
confounded with a cohort effects.  
 
The age-period-cohort analysis serves as a general methodology for cohort analysis when all three 
factors, age, period and cohort are of interest (Yang, Fu, & Land, 2004). In this chapter, age effects are 
the consequences of the CA growing older in terms of having its first cartel law (age one is the first 
year after the cartel law is implemented). Period effects are the consequences of influences that vary 
through time e.g. the financial crisis which occurred in 2008 and might have impacted on the number 
of cartel cases. The cohort effects are the consequences of a group of CA setting up in particular periods 
and sharing a particular event together during a particular time span e.g. change in trade or 
competition policy (commonality of competition laws), free trade between countries.  
 
For example, UK established its first cartel law in 1956. Therefore, in observation year 2014, age = 58 
and the cohort is 1956. All the CAs which established their cartel law in the same period might share 
common features as a result of circumstances in 1956. 
 
                                                          
66 I have used maximum likelihood estimator to estimate the number of cartels equations. I have compared the 
results of an econometric model based on a parametric Poisson, Negative Binomial and Gaussian probability 
distribution. Based on the robustness of the results, the Gaussian distribution was chosen. 
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Normally, an arbitrary five-year interval is used for cohorts. But, since we have key dates where there 
have been main changes in the global laws and regulations with CA’s sharing the common likelihood 
of experiencing the changes, the age data is grouped into the following four cohorts:  
 Cohort 1- Before 1957 – before the EC treaty 
 Cohort 2- Between 1958 to 1986 – After the treaty and before the EU single Act 
 Cohort 3- Between 1987 to 1996– Between the introduction of the EU single Act and the 
launching of WTO competition project 
 Cohort 4- After 1997 – After the launching of the WTO competition project 
However, one well known problem that arises when using the age-period-cohort model is the 
identifiability problem. This occurs due to the exact relationship between the three variables 
(cohort=period-age). It is impossible to empirically deal with one without also dealing with others given 
their closely interrelated effects67. The cohort effects are then modelled as a step function with each 
step corresponding to an interval.  
 
To solve for the identification problem and to capture the age, period and cohort effects, we use the 
same approach used in Levin & Stephan (1991) and Hall, Mairesse, & Turner (2007). The parameters 
are restricted by omitting both of one of the cohort dummies and one of the year dummies to break 
the exact collinearity and identification problem present in the model. 
 
5.4.2. Empirical model  
The model to be estimated is given by: 
Specification I (without budget) 
𝑙𝑛#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑓(𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡|𝛽1) + 𝛽2𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        Equation 5.1 
where 𝑖 is the competition authority and 𝑡 is the year (𝑡 =2006, 2007,…., 2014). 𝑙𝑛#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 is the natural 
log of the number of cartel decisions and is the dependent variable, all explanatory variables are 
defined in Table 5.1. 𝑣𝑖 is the unit-specific unobserved heterogeneity that differs across countries, but 
remains constant over time for any particular country and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the remainder of the disturbance. 
 
Thus specification I captures the age profile of the CA’s cartels prosecuted based mostly on the 
experience acquired overtime. However, detection efficiency and deterrence do not only depend on 
                                                          
67 See Hall, Mairesse, & Turner (2007), page 4. 
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experience but very importantly also on budget. The day to day operations of a CA including 
investigating cartels, or any other type of anti-competitive behaviours or engaging in advocacy, will 
inevitably depend on the level of budget. Therefore, in order to net out the age effects of a CA on the 
number of prosecuted cartel given the CA’s budget, a budget variable is added to the model in 
specification II. Specifications I and II will enable us to compare the age profile of a CA’s prosecuted 
cartels in the absence and the presence of a budget constraint.   
 
Specification II (including budget) 
𝑙𝑛#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝑓(𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡|𝜃1) + 𝜃2𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑙𝑛#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃5𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
𝜃6𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖 + 𝜃7𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝜃8𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃9𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜃10𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−2 +
𝑢𝑖 + 𝜗𝑖𝑡                            Equation 5.2 
 
Where 𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 is the natural log of budget,  𝑢𝑖 is the unit-specific unobserved heterogeneity that 
differs across countries, but remains constant over time for any particular country and 𝜗𝑖𝑡 is the 
remainder of the disturbance. Lagged budget up to two periods are included so as to account for the 
time required by the CA to detect, investigate and convict cartels. 
 
I am aware that 𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡  may in fact be endogenous which would lead to inconsistent estimators: 
for example, while budget can influence the number of prosecuted cartels, the latter can also have an 
impact on the budget to be allocated to the CA. However, this endogeneity issue is hopefully avoided 
if the relationship runs from lagged budget to cartels convicted. 
 
5.5. Results and implications 
 
This section presents the core results with particular focus on the age variable. The results for Equation 
5.1 (excluding explicit allowance for any budget constraints) and for Equation 5.2 when budget is 
incorporated to the model are shown. This is a largely presentational device which serves to establish 
that the key result on age is robust to the inclusion of budget: in other words, the time profile we 
identify is not merely reflecting an omitted variable which perhaps declines after some point.   
 
Since the theory (chapter 4) does not provide precise predictions about the exact mathematical form 
of the actual age profile (it shows that an inverse U-shape profile is possible under certain functional 
forms), the model is tested with different order of age polynomials. This will enable me to obtain the 
most robust results to derive the age profile of cartel cases convicted. The results are illustrated up to 
age polynomial of order 4 – inclusion of even higher order polynomials would complicate the analysis 
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and provide less robust results. The preferred equation under both specifications is selected based on 
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) test68. Stock and Watson (2007) recommend using the AIC rather 
than Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) as choice criterion, by arguing that including more 
parameters is better than omitting signiﬁcant parameters. The results for specifications I and II are 
shown in Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 respectively.  
Table 5.3: Specification I (excluding budget) 
Dependent variable69: 𝒍𝒏#𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒍 
Equation (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
𝑎𝑔𝑒ℎ70 1.381*** 0.157 7.829** 4.736 
 (0.448) (1.431) (3.592) (8.186) 
𝑎𝑔𝑒ℎ2  1.131 -14.29** -3.851 
  (1.256) (6.805) (25.730) 
𝑎𝑔𝑒ℎ3   8.389** -4.746 
   (3.643) (31.42) 
𝑎𝑔𝑒ℎ4    5.361 
    (12.73) 
𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 1.435** 1.414** 1.480** 1.473** 
 (0.685) (0.686) (0.686) (0.685) 
𝑙𝑛#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 0.168*** 0.159** 0.150** 0.152** 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.062) (0.062) 
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 -0.003* -0.003* -0.003** -0.003** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛 -0.0860 -0.0912 -0.126 -0.120 
  (0.110) (0.109) (0.103) (0.104) 
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑤 -0.943*** -0.938*** -0.929*** -0.945*** 
  (0.297) (0.293) (0.274) (0.277) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 0.585** 0.530** 0.406* 0.420* 
 (0.248) (0.253) (0.241) (0.245) 
𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 2 0.398 0.520 0.527 0.552 
 (0.375) (0.394) (0.366) (0.373) 
𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 3 -0.615* -0.508 -0.430 -0.399 
 (0.345) (0.361) (0.337) (0.347) 
𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 4 -0.233 -0.194 -0.130 -0.106 
 (0.413) (0.411) (0.383) (0.389) 
𝑌2009 0.394** 0.395** 0.379** 0.383** 
 (0.177) (0.177) (0.178) (0.178) 
𝑌2010 0.093 0.099 0.072 0.078 
 (0.173) (0.173) (0.174) (0.174) 
                                                          
68 The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) test measures the relative quality of statistical models for a given set of 
data. It estimates the quality of each model, relative to other models given a collection of models for the data. It 
also deals with the trade-off between the goodness of fit of the model and the complexity of the model. The 
model with the lowest AIC is the preferred one. 
69 Note: Dependent variable is log of 1+number of cartels.   
70 𝑎𝑔𝑒ℎ is age divided by 100. 
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𝑌2011 0.128 0.137 0.102 0.109 
 (0.171) (0.171) (0.172) (0.172) 
𝑌2012 0.169 0.181 0.134 0.143 
 (0.172) (0.172) (0.173) (0.174) 
𝑌2013 -0.011 0.002 -0.053 -0.040 
 (0.181) (0.181) (0.183) (0.185) 
𝑌2014 0.063 0.082 0.031 0.048 
 (0.184) (0.185) (0.186) (0.190) 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 -0.449 -0.215 -1.115 -0.882 
 (0.839) (0.875) (0.941) (1.093) 
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎_𝑢 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 0.484*** 0.476*** 0.431*** 0.433*** 
 (0.080) (0.080) (0.074) (0.075) 
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎_𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 0.627*** 0.627*** 0.627*** 0.627*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Number of country 200 200 200 200 
Observations 34 34 34 34 
chi2 35.47 36.27 41.21 41.39 
P-value 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.002 
Chi2- Joint significance of age 9.49 10.56 17.66 17.70 
P-value 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.001 
AIC 469.380 470.579 467.637 469.459 
BIC 532.048 536.545 536.902 542.022 
Chi2- joint significance of cohorts 11.77 12.4 12.22 11.91 
P-value 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Table 5.4: Specification II (including budget) 
Dependent variable: 𝒍𝒏#𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒍 
Equation (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
𝑎𝑔𝑒ℎ 1.215*** 0.433 8.598** 6.803 
 (0.435) (1.414) (3.480) (8.076) 
𝑎𝑔𝑒ℎ2  0.729 -15.620** -9.588 
  (1.253) (6.568) (25.330) 
𝑎𝑔𝑒ℎ3   8.853** 1.292 
   (3.503) (30.870) 
𝑎𝑔𝑒ℎ4    3.082 
    (12.500) 
𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 1.451** 1.444** 1.482** 1.483** 
 (0.684) (0.684) (0.684) (0.683) 
𝑙𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 0.150** 0.144** 0.135** 0.136** 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.061) (0.061) 
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 -0.004** -0.004** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛 -0.141 -0.142 -0.183* -0.179* 
 (0.109) (0.108) (0.101) (0.103) 
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𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑤 -0.927*** -0.926*** -0.916*** -0.925*** 
  (0.287) (0.286) (0.263) (0.267) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 0.633*** 0.596** 0.470** 0.478** 
  (0.240) (0.247) (0.232) (0.236) 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 -0.082 -0.080 -0.079 -0.083 
  (0.167) (0.167) (0.167) (0.167) 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 -0.063 -0.077 -0.043 -0.045 
  (0.193) (0.195) (0.194) (0.194) 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑡−2 0.369** 0.367** 0.353** 0.354** 
  (0.148) (0.148) (0.147) (0.147) 
𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 2 0.495 0.569 0.577* 0.591* 
 (0.363) (0.382) (0.350) (0.356) 
𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 3 -0.322 -0.270 -0.171 -0.157 
 (0.359) (0.369) (0.340) (0.346) 
𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 4 0.025 0.0312 0.125 0.134 
 (0.430) (0.428) (0.394) (0.397) 
𝑌2009 0.352* 0.352* 0.340* 0.342* 
 (0.182) (0.182) (0.182) (0.182) 
𝑌2010 0.035 0.040 0.013 0.016 
 (0.175) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176) 
𝑌2011 0.038 0.045 0.010 0.013 
 (0.175) (0.175) (0.176) (0.176) 
𝑌2012 0.125 0.134 0.087 0.092 
 (0.177) (0.178) (0.178) (0.179) 
𝑌2013 -0.084 -0.073 -0.131 -0.123 
 (0.184) (0.185) (0.186) (0.188) 
𝑌2014 -0.050 -0.034 -0.090 -0.079 
 (0.190) (0.192) (0.192) (0.197) 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 -0.922 -0.741 -1.731* -1.588 
  (0.855) (0.908) (0.962) (1.125) 
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎_𝑢 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 0.460*** 0.458*** 0.404*** 0.407*** 
 (0.078) 0.078 (0.073) (0.742) 
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎_𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 0.620 0.619 0.620 0.619 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Observations 196 196 196 196 
Number of country 34 34 34 34 
chi2  43.65 43.99 49.86 49.92 
P-value 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
Chi2 -Joint significance of age 7.79 8.2 16.31 16.25 
P-value 0.005 0.017 0.001 0.0027 
AIC 460.471     462.134   458.270    460.209     
BIC 532.590   537.530   536.944 542.161 
Chi2 – joint significance of cohorts 7.53 7.79 7.33 7.24 
P-value 0.023 0.020 0.026 0.027 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Based on the results from the above tables, the age polynomial function of order 3 (equation (iii)) is 
preferred since it has (a) the lowest AIC value and (b) the highest joint significance in age at 1% level, 
in both specifications. Having said this, the differences in AIC between the different functional forms 
of age are very small.   
 
Figure 5.5 shows the predicted age profile of convicted cartel cases by competition authorities for each 
cohort, holding the other explanatory variables constant at sample mean values.  
Figure 5.5: Prediction of age profile (specification I) 
 
 
Figure 5.6 shows the same for specification II, i.e. including the budget constraint.  
Figure 5.6: Prediction of age profile (specification II) 
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These show that although deterrence is present throughout the entire period, it only begins to 
outweigh increasing detection (because of increased efficiency) after 40 years which illustrated by the 
flattening of the slope of the age profile.   
 
Figure 5.7 summarises by showing the average (weighted across cohorts) age profile, and comparing 
the two specifications. An inverted U-shape of the age profile is again obtained.   
 
Figure 5.7: Prediction of age profile for average cohort 
 
 
The age profile shows that there is a peak in year 46 and 44 in specifications I and II, respectively. There 
is therefore evidence the CAs age profile can be explained by the interaction of detection efficiency 
and deterrence. As a CA acquires experiences and becomes more efficient in convicting cartels, it 
produces deterrence of cartelised behaviour. Hence, as detection rate increases, it also influences the 
effects of deterrence. The fact that a cubic, rather than a simple quadratic, fits best can be explained 
by the shape of the curve after the turning point.  Figures 5.5-5.7 show that there is a downturn, but 
only very slight – more like a flattening off into a plateau. The implication is that the deterrent effect 
is sufficiently strong to balance increased efficiency in detection, but not sufficiently strong to seriously 
reverse the trend in the number of cases detected. 
 
Turning now to results on the other explanatory variables, I find that cohorts do impact on the number 
of convicted cartels over time. Although individually insignificant except for cohort 2, the cohorts are 
found to be jointly significant at 1% and 5% level for specification 1 and 2 respectively. For example for 
specification I, when comparing cohorts for specification I, CAs which have set up between 1958 and 
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1986, i.e are in cohort 2, are likely to convict 53% more cartels than the CA established before 1957, 
cohort 1. On the other hand, CAs set up between 1987 and 1996, cohort 3, are likely to convict 43% 
less cartels than those in cohort 4 (established after 1996). The profile of the cohort is shown in 
Appendices, Figures 5.B.1 and 5.B.2. It is observed that under both specifications, the cohort profile 
displays an inverse U-shape. 
 
Interestingly, it is found that when budget is included there are only very slight changes in the age 
coefficients. This result confirms that the profile observed is not the result of systematic changes in 
budget over the typical CA’s lifetime. However, this is not to deny the importance of budget in 
determining the level of convicted cartels of a competition authority. Moreover, the actual number of 
convicted cartels tend to be the results of previously allocated budget rather than current period 
budget. A 1% increase in budget in two previous periods (𝑡 − 2) enables the CA to detect and convict 
0.35% more cartels. This may be due to the fact that cartel cases are normally very time consuming, 
involve the use of a lot of resources (both human and financial) and may take years before they are 
completed. Therefore, given the nature of such cases, CAs are unlikely to obtain the immediate results 
from increasing budget.  The budget allocated in the period will impact on future cartels detected and 
convicted.  
 
In addition to age and budget, the number of convicted cartels is also influenced by the other factors 
such as leniency policy, the number of merger notified, the level of punishment, the type of law and 
institutional design.    
 
The results show that one additional period of leniency policy is likely to increase convicted cartels by 
1.47% at 10% significance level. This confirms the effectiveness of using the leniency policy as a tool to 
detect cartels. It indicates that firms are willing to take advantage of the immunity offered by being an 
informant.  Moreover, number of mergers notified is also found to be positively related to convicted 
cartels at 10% level. A 1% increase in number of mergers notified is likely to cause number of cartels 
prohibited to increase by 0.15% and 0.13% for specification I and II respectively. One reason explaining 
such relationship may be the when mergers occur in a particular industry, it may be giving an indication 
to the CA about industries which may be problematic and that should be investigated, hence leading 
to increase in the convicted cartels. 
 
The type of law adopted by a country as well as the type of institutional design is also shown to have 
an effect on the number of convicted cartels by a CA at 1% and 10% significant level respectively. CA’s 
functioning in countries adopting a civil law tend to boost up the number of convicted cartels, contrary 
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to those in countries which follow common law. On the other hand, a CA’s adopting an inquisitorial 
system approach is less likely to convict more cartels than those adopting a prosecutorial approach.  
 
There is also evidence that punishments both in terms of imprisonment and fines do deter cartelised 
behaviour. As the level of fines increases by 10%, the number of convicted cartels is likely to fall by 
0.03% under specification I and 0.05% under specification II. Interestingly, if the maximum 
imprisonment increases by 10% i.e 1.2 months, convicted cartels fall by 1.3% and 1.8% when faced 
with a budget constraint. This consequently produces deterrence effects which reduces the incentives 
for cartels to form and ultimately decreases the number of cartels that the CA can convict. The findings 
confirm the theories in the literature put forward by Elzinga & Breit (1973), Posner (1985), Shavell 
(1985) and Werden, Barnett, & Hammond (2012).  
 
Based on the above discussions, the results from both specifications confirm the theoretical findings 
of our previous chapter. They show that CAs have a stronger cubic age profile when they are faced 
with a budget constraint. CAs therefore do enjoy the benefits of detection efficiency (economies of 
scale) and of their deterrence policy over time. As a CA starts its operations, it becomes more efficient 
in detecting and convicting cartels overtime is explained by the upward trend in the number of 
convicted cartels until it reaches a peak where deterrence start to outweigh the detection efficiency 
hence causing the number of convicted cartel to fall and flatten.  
 
5.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter aimed at testing the theoretical model developed in Chapter 4, to study the age profile of 
cartel cases convicted by a CA. We empirically assessed the success of a CA in deterrence and 
demonstrated that CAs have indeed been successful in producing deterrence.  
 
The empirical results clearly show that by displaying a cubic age profile, age of cartel law does impact 
on the number of cartels cases convicted by a CA. The findings are in line with the theoretical model 
developed in chapter 4. As the competition authority starts its operations, it becomes more efficient 
in detection and hence deterrence. The CA consequently experiences an increase in the number of 
cartels detected, but at a diminishing rate until the deterring effects outweighs the detection 
efficiency. At this point, the CA will then experience a fall in its number of cartels convicted.  
 
While the focus of this chapter is mainly determining the age profile of convicted cartels by a CA, the 
results also confirm the important role of budget in determining the level of convicted cartels of a CA. 
It is found that in a CA is likely to be more efficient in convicting cartels when the budget is larger. 
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Moreover, the actual outcome of a CA tends to be the results of previously allocated budget rather 
than actual budget. Further empirical findings indicates that (i) leniency policy positively impacts on 
the number of prohibited cartels (ii) mergers positively influence the CA’s prohibited cartels (iii) 
countries with a common law prosecute less cartels than those with civil law, (iv) CAs having a 
prosecutorial tend to prohibit more cartels than those having an integrated agency and (v) fines and 
imprisonment do deter cartelised behaviour. 
107 
 
Appendices 
 
5.A Correlation Matrix 
Table 5.A.1: Correlation matrix 
  #𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 #𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑤 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 1         
𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.325 1        
𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 0.487 0.439 1       
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 0.395 0.360 0.556 1      
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 -0.046 0.110 0.262 0.130 1     
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛 0.089 0.146 0.267 0.234 -0.088 1    
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑤 -0.008 0.008 0.216 0.127 -0.046 0.423 1   
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 0.112 -0.127 0.239 0.091 -0.140 0.282 0.533 1  
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 0.425 0.403 0.646 0.525 0.494 0.217 0.201 -0.025 1 
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5.B Age, period and cohorts effects 
 
Specification I 
Figure 5.B.1: Specification I-cohort profile 
 
 
Specification II 
Figure 5.B.2: Specification II-age profile 
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Chapter 6 Impact of budget allocation on the performance of 
competition authorities 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
Just like other institutions, competition authorities (CAs) face limited resources when they perform 
their day-to-day activities. They are subject to constraints in terms of human capital, time 
management, and most importantly for this study, the level of budget they receive. Put together, these 
restraints can press CAs to be selective in the choice of which tasks to carry out especially when they 
have control on the budget allocation across the different types of anticompetitive behaviour. 
 
In this chapter, I am interested in understanding how the level of budget, more particularly its 
allocation, impacts on the number of competition cases the CA investigates. Controlling for the level 
of budget along with the age of the competition authority (which proxies for experience), I am keen in 
addressing the research question: “Does the level of budget together with its allocation among 
alternative types of anticompetitive behaviour (such as number of in-depth merger investigations, 
number of cartels detected, and number of abuses discovered) trigger substitutability or 
complementarity”?  
 
To answer this question I apply the panel dataset assembled for the previous chapters, which spans 
the period 2006-2014 (9 years) and apply a two-stage least squares estimator, so as to deal with the 
endogeneity of budget allocation (chosen by the CA) and the level of budget selected by the 
government.  
 
The main hypothesis to be tested is whether a change in the budget allocation on one area of 
anticompetitive behaviour impacts on other areas of anticompetitive behaviours. For example, 
assuming that the level of overall budget remains unchanged, does a shift in the allocation of budget 
from cartels to abuses affect the number of abuse and cartel decisions taken by the CA in the same or 
subsequent periods, and similarly are there effects on the number of in-depth merger investigations 
undertaken?  
 
In fact, whether the number of cartel and abuse decisions rises or not after the change in budget 
allocation depends on the combined effects of detection efficiency and deterrence. Deterrence now 
can take a new configuration, as it is possible that changes by the CA in its budget allocation may 
change the nature of anti-competitive behaviour by firms, so an increase in spending on detecting one 
type of behaviour may impact (in due course) on the likelihood that firms will turn to an alternative 
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form of anti-competitive behaviour. Thus, the analysis of deterrence is further developed beyond the 
narrower focus of the previous chapter.  
 
Of course, the strength of this new source of deterrence depends to some extent, on firms’ awareness 
of the CA budget allocation. One may question how feasible is it that a breakdown of a cartel, perhaps 
induced by augmented invigilation by the competition authority (triggered by additional budget or 
budget allocation), would revert to an abuse of dominant position or a horizontal merger or sequence 
of mergers? The underlying idea is that, after a cartel breaks down, firms face tougher competition. 
More efficient firms respond to competition positively and grow in size, becoming dominant firms in 
the market and then, later on, may exploit their dominant position in the market illegally. Alternatively, 
cartelists might react to breakdown by instigating a sequence of mergers, designed to re-establish 
quieter competition (perhaps tacit collusion). These are logical possibilities, and this chapter 
investigates whether the evidence confirms substitutabilities (or complementarities) which can be 
explained in these terms.  
 
Previous research related to this topic has mostly focused on the effectiveness of competition 
enforcement. To the best of my knowledge, no attention has been given to the understanding of the 
relationship between different types of anti-competitive behaviour. The closer studies to this work are 
by Davies et al (2014), who empirically assess whether or not cartel breakdowns provoke a period of 
intensive merger activity amongst the former cartelists, and the research by Cosnita-Langlais et al 
(2013), who determine theoretically the connection between cartels and mergers (CA’s intervention).  
 
However, none of those works have considered the link between all the three types of anti-competitive 
behaviour, triggered by changes in the budget and its allocation. This research enables the 
understanding of the behaviour and the strategies by CAs and firms, which can contribute to the 
strengthening of competition law and policies. An anticipation of the main findings indicates that 
budget plays very important role in determining the level of CAs’ activities. A causal relationship is 
observed between cartel and merger cases. In the presence of a budget constraint, CAs are tempted 
to substitute in-depth merger cases to cartel cases. Moreover, the total budget allocated to each CA 
seems to influence the detection of cartels cases, and not monopoly abuse cases or in-depth mergers 
investigations. A weak link has been found between cartels and monopoly abuses. Changes in the level 
of budget or budget allocation are also likely to take time and impact on the activity of the CA.   
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 reviews the existing background 
literature. Section 6.3 discusses the data and sample selection. Section 6.4 explains the empirical 
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methodology followed by section 6.5, which reports the main findings. Section 6.6 concludes and 
offers a discussion of the main policy implications. 
 
6.2. Background literature 
 
Since the last couple of decades, there has been a massive increase in the number of CAs established 
around the world. This is an indication that more and more countries have now realised the importance 
of a CA in promoting a healthy and competitive environment. A CA enforces its competition law and 
policy by preventing, restricting and deterring firms from being engaged in anti-competitive conduct 
such as cartels, anti-competitive mergers and monopoly abuses.  
 
According to International Competition Network (ICN (2008)), 
‘The success of a competition agency depends heavily upon its skill in selecting priorities and designing 
a strategy for applying its authority.’ It goes further, ‘Without a conscious process of setting priorities 
and ranking possible activities according to their legal and economic significance, the competition 
authority is less likely to focus on what truly matters. Without a strategy, the agenda of the competition 
authority is prone to be governed entirely by external impulses in the form of complaints from 
consumers, requests for action by business operators, or queries from legislatures and other 
government ministries. These impulses sometimes might channel a competition agency’s efforts 
toward matters of the greatest significance, but this is not invariably or even routinely the case’.  
CAs annually deploy a great amount of resources to carry out their main activities i.e., investigating 
cartels, anti-competitive mergers and abuses of monopoly power. However, no CA enjoys unlimited 
funds and this forces CAs to make choices and set priorities to ensure that the funding is allocated 
effectively. According to UNCTAD (2013), setting priorities and allocating resources should be at the 
forefront of any competition agency in their operation.  
 
Cartels are viewed as the supreme evil of antitrust, overcharging consumers many billions of dollars 
each year, as documented in Connor & Lande (2011). They have no legitimate purposes and serve only 
to rob consumers of the tangible blessings of competition (Werden, Barnett, & Hammon, 2012). 
According to Hüschelrath & Smuda (2012), a perfectly functioning cartel is expected to lead to the 
same market outcome as a monopoly, causing similar allocative, productive and dynamic 
inefficiencies.  
 
Mergers can harm or benefit consumers (Crandall & Winston, 2003). While mergers can create cost 
efficiencies (economies of scale, economies of scope) and facilitate technological progress, allowing 
the merged firm to produce at a cheaper price than before the merger, they can also lead to increase 
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market concentration, which may result in increased post-merger price, with subsequent negative 
effects on consumer welfare and often also on total welfare.  
 
Monopoly power can bring advantages to the firms and the consumers, but the harm occurs when a 
monopoly exploits its power to raise prices and/or exclude its rivals from the market to earn higher 
profits at the expense of allocative efficiency. The monopolist will seek to extract a price from 
consumers that is above the cost of resources used in making the product. And higher prices mean 
that consumers’ needs and wants are not being satisfied, as the product is being under-consumed. 
 
As stated in UNCTAD (2013), ‘This, for example, could be for an authority to note that, before priority 
setting, it observes that investigations are roughly one third merger, one third abuse and one third 
cartel. The authority might accept that this is a reasonable allocation. But there is still substantial room 
for useful priority setting related to resource allocation.  
 
The following citation from UNCTAD 2013, page 14, corroborates the above example: 
One story might go something like this: cartel cases take more resources per case, so they will get, say 
45 per cent of resources. Merger cases require speedy and instant progress, let’s say by law, while 
abuse cases can have variable speeds, so we will combine staff for both types of cases (like the 
reorganization of Directorate General of Competition of the EU, DG COMP, in 2003). At the same time 
advocacy is an important activity with rewards that can substantially outweigh costs. So we will 
maintain resources for advocacy that would lie within the realms allowed by parliament. This might 
yield 10 per cent for advocacy and, by elimination, 45 per cent for the joint merger/abuse area.’ 
 
These views clearly show that important questions arise if the CA is to allocate its resources effectively. 
Allocation varies over time and reflects particular needs that vary over time. Yet, up to date very few 
studies have actually looked into the role of budget and its allocation in determining the level of 
activities of a CA. CAs normally devotes a great amount budget on cartel cases given they have most 
harmful effects on consumers. Cosnita-Langlais & Tropeano (2013) find that if coordinated effects are 
taken into account in mergers, then for a sufficiently large effect the agency may optimally have to 
refrain from controlling mergers, and instead spend all resources on fighting cartels. Moreover, 
according to Kumar et al (2015), CAs should consider mergers as potential ‘second-best’ alternative to 
cartels, which implies that resource (re)allocation in competition authorities, law practices and 
economic consultancies may become necessary to handle the increase in merger cases. On the other 
hand, the nature of monopoly cases makes it impossible for a CA to analyse them in mass. If they had 
to, CAs would require a great amount of resources. For example, the US investigated less than 20 abuse 
113 
 
monopoly cases a year compared to above 45 cartels decisions that were issued in 2013 and 2014. UK 
investigated only 3 abuse cases compared to 7 cartel cases in 2013. 
 
Just like CAs need to make a choice and decide how to allocate their budget across their various 
policing activities, firms also have a choice to make about their business strategy, so as to maximise 
profit. Whichever, the anti-competitive behaviour that firms choose to adopt, it depends on the 
effectiveness of the CA in enforcing its competition law and policy, detecting and deterring such 
behaviours. Mehra (2007) theoretically models the decision of a firm to either join a cartel or a merger 
by incorporating the effect of market structure, industry characteristics and considering their impact 
on the profit accruing from merger and cartel. She finds that in the absence of cartel fines, a firm 
always prefers a cartel to merger, when the latter does not involve any efficiency gains. Moreover, 
Cosnita-Langlais & Tropeano (2013) find that a tougher anti-cartel action triggers more mergers, and 
vice versa. The costs involved in mergers (large capital requirements) also make firms to prefer to be 
cartelised than to consider merging (Stigler, 1950). Cartels are cheaper, as coordination is only needed 
in times of low demand (Bittlingmayer, 1985). Kumar et al. (2015) suggest that a key benefit of cartel 
formation versus merger is that a cartel can take advantage of customer beliefs that the policing action 
of competition is in place.  
 
Furthermore, studies investigating the impact of cartels breakdown on mergers find evidence that 
after the breakdown of cartels, the level of merger activities in the respective industries increases 
((Davies et al, 2014), Kumar et al (201271, 201572) and Hüschelrath & Smuda (2012)). Findings about 
the relationship that they share are rather mixed. Using a sample of 84 EC cartels, Davies et al. (2014) 
find that mergers are indeed more frequent post-cartel breakdown, especially in markets that are less 
concentrated. Coordinated effects may not only motivate this, but also be a consequence of market 
restructuring. The same authors also find that in markets where mergers do no occur, the post-cartel 
structure is consistent with potential dominance. Cosnita-Langlais & Tropeano (2013) argues that the 
two branches of anti-competition behaviours are complement, and Bittlingmayer (1985) and Mehra 
                                                          
71 Kumar et al. (2012) find evidence of post-cartel merger activity in eight out of ten largest US manufacturing 
industries around the time of the adoption of the Sherman Act in 1890. 
72 Kumar et al. (2015) show that 45% of cartels detected by the EC between 2001-2010, were followed by 
mergers in following years, and that this high percentage was twice as likely in markets where buyers were 
fragmented. They find that, first, the average number of all merger transactions increase by up to 51 percent 
when comparing the three years before the cartel breakdowns with the three years afterwards. Second, for the 
subset of horizontal mergers, merger activity is found to increase even more – by up to 83 percent – after the 
cartel breakdowns. 
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(2007)73 show evidence of cartels and mergers used as alternative arrangements to increase 
profitability.  
 
To sum up, much of the existing literature has focused on the connection between cartels and mergers, 
but limited or no attention has been given to the understanding of the relationship between budget 
and its allocation decision and all the three types of anti-competitive behaviour. By identifying this gap, 
in this chapter, I therefore attempt to assess the substitutability and/or complementarity between the 
three branches of anti-competitive behaviour via the budget allocation decision and budget. 
 
6.3. Intuitive theoretical framework 
 
In this section, the intuition of the theoretical mechanism that justifies the empirical methodology that 
is planned to be used are provided. The idea is similar to that developed in chapter 4, but here is 
extended to allow for alternative sources of illegal behaviour and a thorough role of budget. This 
extension brings in additional complexities, as discussed below.  
 
Following the logic of chapter 2, an economy composed of a collection of markets M is considered. In 
each market there are Nm firms that either compete with each other or avoid competition via some 
sort of anticompetitive behavior. Three alternative sources of illegal anticompetitive conduct are 
examined: cartel, abuse of dominant position in the market, and merger.  
 
Firms are rational agents and maximize their expected profits given the uncertainty of being caught in 
an illegal conduct. It is assumed that firms know the probability distribution of being discovered in each 
of the illegal anticompetitive demeanours and choose the illegal conduct that generates the highest 
expected profit to the firm in that industry. The profitability of illegal activities varies by market and 
market structure, and so does the probability of detection by the CA. A shift rightwards in the 
probability distribution of one of the anticompetitive behaviours may be sufficiently large to deter that 
conduct in certain markets. Once an illegal activity becomes less profitable it may no longer be 
preferred to an alternative demeanour, which non-necessarily is the legal competitive behaviour.  
 
Thus, the underlying framework seems prone to justify a certain degree of substitutability between 
anticompetitive behaviours. Incidentally, I am interested in testing empirically whether or not the 
intensification of detection by the competition authority in one of the anticompetitive branches 
                                                          
73 She argues that the choice between the two forms is determined by factors such as the structure of industry, 
organization of firms, and, last but not least, existing antitrust laws. 
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relative to other illegal anticompetitive activities produces a direct effect in the detection of that illegal 
behaviour, and possibly indirect effect on other anticompetitive conducts.  
 
Of course, it is legitimate to wonder how realistic the assumption of substitutability between 
anticompetitive behaviours is. For example, how is it possible that a breakdown of a cartel induced by 
augmented invigilation by the competition authority, may revert to an abusive of dominant position? 
One way to explain this shift is to think this reversion as a response to an intensification of competition. 
After a cartel breakdown, firms face tougher competition and it may well happen that more efficient 
firms respond to competition positively and grow in size, becoming dominant firms in the market and 
subsequently exploit their dominant position in the market illegally. Of course, a more immediate 
reversion mechanism is a cartel breakdown followed by mergers, proposed as tool to reduce the 
number of players in the market and gain market efficiency/power. There are plenty of other channels 
that can explain how substitution between illegal conducts occurs. In this chapter I remain agnostic on 
how the substitution process takes place, and simply study its implications to substitutability 
empirically. I study the role of budget allocation and furthermore how a change in the budget 
allocation may trigger substitutability between “competing” anticompetitive behaviours.  
 
The level of budget is decided by the government, partly based on the performance of the competition 
authority and partly relying on political reasons. The competition authority chooses the budget 
allocation, i.e. how the budget is allocated across the different activities undertaken by the 
competition authority. Both a possible change in the level of budget and of its allocation is examined. 
The effect of the latter is of particular interest because is under the control of the competition 
authorities, whereas the level of budget is often under the jurisdiction of the government. 
 
The competition authority has objective of maximising consumer welfare and to that aim sets the fines 
and chooses the effort upon which to conduct an investigation in each of the anticompetitive areas. 
Experience is taken as given and the success of a conviction for illegal conduct is beyond the control of 
the competition authority, as it depends on the decision of the Court and the evidence provided by 
the parties involved. One important variable at discretion of the competition authority is the share of 
budget (the share only because the total amount is chosen by the government) to allocate to punish 
the various types of illegal activities. Hence, indirectly the competition authority has control on which 
illegal activity prioritize via the budget allocation. If the competition authority were to select not to 
allocate money to investigate abuses, then all abuses would be undetected, but more money would 
be left to detect the other two types of illegal activities. A certain number of cartels would be punished, 
116 
 
and a number of anticompetitive mergers would be blocked.74 Abuses would become a cheaper option 
of misconduct and I could expect their number to rise in the future, but yet remain undetected until 
the CA does not allocate budget to detect abuses.  
 
In the econometric section, the number of convictions by activity the CA has produced in a period is 
estimated. Among the explanatory variables, the contemporaneous and past level of budget (in logs), 
as well as the contemporaneous and past share of budget allocated to mergers, abuses and cartels will 
be included. The aim is to understand how the budget (decided by the government) and its allocation 
decided by the CA will impact on the substitutability across different conducts, following the 
mechanism described in this section.  
 
The ultimate goal of including budget and its allocation in the number of convictions for cartel, abuse, 
and in depth merger is to test the following conjectures empirically.  
 
Conjecture 1: Changes in the level of budget or in the budget allocation have a contemporaneous 
impact (or almost contemporaneous impact) on in depth mergers, whereas they take some time to 
impact cartels and abuses.  
 
There are two reasons for a delayed impact on abuses and cartels. A first reason is that it takes some 
time to punish a cartel or an abuse of dominant position because of the lengthy process to assemble 
the evidence and wait for a Court decision. The second explanation is that shifting towards one of 
these two illegal conducts may not happen overnight. On the other side in depth merger decisions are 
taken within a year or so and also one can expect the movement towards these activities (not per se 
illegal) will be faster. In the empirical part, this conjecture is tested by adding lags in the budget 
allocation and level in each on the anticompetitive behaviour allocations.  
 
Conjecture 2: An increase in the level of budget does not spread its effect equally among the 
anticompetitive conducts. 
 
This conjecture is silent about the budget allocation - held constant - and hence is all about the level 
of budget. The reason behind the lack of symmetry is that the different activities undertaken by the 
CA are, prior to the increase of budget, subject to different intensities of budget constraint. In some 
activities the budget may be very tight, in others it may be loose. Furthermore, certain activities are 
harder to be discovered even with additional budget, thus creating further asymmetries. In the 
                                                          
74 Of course there is a certain lag between the change in budget allocation and the effect of the change in budget 
on the number of cartel punished, as cartel-related investigations are well known to last few years. 
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empirical results whether the level of budget and its lags (and similarly for the budget allocation) have 
different effects in the anticompetitive activities will be checked. 
 
Conjecture 3: Substitutability of cartels to merger and monopoly abuses to mergers occur more often 
than the vice versa. 
 
When a merger is notified, a CA is obliged to look into the merger (Phase I) to identify if there are any 
anti-competitive issues, normally in a limited time frame. The number of mergers that is notified is 
therefore not within the control of the CA and is therefore exogenous. The CA will then decide to 
whether to proceed to Phase II investigation or clear the merger based on the findings of Phase I. CAs 
very often make such decisions based on the available resources. Moreover, given the limited time 
frame to come up with a decision in a merger investigation, a CA may decide to substitute cartels and 
abuse cases to mergers cases in the short run. This conjecture will empirically be investigated by 
comparing the coefficients of the budget allocation (and its lags) to in depth merger investigation in 
either the cartel or abuse equation with those of the budget allocation to cartels and monopoly abuses 
in the merger equation.  
 
Moreover, from the firm’s perspective, based on the literature put forward in the literature review 
section, it can be expected that with an increase in the detection efficiency of the CA, firms are likely 
to formalise their agreements into mergers to avoid being caught. While there is limited literature on 
the relationship that may exist between monopoly abuse cases and other anti-competitive conducts, 
I remain agnostic about this relationship.  
 
Conjecture 4: Substitutability or complementarity of cartels to monopoly abuse cases and monopoly 
abuse to cartel cases may occur following a change in the budget allocation decisions. 
 
Given a budget constraint, if a CA decides to increase the budget allocated to cartels, holding constant 
the proportion of budget allocated to mergers and the residual category, it will imply a corresponding 
drop in the budget allocated to monopoly abuse cases. If this does not produce deterrence, the change 
in budget can be expected to positively affect the number of cartels detected and negatively the 
number of monopoly abuses discovered. Thus, the CA may then be detecting cartels at the expense of 
monopoly abuse cases. The same effect may apply to any other couple of budget displacement. 
 
On the other hand, an increase in the proportion of budget allocated to cartels, may increase its ability 
to detect more cartels and lead to deterrence of cartelists. This deterrence effect may also spread to 
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the monopolists abusing their power hence causing the number of monopoly abuse detected to fall 
over time.  
 
6.4. Data and econometrics 
 
In this section, I first describe the dataset used in this chapter and then define the econometric model 
and the estimation methodology. The same sample of panel data of 34 competition authorities from 
34 countries75 over the period 2006 – 2014 described in chapter 2, complemented with the variables 
listed in the Table 5.1 is used. The definition of the relevant variables and data sources are documented 
in Table 6.1.76 
Table 6.1: Definition of variables and data sources (yearly data) 
Variables Definition Source 
#𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒍 
 
Number of cartel decisions: It is used as a measure of 
the number of cartel prosecuted by the CA. 
GCR 
#𝒂𝒃𝒖𝒔𝒆 Number of abuse cases closed: It is used as a measure 
of the number of monopoly abuse cases investigated 
by the CA. 
GCR 
#𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒉 Number of mergers that went for phase II 
investigation. 
GCR 
𝒃𝒖𝒅𝒈𝒆𝒕 Funding available for the CA to perform its day to day 
activities. It is expressed in millions of euros. 
GCR 
𝒂𝒈𝒆 Number of years since a competition authority has 
been established and started to operate.  
Annual reports 
and CA's website 
#𝒎𝒆𝒓𝒈𝒆𝒓 Number of mergers notified to the CA GCR 
𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒔 Total cartel fines (million Euros). GCR 
𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒐𝒏 Maximum number of years of imprisonment for 
individuals found guilty of engaging in cartel conduct 
could face. 
GCR 
𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒃𝒖𝒅𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒍 The % of staff devoted to cartel cases is used as a 
proxy for % of budget allocated to cartel cases. 
GCR 
                                                          
75 The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Czech, Denmark, EU, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Lithuania, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and US. 
76 A small amount of interpolation was required for missing years of some independent variables. Also, GCR did 
not report information for Slovenia for 2012. 
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𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒃𝒖𝒅𝒂𝒃𝒖𝒔𝒆 The % of staff devoted to abuse cases is used as proxy 
for % of budget allocated to abuse cases. 
GCR 
𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑𝒃𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒉 The % of staff devoted to merger cases is used as 
proxy for % of budget allocated to merger cases. 
GCR 
 
6.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 6.2 provides pooled summary statistics for all the chosen variables. There is a considerable 
variation in the panel. For examples, the number of cartel decisions in the year ranges from 0 to 90, 
with an average of about 11 cartels, the number of monopoly abuse closed ranges between 0 and 206, 
with an average of 24 abuse cases, the number of in-depth mergers ranging between 0 and 311, with 
an average of 20 in-depth mergers or number of notified merger ranging between 1 and 2231. Of 
course most of the variation in the competition cases is explained by differences in size and 
development across countries, along with a heterogeneous level of experience gained by the 
competition authorities. In the empirical analysis, natural logs are used to moderate the impact of 
extreme heterogeneity in sizes77.  
 
To disaggregate the total budget into expenditures on each category of anticompetitive behaviour we 
employ proportions of staff to proxy for the allocation of budget. For countries which did not report 
their staff allocation, average proportion of staffs allocated to the various categories (for countries 
where data was reported) was used to spread the budget across the various categories. From the Table 
6.2, it is found that on average 27%, 22% and 20% of the budget is allocated to cartels, monopoly abuse 
and in-depth merger cases respectively. One minus the sum of the three proportions of budget 
allocation documented below is the proportion of budget assigned to other categories. 
Table 6.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 300 10.777 14.166 0 90 
#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 300 23.773 32.480 0 206 
#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 301 19.913 42.943 0 311 
#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 301 269.973 377.126 1 2231 
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 294 22.582 27.572 0.25 139.4 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 294 0.266 0.733 0 0.67 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 294 0.219 0.068 0 0.49 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 294 0.203 0.117 0 1 
                                                          
77 To avoid losing observations when any of #𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙, #𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 and #𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ are zero, for which the logarithm is 
minus infinity, one is substituted.   
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US took the highest cartel decisions, 90 in 2011 while Germany had the highest number of merger 
notified in 2007. EU in 2010 imposed the highest fine.  The US DOJ was allocated with the highest 
amount of budget at EUR 139.4 in 2014 while Belgium was allocated with the minimum budget EUR 
0.25 million in 2006. US DOJ spent the highest amount of its budget on cartel and the US FTC spent the 
highest amount of its budget on abuse and merger cases. Of course country size matters in these 
figures.  
 
6.4.1.1. Cross section and time series variations 
The relationships between the (period averages) of cartels, abuse and mergers cases 2006-2014 are 
shown in Figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3.  
 
It can be observed that on average Poland investigated the highest number of mergers78, while US 
made the highest number of cartel decisions. In terms of abuse cases, Poland, Finland, South Africa 
and EU are well above the line of best fit. In terms of the relationship between in-depth merger and 
monopoly abuse cases, it is found that the model explains 26% of the variations in in-depth mergers 
and monopoly abuse cases. Moreover, referring to figure 6.2, the line of best fits reveals that the model 
explains 5% of the variations between cartel and in-depth merger cases. As for the relationship 
between cartels and monopoly abuse cases, the data explains 0.002% of the variations of the model 
(Figure 6.3). The low 𝑅2 may indicate that it can be pretty hard to predict the behaviour in terms of 
activities of CAs. Moreover, a low 𝑅2 may not necessarily be inherently bad if the coefficients are 
statistically significant and important conclusions can be drawn. See Appendices Table 6.A for 
acronyms of countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
78 Poland investigates all the notified merger. 
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Figure 6.1: Relationship between abuse cases and in-depth merger cases 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Relationship between cartel cases and in-depth merger cases 
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Figure 6.3: Relationship between monopoly abuse and cartel cases 
 
  
The strength and direction of a relationship between the different variables are also shown in the 
correlation matrix below, Table 6.3. It is observed there seems to be almost no correlation between (i) 
cartel and abuse and in-depth merger cases, (ii) in-depth merger cases and budget and the proportion 
of budget allocated to monopoly abuse case and (iii) budget and the proportion of budget allocated to 
cartel cases. Interestingly, some correlation is found among the variables (i) cartel cases and budget 
and (ii) monopoly abuse and in-depth merger cases. A weak positive relationship is found to exist 
between monopoly abuse cases and the proportion of budget allocated to cartel. Moreover, mergers 
and the proportion of budget allocated to cartels are found to be negatively weakly linearly related.  
Table 6.3: Correlation Matrix 
 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑 
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑 
𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑 
𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 1       
𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 0.009 1      
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 0.094 0.426 1     
𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 0.425 -0.074 0.013 1    
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 -0.116 -0.161 -0.132 -0.039 1   
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 0.203 0.037 -0.077 -0.167 0.346 1  
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ -0.024 0.117 0.142 -0.067 -0.400 -0429 1 
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6.5. Empirical strategy 
I perform a regression analysis to explain how size and allocation of budget by a CA can impact on 
cartels, abuse monopolies and merger cases. The economic specification is made up of 3 equations: 
cartel, abuse and merger equations. The explanatory variables of interest in the three equations are 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡, 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙, 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒, and 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ. These variables enable the 
understanding of the relationship that may prevail between the budget allocated to a CA, the budget 
allotment decision and the three types of anti-competitive conducts. The estimation will not only 
enable to study the impact of budget allocation on the number of investigated cases for the same 
conduct, but also help in examining the inter-relationship that may exist between resources spent on 
a particular conduct and the detection of other types of conducts (Conjectures 3 and 4). The variables 
of interest will enable us to test how an increase in budget is likely to spread its effect across the 
different anti-competitive conducts (Conjecture 2).  
 
In order to study the contemporaneous impact of budget and its allocation by a CA and address 
Conjecture 1, a regression model with lagged explanatory variables is used. More specifically, I employ 
a linear distributed lag model of order 3. I have selected 3 lags because this particular length of lags 
produces better estimates than two or four lags. More than four lags would have not been reasonable 
with only nine periods and, similarly one lag would have been too short to capture any medium/long-
run time effect. The distributed lag model is used to capture changes in 𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡, 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙, 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒, and 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ beyond the time in which they occurred, for each of the 
detected cases of a CA. Current and past values of 𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡, 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙, 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 and 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ represent one of the phenomena causing changes in the 𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙, 𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 and 
𝑙𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟, and their lagged coefficients measure the impact of past values on the dependent 
variables. For example, if CAs decide to increase the proportion of budget allocated to cartels, the 
effects that it will have on the detection and deterrence of cartels and other conducts will not occur 
instantaneously, but will be spread over future time periods.  
 
The cartel equation is constructed based on Equation 5.2 of Chapter 5. It explores the relationship 
between the number of cartels detected and budget allocated to the CA and its budget allocation 
decision in the current year as well as the previous three years as well as a vector of control variables 
namely the level of punishment imposed in terms of imprisonment and fines, the years the CA has had 
a leniency policy, the age of the CA and the number of mergers notified to the CA.  
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The monopoly abuse equation is analogous and captures the effects of budget and its allocation 
decision in the current and previous three periods along with control variables, age of the CA and 
number of merger filed on the number of monopoly abuse cases investigated. 
 
Finally, the merger equation studies the relationship between the number of in-depth merger 
investigated and budget allocated to the CA and its allocation decision in the current and previous 
three periods and the control variable, age of the CA and number of merger filed. It should be stressed 
that merger filed is treated as an exogenous variable – while in-depth mergers reflects the CA’s 
decisions, the number of mergers filed in the economy is outside the CA’s control.  
 
Including a time trend to the three equations to capture the time effects, the full econometric model 
is given by as follows: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽9𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−3 +
𝛽10𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡−2 +
𝛽13𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡−3 + 𝛽14𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽15𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽15𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡−3 + 𝛽16𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽17𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽18𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽19𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡−3+𝑣1𝑖 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡 
                         Equation 6.1 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑙𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝜃5𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝜃6𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−3+𝜃7𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃8𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝜃9𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝜃10𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡−3 + 𝜃11𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
𝜃12𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜃13𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝜃14𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡−3 +
𝜃15𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃16𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜃17𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡−2 +
𝜃18𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡−3 + 𝑣2𝑖 + 𝜀2𝑖𝑡          Equation 6.2 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑙𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛼5𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛼6𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−3 + 𝛼7𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛼9𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛼10𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡−3 + 𝛼11𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼12𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼13𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛼14𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡−3 +
𝛼15𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼16𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼17𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡−2 +
𝛼18𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡−3 + 𝑣3𝑖 + 𝜀3𝑖𝑡           Equation 6.3 
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𝑙𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 is natural log of the number of cartel decisions, 𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 the natural log of number of abuse 
cases closed, and 𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ is the natural log of number of mergers investigated. All control variables 
have been defined in Table 6.1. 𝑣𝑖 is the unobserved country-specific effect and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic 
error term in each equation.  
 
6.5.1. Endogeneity of budget and budget allocation 
 
Budget and the proportion of budget to be allocated to the different activities by the CA are 
endogenous variables. Budget is a variable under discretion of the government. Endogeneity arises 
because I can expect budget to be linked to competition authority’s performance. Endogeneity of the 
budget allocations is more obvious as it is under the direct control of the competition authority and it 
may depend on targets the authority wishes to meet. To deal with the endogeneity, instrumental 
variables regression analysis are presented, where budget and the proportion of budget allocated to 
the different competition cases are instrumented. Instruments used are argued to affect the budget 
and allocation of budget of a CA, but have no effect on each of the dependent variables, except through 
their influence on budget and proportion of budget allocated to the different activities anticompetitive 
activities.   
 
The instruments are constructed from the proportion of budget allocated to the cartel, monopoly 
abuse and merger cases investigated. To construct the instruments, authorities are first grouped in 
four groups, depending on the period of establishment of CAs, so to have very old CAs, old CAs, young 
CAs and very young CAs.79 Hence, I have Category 1- Before 1957 (before the EC treaty), Category 2- 
Between 1958 to 1986 (after the treaty and before the EU single Act), Category 3- Between 1987 to 
1996 (between the introduction of the EU single Act and the launching of WTO competition project) 
and Category 4- After 1997 (after the launching of the WTO competition project).  
 
From now on, to enable better understanding of the instrument, I choose to focus our explanation on 
one activity where budget is allocated, that is, cartel cases. The same concept would apply to the other 
instruments of 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒, and 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ.  
 
The average proportion of budget allocated to cartels by other CAs in the same group are employed 
as instrument for the proportion of budget allocated to cartels. Some sort of co-movement are 
expected within groups for the budget allocation. The assumption here is that there is some within 
group common behaviour in the budget allocation, but not on the performance of the CAs, as this 
                                                          
79 CAs have been grouped based key dates of main changes in the global laws and regulations with CA’s sharing 
the common likelihood of experiencing the changes. 
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depends on factors that go beyond the grouping, the individual ability of the CA and the country 
particular industrial structures. In the empirical part the strength and validity of the instruments are 
tested and country-level unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for.  
 
After constructing the instruments outlined above and further instruments for the level of budget, 
along the lines of those discussed in previous chapters in this dissertation, I conduct an instrumental 
variable regression (two-stage least squares estimation, 2SLS), where the first stage asks for the factors 
affect the CA’s budget and allocation of budget and the second stage asks which factors that affect the 
number of cartel, monopoly abuse cases detected and merger investigated, controlling for the 
endogeneity of budget and budget allocation in determining the number of competition cases.  
 
The first stage least square results are shown in Table 6.4. 
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Table 6.4: First stage of 2SLS 
  Cartel equation Abuse equation Merger equation 
 Dependent 
variables 𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑 
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑 
𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑢𝑑 
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑 
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑 
𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑 
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑 
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑 
𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑 
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 
𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑑𝑝 0.021 0.024*** 0.005 0.017* 0.046 0.020*** 0.001 0.015 0.043 0.021*** 0.002 0.015 
 (0.035) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.035) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.036) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) 
𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑜𝑝 0.003  -0.025*** -0.008 0.001 0.002  -0.024*** -0.008 -0.003 0.005  -0.025*** -0.008 -0.003 
 (0.031) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.032) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.030) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 0.747*** -0.016 -0.012 0.027** 0.717*** -0.012 -0.008 0.024* 0.721*** -0.013 -0.008 0.025* 
 (0.089) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.084) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.085) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑡−2 0.073 0.010 0.003 -0.028 0.090 0.008 0.003 -0.023 0.087 0.008 0.003 -0.023 
 (0.115) (0.010 (0.012) (0.019) (0.112) (0.010) (0.012) (0.021) (0.112) (0.010) (0.012) (0.021) 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑡−3 0.039 0.007 0.004 -0.013 0.066 0.004 0.000 -0.014 0.066 0.004 0.000 -0.014 
 (0.057) (0.006) (0.008) (0.021) (0.055) (0.006) (0.007) (0.021) (0.055) (0.006) (0.007) (0.021) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 𝑡−1
 
0.811 0.701*** -0.029 -0.173 0.700 0.727*** -0.014  -0.194*  0.727 0.725*** -0.015  -0.193* 
(0.690) (0.177) (0.125) (0.118) (0.700) (0.174) (0.123) (0.110) (0.694) (0.174) (0.121) (0.108) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 𝑡−2
 
-1.268*** -0.121 -0.028 0.071  -1.350*** -0.121 -0.029 0.094 -1.367*** -0.119 -0.028 0.093 
(0.413) (0.128) (0.113) (0.096) (0.417) (0.119) (0.119) (0.088) (0.396) (0.120) (0.119) (0.087) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 𝑡−3
 
-0.291 -0.067 -0.017  -0.232* -0.426 -0.027 0.030  -0.216* -0.428 -0.027 0.030  -0.217* 
(0.469) (0.089) (0.083) (0.122) (0.526) (0.086) (0.077) (0.121) (0.525) (0.086) (0.077) (0.121) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑
𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑡−1
 
-0.219 -0.102 0.649***  -0.235* 0.015 -0.105 0.621*** -0.215 0.038 -0.106 0.620*** -0.214 
(0.487) (0.133) (0.145) (0.138) (0.514) (0.138) (0.140) (0.133) (0.507) (0.136) (0.139) (0.132) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑
𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑡−2
 
-0.897 -0.022 -0.253 0.173  -1.326* -0.011 -0.245 0.099  -1.164* -0.024 -0.253 0.109 
(0.737) (0.145) (0.210) (0.148) (0.691) (0.145) (0.216) (0.128) (0.666) (0.141) (0.212) (0.121) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑
𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑡−3
 -0.256 0.064 0.032 0.061 -0.117 0.021 -0.016 0.046 -0.144 0.023 -0.015 0.045 
(0.449) (0.079) (0.083) (0.128) (0.451) (0.067) (0.084) (0.124) (0.449) (0.067) (0.083) (0.124) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ
𝑡−1
 
0.325 0.011 -0.043 0.641*** 0.414 0.010 -0.049 0.644*** 0.433 0.009 -0.050 0.645*** 
(0.272) (0.059) (0.069) (0.067) (0.281) (0.060) (0.073) (0.073) (0.279) (0.059) (0.071) (0.072) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ
𝑡−2
 
 -1.400*** -0.038 -0.056 0.055  -1.506*** -0.040 -0.063 0.029  -1.478*** -0.042 -0.064 0.031 
(0.258) (0.043) (0.056) (0.041) (0.243) (0.044) (0.058) (0.042) (0.250) (0.041) (0.058) (0.041) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ
𝑡−3
 
0.213  -0.055** -0.034 0.072 0.199  -0.052* -0.031 0.070 0.192  -0.051* -0.030 0.070 
(0.182) (0.026) (0.024) (0.053) (0.174) (0.028) (0.023) (0.052) (0.176) (0.027) (0.023) (0.052) 
Note: Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 6.4: First stage of 2SLS (continued) 
  Cartel equation Abuse equation Merger equation 
 Dependent 
variables 𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑 
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑 
𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑢𝑑 
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑 
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑 
𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑 
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑 
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑 
𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑 
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.010*** 0.001 0.002*** -0.001 0.009*** 0.001 0.002*** -0.001 0.008** 0.001 0.002*** -0.001 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
𝑎𝑔𝑒2 
-0.1×
10−3*** 0.000 
−0.2 ×
10−4***  0.000  -0.0001** 0.000 
−0.2 ×
10−4*** 0.000 
 −0.1 ×
10−3* 0.000 
−0.1 ×
10−4*** 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝑙𝑛#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 -0.005 -0.004 0.001 0.004 -0.004 -0.004 0.002 0.005 -0.005 -0.004 0.002 0.005 
(0.027) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.027) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.028) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒 0.030 -0.003 -0.005  -0.006*         
(0.024) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)         
𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠 0.196*  -0.051***  -0.044** 0.013         
(0.109) (0.012) (0.019) (0.016)         
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.001         
(0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)         
_cons 2.100* 0.070 0.062 -0.112 1.722 0.091 0.082 -0.074 1.894 0.078 0.074 -0.064 
 (1.197) (0.205) (0.203) (0.157) (1.136) (0.204) (0.199) (0.182) (1.160) (0.207) (0.189) (0.178) 
Observation             178 178 178 178 185 185 185 185 186 186 186 186 
Number of 
clusters     34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
F test of excluded instruments          
F (14, 33)  5.05 8.22 14.33 78.63 2.87 7.63 37.93 33.12 3.67 7.8 36.32 33.6 
Prob > F        0.0001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sanderson-Windmeijer multivariate F test of excluded instruments:       
F (11, 33)       2.13 3.51 3.5 33.99 1.64 4.29 2.46 18.65 1.82 4.18 2.6 19.99 
Prob > F         0.046 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.133 0.001 0.022 0.000 0.091 0.001 0.017 0.000 
Note: Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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6.6. Empirical results 
 
The regressions estimated based on the two-stage least squares are reported in Table 6.4. Only the 
results of the key variables are presented. At the bottom of the table, the results of various tests of 
hypotheses related to strength and validity of the selected instruments are displayed. The list of the 
chosen instruments is given in a note to the table. The F-tests, as well as the under identiﬁcation and 
the weak identiﬁcation (also based on an F-statistic) tests get the unambiguous message across that 
instruments are strong (except for the equation 𝑙𝑛#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒). Also, instruments are valid, as conﬁrmed 
by the J over identiﬁcation test for all the three equations.  
 
The full set of results is shown in the Appendices (Table 6.B.1). The regressions are also estimated using 
the Ordinary least squares (OLS) (See Appendices, Table 6.B.2), the seemingly unrelated regression 
estimator (SURE) (See Appendices, Table 6.B.3) and ultimately our preferred regression: the 2SLS 
regression. In that table, we also compare the 2SLS estimates with those based on a biased Ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimator and the seemingly unrelated regression estimator (SURE), to choose for 
the most robust results.  
 
 Comparing the results, 𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 is found to be significant in determining the number of in-depth 
mergers and cartel cases using the OLS estimations and only in-depth mergers under the SURE 
estimations with the IV. 𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡, 𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 and 𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑡−3 are significant in determining only 
the number of cartels cases in the 2SLS but not in the OLS estimation. The SURE estimations however 
reveal that while 𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 positively impacts on cartels cases, 𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑡−2 negatively determines 
the number of monopoly abuse cases.  Moreover, the proportion of budget allocated in the previous 
period is found to be significant in determining the level of cartel cases under the OLS and SURE 
estimations but not when using the 2SLS. On the other hand, the proportion of budget allocated to 
cartels is found to be significant to impact on the level of in-depth mergers with the IV and SURE 
estimations but not when using the OLS. Comparing the results, a number of inconsistencies and 
biasness is observed when using the OLS estimation. Moreover, given the budget endogeneity, it is 
found that the 2SLS provides the most robust results. Hence, the preferred regression is the 2SLS 
regression. 
 
In this section, only the main results, which are drawn from the 2SLS regression are therefore 
discussed. The equations in the statistical model are observed to ‘fit’ the data well with uncentered80 
                                                          
80 When a model does not have a constant, 𝑅2 can take negative values when the model because the 2SLS 
suppress the printing of an 𝑅2. The latter consequently has little meaning in this case.  In such situations, the 
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𝑅2 ranging between 0.74 and 0.81. Budget is found to be indeed a very important element in the 
decision making of CA. The results reveal that holding the budget allocation decision constant, budget 
is positively significant in influencing the number of cartels, but not monopoly abuse and merger 
investigations. In the short run, one percentage increase in the level of budget is likely to cause CA to 
increase detection of cartel cases by 2.14%. Interestingly, it is found that an increase budget allocated 
in the previous period causes the number of cartels detected to decrease. This may indicate the 
presence of deterrence effects. As CAs experiences an increase in their level of budget, they increase 
detection of cartel cases. Detection can generate deterrence, and this consequently causes the 
number of detections to fall, due to a drop in that type of anti-competitive behaviour by firms. In the 
long term, holding budget allocation decision constant, a 1% in increase in allocated budget is likely to 
increase detection of cartels by 0.39% at 10% level. 
 
On the other hand, the level of budget is not found to have significant effects on the monopoly abuse 
and in-depth merger cases, neither in the short nor the long term. The results seem to provide 
evidence that an increase in the level of budget is not likely to spread equally among the 
anticompetitive conducts (Conjecture 2). 
 
While the coefficients of 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙, 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 and 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ do not individually 
impact on the number of cartels detected, 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 and 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ are found to be 
jointly significant. A one per cent increase in the share of budget allocated to cartels associated with a 
corresponding drop in the residual category, is likely to have a negative long run effect on cartels by 
2.87% (conjecture 1). Moreover, a 1% increase in the budget allocated to mergers following a 1% drop 
in the budget allocated to cartels, is likely to cause cartel detection to fall by 1.20%. On the other hand, 
overtime cartel detection is likely to fall by 1.13% following a 1% increase in the budget allocated to 
mergers and a 1% drop in the budget allocated to monopoly abuse. These indicate that in the long run, 
there may be a degree of substitutability between cartels and in-depth merger cases which is in line 
with Conjecture 3.  
 
Incidentally, although the number of monopoly abuse cases are expected to be influenced by the 
individual proportion of budget allocated to abuse cases in the previous two periods, the effect of 
budget allocated to abuses is found to be neither individually nor jointly significant. The results 
however show that in the long run a one per cent increase in the budget allocated to cartels is likely 
to cause a fall in monopoly abuse cases by 7.61%.  This confirms Conjecture 1, the delayed impact of 
                                                          
uncentered 𝑅2 is used such that the values of dependent variable are not centered (mean that has been removed 
from the series) around the mean. 
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budget allocation decisions on the number of abuse cases as well as the substitutability that may exist 
between the cartels and monopoly abuse cases (Conjecture 4).  
 
Furthermore, in the short run, the proportion of budget allocated to cartels is found to be negatively 
related to in-depth mergers. This result further confirms Conjecture 3 such that if a CA increases its 
budget their budget allocated to cartels, less resources will be available to finance in-depth mergers in 
the same year, hence reducing the number of in-depth merger cases in the short term. However, in 
the long-run, only the proportion of budget allocated to monopoly abuses and in-depth mergers are 
found to be jointly significant in determining the number of in-depth mergers. Holding the allocated 
budget constant, a 1% increase in the proportion of budget allocated to mergers, following a 1% drop 
in the budget allocated to monopoly abuse cases is likely to cause in-depth mergers to fall by 2.90% in 
the long term. The results also show that following a 1% increase in the proportion of budget allocated 
to monopoly abuse cases and a fall in the proportion of budget allocated to mergers, in-depth merger 
investigations is likely to fall by 12.49% overtime. On the other hand, a 1% increase in budget allocated 
to merger cases and a 1% drop in the budget allocated to cartel cases is likely to cause in-depth merger 
investigations to increase by 0.40%. A 1% increase in budget allocated to monopoly abuse cases and a 
1% drop in the budget allocated to cartel cases is likely to cause in-depth merger investigations to fall 
by 9.19%. 
 
These findings therefore indicate that there may be a substitution between resources allocated to 
monopoly abuse cases and mergers cases to be investigated by the CAs in the long run. For instance, 
if a CA decides to increase the budget allocated to in-depth merger cases, this is also likely to impact 
on their efficiency in deterring anti-competitive mergers hence reducing the number of in-depth 
mergers. However, in respect to Conjecture 3, the proportion of budget allocated to cartel cases is not 
found to impact on the number of mergers investigated in the long -run. These results consequently 
emerge to an interesting finding of a causal relationship that may exist between in-depth merger and 
cartel cases in the long-run. It is such that assuming allocated budget to be constant, if a CA decides to 
increase the budget allocated to mergers, it is likely to inversely affect the convicted cartels. On the 
other hand, an increase in the proportion of budget to be allocated to cartels increases, it is not likely 
to impact on the investigated mergers. 
 
The results further reveal that there may be a degree of substitution between monopoly abuse cases 
convicted and number of cartels detected in the long run. As CAs increase their proportion of budget 
allocated to cartels, the number of monopoly abuse falls when the allocated budget is held constant. 
This may be explained by two reasons. The first one is the fact that as CAs increase their proportion of 
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budget allocated to cartels, they detect more cartels, which may also have a deterrent effect on firms 
engaged in monopoly abuses, causing the monopoly abuse cases to fall. Another reason is that holding 
the level of budget fixed, when CAs increase the share of budget allocated to cartels, less budget 
becomes available to be spent on other competition cases, which include monopoly abuse cases, 
hence causing the latter to fall. 
Table 6.5: Estimation results based on 2SLS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 𝒍𝒏#𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒍 𝒍𝒏#𝒂𝒃𝒖𝒔𝒆 𝒍𝒏#𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒉 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 2.137** 1.887 0.016 
 (1.052) (1.533) (1.374) 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 -1.515* -1.511 0.013 
 (0.897) (1.191) (1.147) 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑡−2 0.063 -0.016 0.232 
 (0.206) (0.389) (0.276) 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑡−3 -0.293** -0.085 -0.224 
 (0.147) (0.314) (0.345) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 -6.901 -9.112 -14.63** 
 (4.479) (7.492) (6.239) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑡−1 1.420 1.822 8.846* 
 (4.120) (6.521) (5.018) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑡−2 -0.694 2.677 -0.267 
 (2.079) (2.210) (2.748) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑡−3 3.303 -3.059 2.759 
 (2.434) (3.718) (4.447) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒  -3.508 -2.247 0.190 
 (5.248) (5.236) (7.184) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑡−1 3.621 0.575 -2.152 
 (4.342) (4.363) (5.744) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑡−2 3.301 4.847* -0.503 
 (2.477) (2.773) (2.770) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑡−3 -3.479 1.912 -10.02* 
 (2.247) (3.504) (5.191) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 -0.402 -0.717 -6.691 
 (2.358) (4.153) (4.496) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑡−1 -3.623 0.421 5.975* 
 (2.293) (3.509) (3.616) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑡−2 2.700 3.267 -1.123 
 (1.786) (2.351) (2.467) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑡−3 0.130 -0.673 -1.057 
 (0.757) (0.799) (0.652) 
Test of hypotheses 
F-stat 𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 5.05*** 2.87*** 3.67*** 
F-stat 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 8.22*** 7.63*** 7..80*** 
F-stat 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 14.33*** 37.93*** 36.32*** 
F-stat 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 78.63*** 33.12*** 33.60*** 
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Under idendification chi2- stat: Kleibergen-Paap rk  14.561 16.014 15.555 
Chi-sq(11) P-val 0.204 0.141 0.159 
Weak identification Wald F stat: : Cragg-Donald 0.959 1.202 1.213 
Kleibergen-Paap rk  1.212 1.011 1.017 
Hansen J statistic  8.913 8.715 9.868 
Chi-sq(10) P-val 0.540 0.559 0.452 
Uncentered R-squared 0.811 0.746 0.750 
Joint significance: 𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 chi2 6.38* 2.01 0.96 
                                𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 chi2 8.39* 10.14** 6.3 
                                𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 chi2 6.6 5.9 25.51*** 
                                𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ chi2 13.31*** 6.1 11.62** 
Observations 178 177 178 
Note: Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Among the control variables, notified mergers are found to be significant in positively determining the 
cartels and in-depth merger cases. Age is also found to have an influence on the cartel and in-depth 
merger cases but not on monopoly abuse cases. Age however is found to have different impacts on 
the latter, with a U-shape effect on the cartel cases and an inverse U-shape effect on merger cases. 
Moreover, the level of fines and the maximum years of imprisonment are found to negatively impact 
on the number of cartels. None of the control variables are however found to affect the number of 
monopoly abuse cases. 
 
The overall assessment of results reinforces the importance of budget and allocation of budget in 
determining the level of activity of CAs. They are to some extent in line with the four conjectures put 
forward for the analysis. Budget allocation decisions are found to more likely have long term rather 
than short-term effects. The fall in the number CA’s activity should however be interpreted with 
cautiousness, as it can be a result of a fall in detection due to lack of resources or indicate the success 
of the CAs in deterring anti-competitive conducts. While our simple empirical model certainly has its 
limitations and casts aside many important questions, it has offered a meaningful frame for further 
empirical studies. 
 
6.7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter aimed at empirically testing the interaction that may exist between mergers, cartels and 
abuses given a budget and competition authorities’ budget allocation decisions. To deal with the 
endogeneity of budget and budget allocation, an IV econometric methodology is applied using 
instruments obtained from behaviour of other institutions in similar groups.  
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Focusing the analysis on the variables of interest i.e. budget and the budget allocation decisions of 
CAs, I find that they play an important role in determining the level of cartel, monopoly abuse and 
merger activities of a CA. Only budget allocation to cartels seems to have a contemporaneous impact 
on in-depth merger investigations; allocation decisions appear to take more time before impacting of 
cartels and monopoly abuse cases. A causal relationship is also identified to exist between merger 
investigations and convicted cartels cases. It is found that while the decision to allocate more budget 
to merger investigations is likely to reduce the cartel activity of a CA, an increase in budget allocated 
to cartel cases has no effect on the level of investigated mergers. Moreover, a degree of substitutability 
is also observed between cartels and monopoly abuse cases. There is also evidence that an increase in 
budget allocated is not likely to spread its effect equally among the anticompetitive conducts. 
 
While the findings clearly indicate that there exists interactions (although at different intensities) 
between allocated budget, budget allocation decisions and the different type of anti-competitive 
conducts, it is however important that the results are interpreted with caution. A fall in the number of 
cartel, monopoly abuse or in-depth merger cases may not necessarily imply that the CAs is not doing 
well in detection. It may also be explained by the presence of the effects of deterrence on the activity 
of the CAs, which would also mean that CAs are successful. 
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Appendices 
 
6.A List of acronyms 
Table 6.A.6: List of acronyms 
Countries Abbreviation Countries Abbreviation Countries Abbreviation 
Australia Aus Germany Ger New Zealand Nze 
Austria Austria Greece Gre Norway Nor 
Belgium Bel Hungary Hun Pakistan Pak 
Brazil Bra Ireland Ire Poland Pol 
Canada Can Israel Isr Portugal Por 
Chile Chi Italy Ita S Africa Saf 
Czech  Cze Japan Jap Spain Spa 
Denmark Den Korea Kor Sweden Swe 
EU EU Lithuania Lit Switzerland Swi 
Finland Fin Mexico Mex 
United 
Kingdom UK 
France Fra Netherlands Net United States US 
 
 
6.B Regression results  
 
a. Two stage least square (2SLS) results 
Table 6.B.1: 2SLS results 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 𝒍𝒏#𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒍 𝒍𝒏#𝒂𝒃𝒖𝒔𝒆 𝒍𝒏#𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒉 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 2.137** 1.887 0.016 
 (1.052) (1.533) (1.374) 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 -1.515* -1.511 0.013 
 (0.897) (1.191) (1.147) 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑡−2 0.063 -0.016 0.232 
 (0.206) (0.389) (0.276) 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑡−3 -0.293** -0.0850 -0.224 
 (0.147) (0.314) (0.345) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 -6.901 -9.112 -14.63** 
 (4.479) (7.492) (6.239) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑡−1 1.420 1.822 8.846* 
 (4.120) (6.521) (5.018) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑡−2 -0.694 2.677 -0.267 
 (2.079) (2.210) (2.748) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑡−3 3.303 -3.059 2.759 
 (2.434) (3.718) (4.447) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒  -3.508 -2.247 0.190 
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 (5.248) (5.236) (7.184) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑡−1 3.621 0.575 -2.152 
 (4.342) (4.363) (5.744) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑡−2 3.301 4.847* -0.503 
 (2.477) (2.773) (2.770) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑡−3 -3.479 1.912 -10.02* 
 (2.247) (3.504) (5.191) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ -0.402 -0.717 -6.691 
 (2.358) (4.153) (4.496) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑡−1 -3.623 0.421 5.975* 
 (2.293) (3.509) (3.616) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑡−2 2.700 3.267 -1.123 
 (1.786) (2.351) (2.467) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑡−3 0.130 -0.673 -1.057 
 (0.757) (0.799) (0.652) 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.063*** -0.015 0.040* 
 (0.020) (0.035) (0.021) 
𝑎𝑔𝑒2 0.001*** 0.000 -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 -   
    
𝑙𝑛#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 0.221* 0.079 0.403*** 
 (0.113) (0.126) (0.067) 
𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒 -0.103   
 (0.103)   
𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠 -1.289*   
 (0.735)   
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛 -0.097***   
 (0.030)   
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 -0.012 -0.001 0.022 
 (0.051) (0.066) (0.056) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 2.481 2.096 3.804 
 (2.077) (2.377) (2.602) 
Observations 178 185 186 
R-squared 0.048 0.014 0.025 
Note: Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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b. OLS Results  
Table 6.B.2: OLS results 
VARIABLES 𝒍𝒏#𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒍 𝒍𝒏#𝒂𝒃𝒖𝒔𝒆 𝒍𝒏#𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒉 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 0.430* 0.059 0.677** 
 (0.252) (0.374) (0.299) 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 -0.101 -0.052 -0.460 
 (0.320) (0.480) (0.384) 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑡−2 0.188 0.162 0.165 
 (0.269) (0.413) (0.331) 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑡−3 -0.338 0.023 -0.269 
 (0.212) (0.322) (0.258) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 -0.272 -3.501* -1.157 
 (1.174) (1.785) (1.431) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑡−1 -2.656* -1.484 -1.377 
 (1.575) (2.402) (1.924) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑡−2 -1.572 1.075 0.963 
 (1.900) (2.923) (2.342) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑡−3 3.283 -3.559 4.206 
 (2.369) (3.611) (2.894) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒  -0.263 2.693 -2.386 
 (1.308) (1.978) (1.583) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑡−1 2.439 -1.426 2.353 
 (1.779) (2.685) (2.152) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑡−2 1.358 2.933 -2.128 
 (2.048) (3.150) (2.452) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑡−3 -4.992** 0.828  -10.700*** 
 (2.504) (3.833) (3.070) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ -0.536 0.860 0.051 
 (1.110) (1.674) (1.340) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑡−1 -2.816** 0.544 0.982 
 (1.272) (1.934) (1.550) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑡−2 0.274 0.549 -0.695 
 (1.087) (1.671) (1.337) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑡−3 0.730 -0.191 -1.282 
 (0.733) (1.129) (0.902) 
𝑎𝑔𝑒  -0.052*** -0.007 0.043*** 
 (0.014) (0.021) (0.017) 
𝑎𝑔𝑒2 0.001*** 0.000  -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 -   
    
𝑙𝑛#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 0.241*** 0.100 0.410*** 
 (0.063) (0.093) (0.074) 
(continued) 
 
138 
 
Table 6.B.2: OLS results (continued) 
VARIABLES 𝒍𝒏#𝒄𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒆𝒍 𝒍𝒏#𝒂𝒃𝒖𝒔𝒆 𝒍𝒏#𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒉 
𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒 0.029   
 (0.062)   
𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠 -0.574   
 (0.474)   
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛                 -0.075***  
 (0.019)   
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 2.622** 2.276 1.734 
 (1.029) -1.566 -1.253 
Observations 179 186 187 
R-squared 0.414 0.218 0.38 
Adjusted R-squared 0.331 0.129 0.309 
F-test 5.010 2.440 5.380 
Prob>F 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Note: Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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c. SURE results  
Table 6.B.3: SURE results 
  NO IV IV  
VARIABLES 𝑙𝑛#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 𝑙𝑛#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑙𝑛#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 𝑙𝑛#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 𝑙𝑛#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑙𝑛#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 
  (ii) (iii) (ii) (iii) (ii) (iii) (ii) (iii) (ii) (iii) (ii) (iii) 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 -0.188 0.015 0.264 0.237 0.595*** 0.855*** 0.385 -0.095 -0.658 -0.993 0.492 1.128* 
 (0.168) (0.172) (0.191) (0.211) (0.176) (0.197) (0.636) (0.616) (0.615) (0.636) (0.560) (0.605) 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 -0.231 -0.304 -0.435** -0.531** -0.208 -0.385* 1.191** 0.968* -0.515 -0.711 -0.103 -0.527 
 (0.186) (0.195) (0.218) (0.243) (0.200) (0.227) (0.549) (0.543) (0.669) (0.686) (0.609) (0.652) 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑡−2 0.460** 0.346* -0.246 -0.277 0.028 0.308 0.081 -0.160 -1.348* -1.345* -0.523 -0.221 
 (0.189) (0.196) (0.220) (0.244) (0.202) (0.229) (0.637) (0.594) (0.775) (0.759) (0.705) (0.722) 
𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑡−3 0.109 0.033 -0.182 -0.302 0.002 0.162 1.054* 0.405 0.666 1.028 -0.285 -0.032 
 (0.157) (0.152) (0.181) (0.189) (0.167) (0.177) (0.579) (0.559) (0.704) (0.721) (0.641) (0.685) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 0.128  -0.461  0.685  -0.205  -0.640  0.220 
  (0.729)  (0.905)  (0.847)  (0.737)  (0.953)  (0.906) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑡−1 -2.282**  -1.702  -1.550  -1.958**  -1.172  -0.677 
  (0.891)  (1.098)  (1.028)  (0.875)  (1.122)  (1.066) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑡−2 -0.274  2.314*  2.518**  -1.042  1.484  2.533** 
  (1.073)  (1.322)  (1.238)  (1.038)  (1.343)  (1.277) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑡−3 1.633  -1.960  -0.545  1.627  -2.328  -0.523 
  (1.487)  (1.846)  (1.729)  (1.495)  (1.917)  (1.822) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒  -0.180  1.301  -2.677***  -0.353  1.048  -1.809* 
  (0.828)  (1.029)  (0.964)  (0.822)  (1.052)  (1.000) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑡−1 0.508  -1.837  -0.190  -0.301  -2.213*  0.058 
  (1.095)  (1.341)  (1.255)  (1.063)  (1.341)  (1.275) 
(continued) 
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Table 6.B.3: SURE results (continued) 
  NO IV IV  
VARIABLES 𝑙𝑛#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 𝑙𝑛#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑙𝑛#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 𝑙𝑛#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 𝑙𝑛#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑙𝑛#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 
  (ii) (iii) (ii) (iii) (ii) (iii) (ii) (iii) (ii) (iii) (ii) (iii) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑡−2 2.538*  2.796  -1.961  2.518*  2.019  -1.526 
  (1.404)  (1.728)  (1.618)  (1.371)  (1.736)  (1.651) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑡−3 -0.531  1.123  -1.269  -0.672  1.682  -1.819 
  (1.605)  (1.981)  (1.855)  (1.600)  (2.054)  (1.952) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ -0.223  0.470  0.717  -0.754  0.377  1.412 
  (0.753)  (0.930)  (0.871)  (0.780)  (1.009)  (0.959) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑡−1 -2.695***  -0.169  -1.318  -2.093**  -0.299  -0.176 
  (0.946)  (1.167)  (1.093)  (0.888)  (1.142)  (1.085) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑡−2 1.618**  1.292  0.642  1.194*  0.728  0.242 
  (0.692)  (0.863)  (0.808)  (0.671)  (0.869)  (0.826) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑡−3 1.046**  -0.840  -0.293  1.086**  -0.693  -0.056 
  (0.440)  (0.546)  (0.511)  (0.450)  (0.578)  (0.550) 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.148* -0.125 -0.205** -0.138 -0.029 -0.103 -0.309*** -0.205** -0.154 -0.100 0.007 -0.087 
 (0.087) (0.084) (0.099) (0.103) (0.091) (0.097) (0.095) (0.091) (0.113) (0.116) (0.103) (0.110) 
𝑎𝑔𝑒2 0.001** 0.001** 0.001* 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 - -     0.622 3.939     
       (0.499) (3.020)     
𝑙𝑛#𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟 0.054 0.071 0.043 0.085 -0.011 -0.067 0.120 0.060 -0.045 -0.027 0.032 0.015 
 (0.074) (0.073) (0.084) (0.089) (0.078) (0.084) (0.085) (0.082) (0.098) (0.099) (0.090) (0.095) 
𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒 0.022 0.011     -0.022 0.011     
 (0.051) (0.051)     (0.059) (0.061)     
(Continued) 
Table 6.B.3: SURE results (continued) 
  NO IV IV  
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VARIABLES 𝑙𝑛#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 𝑙𝑛#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑙𝑛#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 𝑙𝑛#𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑙 𝑙𝑛#𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑙𝑛#𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 
  (ii) (iii) (ii) (iii) (ii) (iii) (ii) (iii) (ii) (iii) (ii) (iii) 
𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠 0.037 0.038     -0.240 0.056     
 (0.346) (0.318)     (0.323) (0.330)     
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛 0.005 -0.097     0.005 -0.095     
 (0.072) (0.072)     (0.078) (0.075)     
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 4.230 4.408* 10.46*** 8.896*** 3.157 4.860* -0.289 0.000 13.410*** 12.680*** 4.718 5.595* 
 (2.767) (2.623) (2.953) (3.025) (2.715) (2.833) (3.157) (0.000) (3.543) (3.577) (3.224) (-3.400) 
Observations 182 178 182 178 182 178 187 177 187 177 187 177 
R-squared 0.760 0.812 0.823 0.844 0.817 0.831 0.752 0.814 0.801 0.834 0.802 0.815 
RMSE 0.497 0.443 0.584 0.553 0.537 0.518 0.506 0.442 0.622 0.575 0.566 0.546 
Chi2-test 576.82 768.66 846.97 962.87 809.78 874.6 566.49 574.33 752.21 891.89 757.57 781.38 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
The five papers included in this thesis have assessed the performance of a CA, determined the different 
factors that can restrict the effectiveness of a competition enforcement regime and the interaction 
between the different types of anti-competitive cases based on budget allocation decisions in 35 countries 
for period between 2006 and 2014.  
 
The five papers differ from each other in the specific questions asked, in the theoretical and empirical 
methodologies. The compilation of the papers in this thesis provides a significant contribution to the 
existing economics literature, not only in terms of the dataset used, but also in terms of the extension of 
existing theories and the level of nature of the analysis conducted.  
 
Chapter 2 has provided an overview of the basic features of the data used in the thesis and background 
information on the CAs found in our database. It has enabled us to better understand the findings of the 
chapters.  
 
Chapter 3 has studied the different national and institutional features that could impact on the reputation 
of a CA. We argue that the ‘GCR star rating’ measure of reputation to be highly correlated with genuine 
performance. The national governance culture and common law legal systems are found to play a 
significant role in determining the reputation of a CA. We also observe that ‘economies of scale’ and 
(endogenous) budget are important positive factors. 
 
In Chapter 4, a model has been theoretically developed to assess the success of CAs in detection and 
deterrence of cartelised behaviour. The model is then used in deriving the functional form of the age 
profile for the number of cartels convicted over time. It is interpreted in terms of both its efficiency in 
detection and success in deterrence. We find that the age profile of a CA’s convicted cartels depends on 
the magnitude of the detection efficiency of the CA and the deterrence effects of competition law and 
policy. Detection and deterrence are found to have opposite effects on the age profile of cartels convicted 
of a CA. The shape of the age profile then depends on the magnitude (outweighing effects) of both 
detection and deterrence.  
 
Chapter 5 has empirically tested the theory put forward in Chapter 4. I find that age of the cartel law does 
have an impact on the number of cartels convicted over time and tends to decrease and flatten over time. 
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This shows evidence of increasing deterrence as a consequence of the increased efficiency of detection 
and the success of the CAs in deterring cartels. Further empirical findings show that the importance of 
previous budget allocated is important, leniency, type of law, institution design and fines and 
imprisonment in the detecting and deterring cartels. 
 
Chapter 6 empirically looked at how the budget allocation decisions impact on the number and types of 
competition cases that the CA can look into. The empirical analysis is conducted based the above 
mentioned panel dataset. I apply an IV econometric methodology that deals with the endogeneity of 
budget allocation problem that may arise. The system models number of cartels detected (cartels), abuse 
of dominant position cases (abuses) and in-depth merger investigations (mergers) as endogenous. The 
endogeneity of the budget variables is corrected by using instruments obtained from behaviour of other 
institutions in similar groups. It consequently enables the better understanding of the behaviour and the 
strategies by CAs and firms. It is found that while allocation decisions tend to take more time before 
impacting on cartel and monopoly abuse cases, only budget allocation to cartels seems to have a 
contemporaneous impact on in-depth merger investigations. I also find evidence of causality between 
merger investigations and convicted cartels cases as well as a degree of substitutability between cartels 
and monopoly abuse cases.  
 
Directions for future research  
In chapter 3, the model put forward focused mostly on the national characteristics and the institutional 
design when catering for the endogeneity of budget. However, a full structural equation grounded in the 
political economy of budget setting may be specified. The study can also be extended by looking at the 
independence of the CA.   
 
The model developed in chapter 4 assumed that (i) budget is exogenous and is allocated by government, 
(ii) firms and the CA are risk neutral agents and that (iii) the CA does not make type I and type II errors, so 
as to keep the model simple. These might be strong assumptions to make in reality and the model could 
therefore be extended by relaxing such assumptions. For example, the endogeneity of the budget could 
be looked into such that it is also a function of performance i.e., the optimum probability that a cartel is 
convicted. It can further be assumed that firms are risk-averse or that there is a possibility that the CA is 
making errors. Moreover, a more ambitious research will be to incorporate the interaction between 
mergers investigated and monopoly abuse cases detected into the model. It will be interesting to see how 
the CA takes cartels, monopoly abuse cases and mergers cases into account when setting up their 
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threshold. As for chapter 5, extension of the time dimensions might have given more robust results. By 
lagging budget to cater for the endogeneity of budget, observations were lost.  
 
Chapter 6 has been focusing mostly on the endogeneity of budget and the allocation of budget and the 
construction of instruments. I looked at a system of equations where cartels, monopoly abuse and merger 
cases are the endogenous variables. In this chapter, since the lag budget variables and the allocation 
decisions by a CA are used to study their contemporaneous impact, considerable number of observations 
are lost. It will therefore be interesting to extend the time period to also obtain more robust results. I also 
attempted to apply the three-stage least squares. However, this method was dropped due to the difficulty 
of obtaining a suitable instrument for each equation in our model. It would therefore be challenging to 
model a system of equations to study the interdependence between the three types of anti-competitive 
behaviour. As a topic for further research, the analysis could be conducted as a 3-equation VAR model 
with an accompanying Granger causality test. 
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